Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander by Finlayson, Neil
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
 
 
Neil Finlayson 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Graduate Program in English 
York University 
Toronto, Ontario 
 
 
 
May 2019 
 
 
 
ÓNeil Finlayson, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation contextualizes and accounts for the proliferation of representations of wander 
that permeate British Romanticism.  The prominence of wander in this writing is an articulation 
of the embodiment of a new temporal mode, namely the quantified temporality of modernity.  
The study begins by identifying two main versions of Romantic wander: one that is free and 
naturalized, and one that is monotonous and dispossessing.  The duality of wander maps onto 
two distinct aspects of clock time; a temporality that becomes increasingly entrenched, socially, 
culturally, and economically, over the course of the eighteenth-century.  Through reading four 
explicit representations of Romantic wander, the dissertation argues that clock time’s open 
permissiveness is performed in Romanticism as a rhetoric of free wander, while clock time’s 
structured monotony is demonstrated by the experience of displaced and alienated wander.  
William Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814) rhetorically positions free wander as an antidote to 
the industrialization and solipsism of modernity that is encroaching upon the poem’s pastoral 
space; however, the rhetoric of wander in the text becomes ideological, in its naturalization of 
an economical temporal expenditure.  Frances Burney’s The Wanderer (1814) demonstrates 
how the rhetoric of free wander is a privileged fiction, and shows how wander, when 
experienced by a nameless, connectionless young woman, is not only alienating, but dangerous.  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798, 1817) draws a link between 
the dispossessed wander of the Mariner and the newly mechanized, rationalized, and 
instrumental world he uncovers inadvertently on his voyage—the wandering Mariner becomes 
the first itinerant, individuated, and time-bound subject of modernity.  Finally, Charles Robert 
Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820) functions as a cautionary tale of the alienation that 
accompanies modern subjectivity and its quantified temporality.  Ultimately, wander functions 
as a kind of warning, as Romanticism paces the uncertain ground of modernity.  The duality of 
wander makes intelligible the duality of the temporality of modernity—a time that is alternately 
the rhetorical buttressing of class and gender privilege, as well as a means of discipline and a 
form of dispossession. 
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Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
Chapter One: 
 
Introduction: Wandering on the Clock 
 
 There are two distinct versions of wander in Romanticism.  Most immediately, 
Romantic wander signifies a free and unstructured movement that fosters imaginative 
growth and development.  Wordsworth begins The Prelude by harnessing exactly this 
sense of wander when he states, “I look about, and should the guide I chuse / Be 
nothing better than a wandering cloud / I cannot miss my way” (1: 16-18).  Coleridge 
likewise deploys this version of wander in “Frost at Midnight,” as he imagines, “thou, my 
babe! shalt wander like a breeze / By lakes and sandy shores” (54-55).  This iteration of 
wander is echoed throughout Romanticism, from Mary Robinson’s opening call of “Spirit 
Divine! with thee I’ll wander!” in “To the Poet Coleridge,” to Keats’ “Ode to Psyche,” 
which opens, “I wander’d in a forest thoughtlessly” (2-3; 7).  Despite this, wander in 
Romanticism is by no means an exclusively positive and freeing movement.  Romantic 
wander is equally a forced, displaced, and alienating experience.  As Susan Wolfson 
observes, Romanticism continuously represents “encounters with outcasts of all kinds—
refugees, the poor, abandoned and fallen women, discharged soldiers, sailors, vagrants, 
peasants, north-country shepherds and smallholders, abject slaves” (8).  This iteration of 
Romantic wander—evident in Blake’s opening lines of “London,” “I wander thro’ each 
charter’d street / Near where the charter’d Thames does flow. / And mark in every face I 
meet / Marks of weakness, marks of woe”—is far afield from a wander regarded as the 
very summit of an imaginative and integrative freedom (1-4).  Wander in Romanticism is 
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both freedom and alienation; both individual possibility and abjection; both the trope of 
the Romantic bard and the trope of the Wandering Jew.  To wander in Romanticism is to 
be free and unchecked—to be devoid of social parameters, and to be capable of 
envisioning and imagining new modes of being; however, to wander in Romanticism is 
also to be atomized and abject, to be uprooted and listless—to be over-determined.   
I argue that the duality of Romantic wander, as both a movement of liberation 
and alienation, reflects the expansion and naturalization of the temporality of clock time 
that occurs over the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.  Wander in 
Romanticism—through both its instantiations—encodes the ways in which clock time 
begins to radically restructure experience.  In “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial 
Capitalism,” E.P. Thompson calls attention to the significant shift in temporal 
consciousness ushered in by the sociopolitical promotion of clock time over the course 
of the eighteenth-century.  Thompson argues that the onset of industrialization 
oversees the imposition of “a new time-discipline,” which calcifies into a “propaganda of 
time-thrift” “directed at the working people” (90).  Thompson writes, “a general 
diffusion of clocks and watches [occurs] (as one would expect) at the exact moment 
when the industrial revolution demanded a greater synchronization of labour” (69).  The 
expansion and enfranchisement of clock time carries out what Cesare Cassarino 
identifies as the “objectification” of time (226).  Clock time disentangles temporality 
from traditional, cultural and economic practices, and, in so doing, transforms time into 
an objective and open horizon of being, in and of itself.  However, this newly objectified 
time is established and structured outside of individual ontology, and becomes an 
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external site of temporal estrangement.  Clock time appears to give time by rendering it 
an open and available object, but it does so by way of wrenching time free from bodies 
that are already temporal (226).  “This is the historical conjuncture,” Cassarino writes, 
“when the double-edged liberation of productive forces from the various yokes of 
premodern social arrangements increasingly realizes the vital potentials latent in time    
. . . as well as increasingly turns time into dead and deadening time” (226).  The doubled 
representation of wander in Romanticism—wander as free and wander as “dead and 
deadening”—encodes and figures the experience of temporality within the new and 
equally doubled temporal mode of clock time.   
The duality of Romantic wander and its reflection of the duality of clock time, 
however, can be understood further as being comprised of both a rhetoric of wander 
and an experience of wander.  The positive version of wander, as a free, natural, and 
developmental movement, constitutes a rhetorical fashioning of wander; one that 
makes an objective, quantified configuration of time acceptable and desirable.  The 
negative version of wander, as an uprooted, compulsory, and alienated movement, 
represents the more authentic and genuine experience of time as homogenous, 
repetitive, and ceaselessly sequential.  Accordingly, the positive rhetoric of wander is 
not a means of resistance or opposition to clock time, as one might imagine, but rather 
a rhetorical, if not an ideological, means of making clock time amenable as a new mode 
of organizing and articulating subjectivity.  The positive and rhetorical iteration of 
wander renders palpable and acceptable the structuring of clock time, and assists in its 
naturalization and domestication.  The negative experience of wander, on the other 
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hand, actively diagnoses the temporal alienation and dispossession of clock time.  As I 
will argue, the positive rhetoric of wander proves to be accessible only to those who 
enjoy a marked class and gender privilege.  The negative experience of romantic 
wander, however, lays bare the temporal alienation and dispossession of clock time 
experienced more broadly.  
Embedded in the very title of what is arguably Wordsworth’s most anthologized 
poem, “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud,” the word wander might metonymically stand for 
Romanticism itself.  Indeed, several of Wordsworth’s canonized texts present wander of 
one form or another, from The Prelude, to “The Female Vagrant,” to “The Idiot Boy,” to 
“Resolution and Independence.”  Wander, in both its positive, rhetorical form, and in its 
negative, experiential form, is also prominent in the writing of Coleridge.  While “This 
Lime-tree Bower My Prison” uses the word wander to convey an imagined and 
productive natural movement, The Wanderings of Cain depicts wander as a compulsory 
and alienated act.  Wander, in both senses, is integral to numerous other texts that 
might well stand as canonical statements of Romanticism.  Percy Shelley’s “Alastor,” 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, and Byron’s Don Juan, which ironically “Forbids all 
wandering as the worst of sinning,” each prominently feature wandering (1: 52).  
Romanticism also offers several presentations of the dispossessed Wandering Jew, from 
Mathew Lewis’ The Monk, to Percy Shelley’s first and last major poems, Queen Mab and 
Hellas.  Indeed, Gothic texts are often powered by the wanderings of their heroine.  The 
opening chapter of Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udulpho presents the narrator’s 
observation that “M. St. Aubert loved to wander, with his wife and daughter, on the 
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margin of the Garonne,” a movement Emily St. Aubert continues throughout the novel 
(1).   
 The proliferation of wander in Romanticism is rooted in the Romantic 
reclamation of the mode of romance.  Susan Wolfson argues that “the rapid changes, 
new demands, and confusions of the age often pressed writers into imagining worlds 
elsewhere, the impulse of the mode from which the ‘Romantic’ era gets its name: the 
‘Romance’” (6).  Wolfson observes how the revival of the quest motif in Scott, Byron, 
and others, the resurgence of antique settings, plots, and spellings, from the “Ancyent 
Marinere” to many of Keats’ poems, and the oft-used subtitle of “a romance” appended 
to many of the Gothic texts published in the period, all underscore Romanticism’s 
interest in the mode of romance (6).  Indeed, both Harold Bloom and Northrop Frye call 
attention to the ways in which the mode of romance underwrites and animates 
Romanticism.  Bloom sees the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries as, “the 
period during which romance as a genre, however displaced, became again the 
dominant form” (3).  Similarly, Frye states that the “romance form revives” in 
Romanticism “so significantly as to give its name to the whole movement” (2, 37).  
However, as Bloom and Frye observe, Romanticism’s adaptation of romance enacts a 
pivotal transformation from the external to the internal, from a quest without to a quest 
within.  “The movement of quest-romance, before its internalization by the High 
Romantics,” Bloom writes, “was from nature to redeemed nature, the sanction of 
redemption being the gift of some external spiritual authority, sometimes magical” (5-
6).  Romanticism takes the external, social quest, and transfers it into an internal and 
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individual quest of imaginative and creative freedom.  “In Romanticism,” Frye writes, 
“the poet himself is the hero of the quest . . . he turns away to seek a nature who 
reveals herself only to the individual” (37).  The artist becomes the quester in Romantic 
romance, where “the most comprehensive and central of all Romantic themes, then, is a 
romance with the poet for hero” (37).  Bloom attests to this, by claiming that 
Romanticism’s interest in romance is “more than a revival, it is an internalization of 
romance, particularly of the quest variety, an internalization made for more than 
therapeutic purposes, because made in the name of humanizing hope that approaches 
apocalyptic intensity” (5).  The Romantic poet, Bloom argues, “takes the patterns of 
quest-romance and transposes them into his own imaginative life, so that the entire 
rhythm of the quest is heard again in the movement of the poet himself from poem to 
poem” (5).   
 The internalization of romance, where the quest becomes an act of artistic self-
redemption, however, is a double-edged sword.  The self-wandering of the internal 
Romantic quester runs the risk of derailing into an endless solipsism, self-consciousness, 
and alienation.  Frye identifies this danger in observing how figures of Romantic tragedy 
are characterized by their displaced wander.  “The exile or wanderer,” in Romanticism, 
“is usually isolated by an introverted quality of mind.  Byron’s Childe Harold, the Ancient 
Mariner, and Shelley’s Alastor and Wandering Jew figures,” Frye writes, “show us, in 
very different contexts, aspects of the tragic situation, from a Romantic point of view, of 
being detached from society and its conventional values” (41).  Hamlet, Frye observes, is 
a crucial pretext for this tragic Romantic wanderer, as they both share an “excess of 
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conscious awareness over the power of action” (40-41).  Bloom underlines the potential 
perils of the Romantic quester in observing how the internal quest of the Romantic poet 
is always in danger of veering into the swamp of self-consciousness.  “The quest,” Bloom 
writes, “is to widen consciousness as well as to intensify it, but the quest is shadowed by 
a spirit that tends to narrow consciousness to an acute preoccupation with self” (6).  The 
wandering quest of Romanticism strikes out to attain an imaginative and freeing artistic 
consciousness, but that quest is haunted by the spectre of the endless and alienated 
wandering of self-consciousness.  “This shadow of imagination,” writes Bloom, “is 
solipsism” (6). 
Romanticism’s harnessing of romance is thus alternately freeing and disabling.  
Patricia Parker shows how this duality and ambiguity is part and parcel of the mode of 
romance.  “‘Romance,’” Parker writes, “is characterized primarily as a form which 
simultaneously quests for and postpones a particular end, objective, or object” (4).  
Romance has an object, but the very object of the form of romance is to place that 
object beyond reach.  Parker states, “when the ‘end’ is defined typologically, as a 
Promised Land or Apocalypse, ‘romance’ is that mode or tendency which remains on the 
threshold before the promised end, still in the wilderness of wandering ‘error,’ or ‘trial’” 
(4).  As a mode, romance dwells in uncertainties—it opens the prospect of social- or self-
realization through wander, but does so at the risk of never reaching an end.  Indeed, 
citing Paradise Lost, a text that emerged through Milton’s conscious rejection of 
romance, Parker shows how wander, as the spirit and the very energy of romance, 
becomes pejorative and erroneous.  Parker states, “The multiple play upon ‘error’ and 
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‘wandering’ in Paradise Lost shares this aspect of the potentially endless,” and “the 
provision of a limit to ‘wandering’ in Raphael’s ‘be lowly wise’ suggests, by indirection, 
the possibility of trespass or transgression, and indeed it is Eve’s ‘wand’ring vanity’ 
which leads to the first trespass and the beginning of all moral error” (140).  Wander, via 
romance, is associated in Milton with error, deviance, transgression, and trespass.  
“‘Error’ in its many contexts,” writes Parker, “seems, indeed, to be weighted according 
to whether or not it has an end, or telos.  The vain curiosity of ‘wand’ring thoughts’ that 
dream of ‘other Worlds’ is dangerous only insofar as it approaches Belial’s ‘thoughts 
that wander through Eternity’” (140). 
 The spectre of an endless self-consciousness and alienation that looms over 
Romantic wander maps onto the concern that the wandering of romance borders on 
error and transgression, which Parker finds in Milton.  Wander in Romanticism, then, 
carries both the tradition of free and generative integration, as a harnessing of the 
quest-romance, as well as the possibility of error, abjection, and alienation.  Romantic 
wander is doubled—it is at once the possibility of freedom and the danger of infinite 
dispossession.  Wolfson confirms this duality, by showing how romance makes itself felt 
in Romanticism as both a positive, inspirational legacy, as well as a deceptive and 
illusionary pitfall.  Wolfson writes, “Romance is not only the genre of enchanted dreams 
and inspired visions, but also of superstitions and spells, delusions and nightmare” (7).   
Romanticism’s adaptation of romance offers the opportunity for creative affirmation, 
but carries with it the risk of enchanted delusion.  Wolfson writes, “the magical mystery 
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tour of supernatural romance may hold the keys to paradise or the passage to hell, or 
both by turns” (7).   
The idea that romance in Romanticism carries with it the dangers of 
enchantment and delusion is underlined by both Barbara Fuchs and Patricia Parker.  
Fuchs argues that Romanticism’s conjuring of romance is rooted in a naïve nostalgia of 
the past.  The Romantic undertaking of romance, Fuchs claims, “revives and recirculates 
many of the topoi associated particularly with medieval romance, such as the 
marvelous, the magical, the mysterious,” but fails to fully “engage” romance, and 
remains “not particularly interested in romance as narrative strategy or form” (122).  
Accordingly, it “privileges a certain nostalgic purchase on times gone by, idealizing what 
it imagines as the organic culture of a romance past, and its seductive appeal” (123).  
Romance for the Romantics is alluring, seductive, and misleading, Fuchs argues, it 
“beguiles these poets even when they know better, luring them towards an irretrievable 
past” (123).  Similarly, Parker shows that for the inheritors of Milton “‘Romance’ was an 
ambivalent mode . . . because its charms were indistinguishable from its snares” (163).  
“Paradise Lost,” writes Parker, “delivers a harsher judgment on the dangers of 
wandering and the post-Miltonic poems which are closest to the form of the companion 
poems frequently internalize the anxieties of the epic’s darker moral, the possibility of 
wandering past a point of no return” (163).  Romanticism’s use of romance is freighted 
with the Miltonic concern that the wandering of romance opens the possibility of 
interminable alienation, “a dream from which there was potentially no awaking and a 
‘suspension’ from which there might be no exit” (163).  “From the Romantics forward,” 
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Parker claims, “the poet himself approaches the condition of the wanderer between 
two worlds, a solidarity doomed to an existence which is neither life nor death,” and 
“the figure of the poet as vagabond or exile becomes virtually inseparable from the 
differentiated, exiled nature of poetic language” (224).  The wandering of romance then 
comes to Romanticism bearing both the possibility of freedom, and the dangers of 
delusion, misdirection, perilous self-consciousness, and alienation. 
Critical assessments of wander in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British 
literature identify the wanderer as a figure who heralds the rise of modernity.  Ingrid 
Horrocks argues that the figure of the wanderer in eighteenth-century poetry comes to 
“eclipse” the “metaphor of the prospect viewer” as a vital means of addressing the 
fragmentation of traditional society (666).  Horrocks writes, 
In the increasingly urbanized and commercialized environment of the 
second half of the eighteenth-century, in a world that was being changed 
by enclosure and the instability of empire, the wanderer came to 
importance in order to perform a similar generalizing function to that 
which had formerly been annexed to the prospect viewer in literary and 
political imaginings of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. (665) 
The wanderer, argues Horrocks, emerges as a poetic perspective through which an 
increasingly atomized society might be reconciled to its own fragmentation.  “The shift,” 
Horrocks writes, “involves a kind of stepping down, in both literal and figurative terms, 
of the writer and the imagined observer, from the hilltop to the fields and the town” 
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(666).  Horrocks notes that “poets such as Thomas Gray, Oliver Goldsmith and William 
Cowper propose the viewpoint of a wanderer” in order to advocate “a new idea of 
community,” as older social modes begin to break down (666).  However, in taking on 
this wandering stance of “mobility,” late eighteenth-century poets effectively usher in 
the “possibility of alienation from any place or position” (666).  Writers adopt the 
perspective of the wanderer as a means of forging sympathetic social communities in a 
rapidly de-centralizing world; however, this very shift from a fixed and landed 
perspective to a mobile and uprooted one paradoxically furthers the very fragmentation 
that was being addressed.  The wanderer, Horrocks states, “is developed in an effort to 
imagine how a rapidly de-centering society could still be represented as a connected 
whole, but carries with it into the very structure of its new identity elements of the 
anxieties that made it necessary in the first place” (667). 
 Harold Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman also see in the wanderer an anticipation of 
the anomie and atomization of modernity.  Bloom observers how Romantic wanderers 
are part “of the Gothic Revival,” “its first version is clearly to be related to the ballad of 
The Wandering Jew in Percy’s Reliques;” but he reads this “major Romantic archetype,” 
whom he describes as “the man with the mark of Cain, or the mocker of Christ who 
must expiate in a perpetual cycle of guilt and suffering, and whose torment is in excess 
of its usually obscure object and source,” as a direct precursor and progenitor to the 
modernity of later writers like Dostoevsky (1).  Hartman identifies the figure of the 
wanderer as a sign of modernity manifested by Romanticism’s struggle with self-
consciousness, in the wake of the French Revolution.  Hartman argues that one of the 
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chief concerns of Romanticism is its overcoming of the “division in the self” of self-
consciousness; a division that he argues Romanticism identifies as “death-in-life” (558).  
Accordingly, Hartman reads the wanderer as a reflection of the burden of self-
consciousness that Romanticism strives to transcend.  Hartman writes, “the theme 
which best expresses this perilous nature of consciousness, and which has haunted 
literature since the Romantic period, is that of the Solitary, or Wandering Jew” (558).  
Hartman states, 
He may appear as Cain, Ahasuerus, Ancient Mariner, and even Faust.  He 
also resembles the later (and more static) figures of Tithonus, Gerontion, 
and poète maudit.  These solitaries are separated from life in the midst of 
life, yet cannot die.  They are doomed to live a middle or purgatorial 
existence which is neither life nor death, and as their knowledge 
increases so does their solitude.  It is consciousness, ultimately, which 
alienates them from life and imposes the burden of a self which religion 
or death or a return to the state of nature might resolve.  Yet their 
heroism, or else their doom, is not to have this release. (558) 
The wanderer figures the burden of self-consciousness, where one has heroically 
extricated one’s self from the traditional, organic community, but then takes on the full 
weight of that isolation in the process.  Wander, then, becomes the ceaseless and 
pained movement of this self-consciousness—free from tradition, and yet devoid of the 
consolation offered by the parameters of traditional society.  Hartman aptly figures the 
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wanderer’s burden of modernity by quoting an observation made by Yeats: “‘I write, 
write, write,’ said Mme. Blavatsky, ‘as the Wandering Jew walks, walks, walks’” (559). 
 Margaret Doody and Fred Botting likewise see the wanderer as a post-French 
revolutionary figure of modernity; however, they regard this figure as a socially critical 
force in Romanticism.  In Gothic, Fred Botting observes how wander either takes the 
form of a “defiant rebel against the constraints of social mores,” or that of a roving 
figure of the “romance tradition;” but in both of these cases wander acts as a mode of 
social critique (92).  Botting writes, 
The individual in question stands at the edges of society and rarely finds a 
path back into the social fold.  The critical distance taken with regard to 
social values derives from radical attacks on oppressive systems of 
monarchical government.  Instead, the consciousness, freedom and 
imagination of the subject is valued.  Usually male, the individual is 
outcast, part victim, part villain. (92) 
The Romantic wanderer is a figure that embodies and continues the French Revolution’s 
critique of oppressive institutions (Botting 93).  These figures, Botting writes, in their 
“identification with Prometheus and Milton’s Satan” are “heroes because of their 
resistance to overpowering tyranny” (92).  Wanderers combat the “real evil” that is 
“manifested in government hierarchies, social norms, and religious superstition,” a 
resistance to traditional structures of power that makes them heroic figures of 
modernity (93).  Margaret Doody also sees wander as a movement that encodes the 
more rebellious and reforming impulses of modernity.  Doody writes, 
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“Wandering” is the quintessential Romantic activity, as it represents 
erratic and personal energy expended outside a structure, and without 
progressing to a set objective.  Impelled either by the harshness of a 
rejecting society or by some inner spiritual quest, the Wanderer leaves 
the herd and moves to or through some form of symbolic wilderness or 
wildness, seeing a world very different from that perceived by those who 
think they are at the centre.  Alien and alienated, yet potentially bearing 
a new compassion or a new wisdom, the Wanderer draws a different 
map. (vii)    
The Romantic wanderer’s quest is antagonistic to traditional social modes, and, 
according to Doody and Botting, promotes new and alternate ways of being.   
As these critics maintain, both versions of Romantic wander function as signs of 
modernity.  The free and empowered wanderer is an agent of social critique forged over 
the course of the Enlightenment.  The displaced and dejected wanderer, on the other 
hand, is a dispossessed subject, who carries the weight of a newly alienating self-
consciousness.  Both iterations proliferate and circulate in the wake of the French 
Revolution.  The duality of wander, moreover, reflects a duality that lies at the very core 
of modernity itself.  In Alternative Modernities Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar understands 
modernity as inherently “divided” and “Janus-like” (9).  Gaonkar argues that the concept 
of modernity contains two distinct and conflicting strains.  The first is an historical, 
Enlightenment configuration of modernity that is characterized by the regulation and 
standardization of society “set free from constraints imposed by tradition” (2).  The 
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second strain is an opposing “cultural modernity,” which, starting “with the Romantics 
in the late eighteenth century,” registers the disgust with “the middle-class ethos” and 
“its discounting of enthusiasm, imagination and moral passion in favor of pragmatic 
calculation and the soulless pursuit of money” (2).  Modernity is the reorganization of 
society through the promotion of disciplines and institutions, but it is also an aesthetic 
resistance to this standardization and regulation, which puts a “high premium . . . on 
spontaneous expression, authentic experience, and unfettered gratification of one’s 
creative and carnal urges” (3).  Gaonkar argues that the divide of modernity he uncovers 
is apparent in the duality and division that pervades arch-modern figures.  “Marx’s 
‘revolutionary,’ Baudelaire’s ‘dandy,’ Nietzsche’s ‘superman,’ Weber’s ‘social scientist,’ 
Simmel’s ‘stranger,’ Musil’s ‘man without qualities,’ and Benjamin’s ‘flaneur,’” Gaonkar 
writes, are all suspended between the “intoxicating rush of an epochal change” and a 
newly imposing and regulatory social framework (3).  Gaonkar argues that these figures 
aptly personify modernity’s divided position, where one is “at once disengaged and 
embroiled, reflexive and blind, spectators and participants” (3).  The duality of wander 
in Romanticism reflects a duality that lies at the centre of modernity itself: the positive, 
rhetoric of wander seeks to advance a new subjective mode through what it presents as 
a free and open temporality; but the negative, experience of wander demonstrates the 
alienation and atomization that clock time engenders.   
 I argue that the duality of Romantic wander reflects two responses to the 
singularity of clock time.  The first response is the positive, rhetorical promotion of clock 
time as an open, deregulated venue of being; and the second is the negative, 
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experiential revelation of clock time as temporal alienation.  In this light, positive, 
rhetorical wander becomes an ideology of clock time, as it strives to assist in the 
naturalization of what amounts to a disciplinary temporal mode.  To be sure, both Anne 
D. Wallace and Celeste Langan each show how the late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century emergence of pedestrianism has an ideological imperative.  The rise 
in walking, Wallace shows, is due to an increasingly mobilized rural class brought on by 
the early phases of industrialization.  Wallace argues that “the transport revolution 
beginning in the mid-eighteenth century . . . altered the socio-economic context of 
walking by making fast, cheap travel available to the laboring classes, thus increasing the 
attractiveness of travel in general and removing walking’s long-standing implication of 
necessity and so of poverty and vagrancy” (10).  The ideological promotion of walking 
was also central to the process of enclosure, which oversaw the private appropriation of 
“almost all of the remaining agricultural land—about 50 per cent of England’s total 
cultivated area—by the mid-nineteenth century” (10).  The tension between private 
land and long-standing public footpaths, “the controversy over public rights of way 
through private lands,” was somewhat attenuated by walking, as “English common law 
provides that pubic use itself creates public right of way” (10).  Walking, Wallace asserts, 
became a means of “unenclosing that path, reappropriating it to common use and 
preserving a portion of the old landscape against change” (10).  However, as Wallace 
argues, the re-appropriation of walking was less an act of resistance than it was an 
ideological naturalization of the enclosure.  Walking, Wallace argues, gained a 
representational genre of its own towards the end of the eighteenth-century through 
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the reclamation of the georgic mode, which was re-invigorated by replacing the 
“ideological space vacated by the farmer” with the walker (11).  Wallace identifies this 
mode as the “peripatetic,” which she claims “represents excursive walking as a 
cultivating labour capable of renovating both the individual and his society by 
recollecting and expressing past value” (11).  Walking becomes ideological in so far as it 
strives to reconnect uprooted and atomized walkers back into a cohesive social domain.  
The rhetoric of walking, like the positive, rhetoric of wander, masks the disciplinary 
foreclosure of traditional labour practices through the positive discourse of organic 
mobility.    
Celeste Langan also identifies walking with a kind of ideological work.  In 
Romantic Vagrancy Langan figures “vagrancy” as “the framing issue of Romantic form 
and content,” through its promotion of what she identifies as “the pathos of liberalism” 
(14).  Romanticism’s representation and “idealization” of vagrancy displays a “mobility 
that appears to guarantee to the vagrant a residual economic freedom, despite his or 
her entire impoverishment” (17).  This move, Langan asserts, is seconded by the 
bourgeois poet’s “reduction and abstraction” of “speech-acts that appear to consolidate 
residual political identity,” where “the poet and the vagrant together constitute a 
society based on the twin principles of freedom of speech and freedom of movement” 
(17).  The vagrant’s walk, argues Langan, and its pathology as marked by Romanticism, 
undertake an ideological obfuscation of the material, and work to naturalize newly 
emerging economic relations.  Walking in Romanticism mystifies the material.  Langan 
writes, “coming and going becomes, in itself, the pure form of freedom, an absolute 
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unmarked by origin and destination, by interest or antipathy” (20-21).  Building on the 
work of Wallace and Langan I argue that the positive, rhetoric of wander ideologically 
contains, naturalizes, and renders desirable the temporality of clock time.  
The entrenchment of clock time that transpires in the early nineteenth-century is 
the result of numerous economic, technological, and social changes that occur 
throughout the eighteenth-century.  Mechanical clocks had been in existence since the 
medieval period, but their increased ubiquity and pervasiveness, and, moreover, their 
fundamental restructuring of economic and cultural life is a product of the eighteenth-
century.  G.J. Whitrow argues that time grows increasingly standardized throughout the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries.  The rise of Protestantism, and Puritanism 
specifically, oversees the movement away from a more localized sense of time—a time 
marked by seasonal labour and religious and cultural customs—to a regimented, 
structured, and homogeneous time characterized by routine and practice.  Whitrow 
states, 
In England, belief in the uniformity of time was greatly influenced by the 
Puritans in their strong opposition to the practices of the Roman Church, 
in particular to the idea of special days in the ecclesiastical calendar.  
Instead, the Puritans advocated a regular routine of six days of work 
followed by a day of rest on the Sabbath, the famous Non-conformist 
ethic.  During the course of the seventeenth century, despite the reaction 
against Puritanism that followed the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, 
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this point of view became increasingly influential, so that by the end of 
the century it had come to be generally accepted. (109-10) 
Puritanism’s methodical approach to life refigured time as a regulated and regulating 
horizon of religious and economic practice (110).  Over the course of the eighteenth-
century this Protestant-led notation and demarcation of time was naturalized, and “the 
abstract framework of uniformly divided time gradually became the new medium of 
daily existence” (110). 
In addition to Protestantism, Whitrow argues that the rise of the “mercantile 
class” also greatly contributed to the increased standardization of time (110).  
Feudalism, Whitrow argues, connected time directly to the land: “as power was 
concentrated in the ownership of land, time was felt to be plentiful and was primarily 
associated with the unchanging cycle of the soil” (110).  Accordingly, the move towards 
an economy of “mobility”—an economy governed by “the increased circulation of 
money and the organization of commercial networks”—oversaw the displacement of 
traditional and landed notions of time (110).  This fundamental economic and social 
shift replaced the time “associated . . . with cataclysms and festivals,” with time as the 
measure of “everyday life” (110).  The onset of capitalism demanded a more uniform 
temporality, which cut across regional and cultural differences.  Whitrow notes how the 
expression “time is money,” which might well amount to capitalism’s motto, clearly 
reveals the imperative capitalism had for a quantifiable and exchangeable temporality 
(110).  Whitrow goes on to show how this temporal transformation is an eighteenth-
century development.  Time at the beginning of the eighteenth-century, as reported by 
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Samuel Pepys, still seemed to be relatively unstructured.  Whitrow notes that Pepys 
“lived by the church bells of London and occasionally a sun-dial . . . [and] moved around 
from public places to coffee houses and taverns hoping to do business” (112).  However, 
by the century’s end, clock time is less a passing object of observation than it is the 
means through which bodies are regulated and routinized. 
 David S. Landes argues that the increased structuring of time, that takes place 
from early modernity to the Industrial Revolution, reorganized notions of subjectivity.  
Technological developments in timekeeping oversaw what Landes identifies as the 
“privatization (personalization) of time,” through the increased availability and 
possession of domestic clocks and personal watches—a development that replaced time 
as a social and communal concern with time as a means of individual regulation (92).  
The locus of time was transferred from “the cry of the night watch, the bell of the 
church, or the turret clock in the town square,” to the “home or . . . person” (Landes 92).  
This transference, Landes writes, became “a major stimulus to the individualism that 
was an ever more salient aspect of Western civilization” (92).  The rise of the personal 
and domestic clock assisted in reconfiguring time as an omnipresent and disciplinary 
venue of being in and of itself.  The public clock, Landes states, was sometimes too 
distant to be noted; however, “a chamber clock or watch is something very different: an 
ever-visible, ever-audible companion and monitor” (92).   
The increased ubiquity of clock time helped to generate and facilitate newly 
time-bound subjects, as both watches and domestic clocks “gave the hour at all times 
and in all places” (Landes 96).  Time, under the measure of the clock, became a means 
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of constant, continuous supervision.  As a result, clock time was instrumental in the 
manufacturing of the modern bourgeois subject (96).  “A turning hand,” writes Landes, 
“specifically a minute hand (the hour hand turns so slowly as to seem still), is a measure 
of time used, time spent, time wasted, time lost . . . a prod and key to personal 
achievement and productivity” (92-3).  The watch and domestic clock thus became the 
monitors of modern subjectivity—the means of organizing and regulating one’s actions.  
Landes writes, “what the clock was to the cloistered ascetics of the Middle Ages, the 
watch was to the in-the-world ascetics of post-Reformation Europe” (96).  However, the 
prominence of personal and domestic clocks was just as much cultural as it was 
technological.  Landes claims that these new temporally organized subjects were largely 
“North European and Protestant,” which was due to the fact that “the clock and watch 
industry [was] concentrated” “north of the Alps,” but was equally due to the 
“chronometric aspect” of “Calvinist Europe” (96).  Landes writes, “Calvin himself, so 
impatient of ornament and distraction, accepted the watch as a useful instrument” (97).  
Innovations in the technology of clock making, and a Protestant worldview that valued a 
methodical and uniform notion temporality, thus combined to allow for the appearance 
of “a new kind of man, one who became more and more common with the growth of 
business and the development of a characteristically urban style of life” (96). 
 Landes observes how this expansion of clock time was nowhere as prevalent as it 
was in eighteenth-century Britain, where the clock making industry found fertile ground 
in Britain’s “efficient techniques, low costs, and access to large markets” (238).  
Furthermore, Britain was “a relatively urbanized society” and “the incomes of the 
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middle class were proportionately higher” than other places in Northern Europe, which 
made the “demand for timepieces” in Britain greater than anywhere else (Landes 238, 
239).  The result of these social and economic factors was a Britain “time-bound in its 
activity and consciousness,” and the growth and expansion of a “time awareness” that 
permeated all aspects of British culture (Landes 239).  There arose, Landes writes, “a 
dense grid of coach services, competing fiercely not so much in price as in speed,” 
where “drivers were given locked clocks to hold them to their place, while the 
passengers with their own appointments to keep checked their watches” (239-40).  In 
the British eighteenth-century clock time became the medium within which one 
thought, acted, and moved. 
The increased regulation of British life through the naturalization of clock time is 
perhaps most widely evident in the changes that occurred in labour practices towards 
the end of the eighteenth-century.  The rise of capitalism required a sense of time that 
was uniform and suitable to the demands of production.  Capitalism needed to expunge 
the more traditional approaches to time it regarded as irregular and disruptive.  The 
development of “the factory,” Landes argues, accomplished this, by ushering in “a new 
mode of industrial organization that had discipline as its raison d’etre” (240).  Factories, 
and the clocks upon which they relied, re-scripted labour practices and further 
established clock time as a means of regulating and disciplining subjects.  Landes writes, 
“from the 1770s on an increasing number of workers found themselves employed in 
jobs that required them to appear by a set time every morning and work a day whose 
duration and wage were a function of the clock” (240-1).  Labour itself was structured 
	 23	
and organized by the clock, and labourers were disciplined by clock time’s routine, as 
workers, “coming as they did from cottages and fields,” “felt the factory to be a kind of 
jail, with the clock as the lock” (Landes 241).  In factory production the clock reigned 
supreme: “employers reserved the harshest fines for latecomers and absentees—that 
was the stick—while a favourite prize for good workers was a clock—that was the 
carrot” (241).  To be sure, fear that owners had “some way [of] slowing or setting back 
the clock so as to steal additional labour” fuelled “workers’ concern to defend 
themselves,” and “led numbers of them to buy their own watches” (241, 242).  
Ironically, the very resistance to exploitation under a clock-governed mode of 
production was, in fact, only a deeper commitment to clock time. 
E.P. Thompson also demonstrates how clock time became the dominant means 
of organizing economic and cultural life in Britain by the end of the eighteenth-century.  
Thompson argues that the Industrial Revolution was enabled by a change in time-sense 
that occurred over the eighteenth-century.  Thompson writes, “as the seventeenth 
century moves on, the image of clock-work extends, until, with Newton, it has 
engrossed the universe [and] by the middle of the eighteenth century (if we are to trust 
Sterne) the clock had penetrated to more intimate levels” (57).  Thompson goes on to 
examine the extent to which the social and economic changes necessary for the 
industrialization of the nineteenth-century relied upon “changes in the inward notation 
of time” (57).  This change in the conception of time began with the increase in 
timepieces.  Thompson observes that “there were a lot of timepieces about in the 
1790s,” where the “emphasis” upon a timepiece shifted “from ‘luxury’ to 
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‘convenience,’” and where “even cottagers” began to accumulate “wooden clocks 
costing less than twenty shillings” (69).  The influx of timepieces fostered a 
harmonization and standardization of temporality that was necessary for 
industrialization. 
 Prior to the “synchronization of labour” demanded by industrialization, work, 
Thompson writes, was structured around “task-orientation,” rather than the clock 
(Thompson 71).  Task-orientation is a more collective approach to labour that takes its 
time based upon the immediacy and urgency of a particular task, where the task sets 
the time of production, and not the other way around.  In task-orientation, “social 
intercourse and labour are intermingled—the working-day lengthens or contracts 
according to the task—and there is no great sense of conflict between labour and 
‘passing the time of day’” (Thompson 60).  Moreover, individual work—not just the task-
based labour of the community—was also free from the jurisdiction of the clock.  
Thompson states, “the work pattern was one of alternate bouts of intense labour and of 
idleness, wherever men were in control of their own working lives” (73).  Prior to the 
institutionalization of clock time, work was irregular and intermittent.  This is 
exemplified by customs like “Saint Monday,” a day of idleness that “appears to have 
been honoured almost universally wherever small-scale, domestic, and outwork 
industries existed” (Thompson 74).  The lack of structured productivity and the “heavy 
weekend drinking” that customs like Saint Monday encouraged, thus became the target 
of Methodists and Victorian temperance tracts alike, which had the express purpose of 
installing a routinized and disciplinary sense of time based upon the clock (76, 75). 
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 Thompson shows how this “time-discipline” was established and naturalized 
over and against the more erratic, and yet “humanly comprehensible,” time of task-
orientation, through the implementation of a discourse and practice of economical 
temporal expenditure (60).  Thompson writes, “we are entering here, already in 1700, 
the familiar landscape of disciplined industrial capitalism, with the time-sheet, the time-
keeper, the informers” (82).  So valuable was the measure of time to the regulation of 
labour, Thompson argues, that the “warden of the mill was ordered to keep the watch 
under lock and key” (82).  This increased time-discipline was not limited to the factory.  
Thompson claims that both enclosure and agricultural improvement were equally 
invested in the “efficient husbandry of the time of the labour force” (78).  Rural workers 
in the face of these top-down changes in agriculture could either be subject to “partial 
employment and the poor law, or submit to a more exacting labour discipline” (78).  
Alongside the repressive and disciplinary means of enacting time-discipline were more 
covert and ideological means of imposing clock time.  Both the domestic realm and the 
school emerged as spaces through which time-thrift could be discursively marshaled.  
Thompson states that moralists such as Rev. J. Clayton advocated early rising and dutiful 
work, and Clayton discouraged the tea table, as a “‘devourer of time and money,’” and 
frowned upon “wakes and holidays and the annual feasts of friendly societies” (83).  
Thompson states that Clayton was one of many moralists engaged in “the quite sharp 
attack upon popular customs, sports, and holidays which was made in the last years of 
the eighteenth-century and the first years of the nineteenth” (84).   
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Schools were also institutions of time-discipline regulated by the clock.  
Thompson writes, “once within the school gates, the child entered the new universe of 
disciplined time;” a discipline that also applied to teachers, who, at Methodist schools in 
York, were “fined for unpunctuality” (84).  John Wesley, whose Methodism bears a 
name that stands as a testament to the significance of structured time, “rose every day 
at 4 a.m.” and “ordered that the boys of Kingswood School must do the same” (88).  
From these “Puritan, Wesleyan, or Evangelical traditions” the gospel of clock time 
becomes increasingly secularized and widespread over the course of the eighteenth-
century, and reaches “its apogee” in the twentieth century “with Henry Ford;” via 
Benjamin Franklin “who had a life-long technical interest in clocks,” and who claimed, in 
his Autobiography, that as a printer in 1720s London he never “follow[ed] the example 
of his fellow-workers in keeping Saint Monday” (89).  Thus clock time became over the 
eighteenth-century the dominant means of organizing and disciplining economic 
production and subjectivity.  Thompson observes that the third generation to work 
under the clock “struck for overtime or time-and-a-half,” and thereby fully “accepted 
the categories of their employers” of a fully naturalized and entrenched clock time (86).  
By the end of the eighteenth-century time becomes that which “must be consumed, 
marketed, put to use,” and it becomes “offensive for the labour force merely to pass the 
time” (Thompson 90-91). 
The naturalization of clock time that occurs over the eighteenth-century is 
evident in the fiction of the period.  Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, 
Richardson, and Fielding identifies how the transition in the cultural understanding of 
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time was instrumental in the forming of the eighteenth-century British novel.  Watt 
argues that the ascendance of the novel in the eighteenth-century was due, in part, to 
the shifting sense of temporality that began in the early modern period.  Indeed, this 
transition in time-sense, Watt notes, oversaw the emergence of time itself “not only as 
a crucial dimension of the physical world, but as the shaping force of man’s individual 
and collective history” (22).  Prior to the time of modernity, the classical world did not 
consider time to be consequential.  Watt writes,  
The restriction of the action of tragedy to twenty-four hours, for 
example, the celebrated unity of time, is really a denial of the importance 
of the temporal dimension in human life; for, in accord with the classical 
world’s view of reality as subsisting in timeless intervals, it implies that 
the truth about existence can be as fully unfolded in the space of a day as 
in the space of a lifetime. (23) 
The timelessness of pre-modern narrative, Watt claims, becomes unhinged over the 
course of early modernity, which comes to view time as a venue of being in and of itself.  
The increasing significance of time in relation to human action is galvanized in the novel, 
which, as Watt argues, oversees the full-fledged formalization of time through its 
dependence upon causality, development, and change.  The plot of the novel actively 
uses “past experience as the cause of present action,” where “a causal connection 
operating through time replaces the reliance of earlier narratives on disguises and 
coincidences” (22).  The novel thus relies upon time as its very means of generation; the 
novel exists because time is perceived as a frame in which events transpire, and in which 
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subjects are transformed.  “The novel,” Watt writes, “has interested itself much more 
than any other literary form in the development of its characters in the course of time” 
(22).  
Watt further observes how the novel formalizes clock time through its interest in 
the minutiae of everyday life.  Watt argues that “the novel’s closeness to the texture of 
daily experience directly depends upon its employment of a much more minutely 
discriminated time-scale than had previously been employed in narrative” (23).  Stuart 
Sherman develops this idea in Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and English Diurnal Form 
1660-1785, in which he finds a relationship between the continuous sequence of clock 
time and eighteenth-century prose narrative.  Sherman claims that Christiaan Huygens’s 
mid-seventeenth-century innovation to clockwork—the regulating pendulum—greatly 
enhanced the precision of chronometry.  The pendulum, Sherman writes, “immediately 
imparted to the machinery a new accuracy,” and altered cultural understandings of time 
over the eighteenth-century by recasting clocks as audibly perceptible temporal 
registers (4).  Sherman writes, “the new clocks were the first to make the progress of 
time available to the sense by way of a running report” (5).  The figurative, 
onomatopoetic “Tick, Tick, Tick” of the clock, Sherman argues, provided “an emblem for 
a new construction of time as series within series, concentric and cumulative” (5).  This 
“new chronometry,” Sherman claims, became a centralizing factor in the construction of 
eighteenth-century narrative: “the serial and closely calibrated temporality that became 
a widespread preoccupation on clocks and watches became concurrently a widespread 
practice in prose written, distributed, and read over steady, small increments of real 
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time” (9).  Clock time, Sherman asserts, gives rise to and conditions an entirely new 
mode of being that is reflected by the novel, but is also evident in “diaries, periodicals, 
daily newspapers, diurnal essays” (8).  Sherman goes on to observe how this “new, 
pervasive textual timing” altered subjectivity as well (8).  One began to see and 
understand one’s self through “a continuous self-construction, a running report on 
identities both shifting and fixed, private and public” (8).  Clock time became the 
technology through which subjects understood and represented themselves.  As 
Sherman notes, “diurnalists began ‘humanizing’ time on a new pattern at just that 
juncture when a new time was made available to be so engaged” (12).  Clock time thus 
elicited a modal shift in economic, social, and subjective being.    
 Through the technological, economic, and cultural shifts that occur over the 
course of the eighteenth-century, clock time becomes the dominant mode of 
temporality in Britain.  To be sure, this new temporal mode gains both a physics and a 
metaphysics in Newton and Kant.  Wai-Chee Dimock argues that Newtonian mechanics, 
which were foundational for eighteenth-century thought, effectively translated time 
into space, by making time linear and homogenous.  Dimock writes, “Space and Time 
are absolute for Newton not only in the sense that they are objective and immutable 
but also in the sense that they are fixed numbers, expressible as ‘absolute places’” 
(155).  Time in Newtonian physics is transformed into an external, spatial set of 
coordinates that are both physical and absolute.  “Conceived in this image,” Dimock 
continues, “time functions in exactly the same way as a spatial coordinate.  It is a place, 
a location, a sequence of units on a calibrated line—and, for all those reasons, a 
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container to which any event can be assigned” (155).  Through linearization time 
consists of spatial, sequential, and singular units, wherein each moment has its own 
designated coordinate through which time unstoppably moves.  Time under Newton 
becomes a “container” of being—a sequence of points on a line one’s life transpire in—
and in its formalization all time becomes homogeneous, equivalent, and standardized 
(156).  Dimock writes, “Newton spatializes time and, in the same gesture, standardizes 
it” (156).  Indeed, the enlightenment metaphor of God as the grand clockmaker 
demonstrates how time is understood as divinely and universally spatial. 
Kant, Deleuze shows, transposes the absoluteness of time from the scale of the 
universal and objective, to the scale of the particular and the subjective.  Deleuze argues 
that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason envisions a new temporality in which time becomes 
the primary underlying venue of subjectivity.  Kant internalizes the spatial and linear 
temporality Newton had ascribed to the universe.  Time in Kant’s first critique is “out of 
joint, the door off its hinges,” which “signifies the first great Kantian reversal: movement 
is now subordinated to time” (27).  Kant’s configuration of time, Deleuze claims, is 
“unilinear and rectilinear, no longer in the sense that it would measure a derived 
movement, but in and through itself, insofar as it imposes the succession of its 
determination on every possible movement” (28).  Time under Kant is no longer an 
effect or response to movement or change—it is no longer the marking of difference or 
of heterogeneity—but is instead the means of determining and measuring movement.  
Time under Kant becomes a primary horizon of being.  Deleuze argues that Kant’s 
configuration of time converts time into a formal entity: “everything that moves and 
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changes is in time, but time itself does not change or move, any more than it is eternal.  
It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable form that 
does not change . . . the immutable form of change and movement” (29).  This 
formalization of time organizes and standardizes temporal experience.  Deleuze writes, 
“our undetermined existence is determinable only in time, under the form of time” (29).  
The formalizing of time undertaken by Kant repositions subjectivity as that which occurs 
in time: “existence can never be determined as that of an active and spontaneous being, 
but as a passive ‘self’ that represents to itself the ‘I’” (30).  
 This sense of time, Deleuze argues, is the time of modernity, a time that is 
characterized by displacement and uprooted-ness.  “Time,” Deleuze maintains, “is no 
longer the cosmic time of an original celestial movement, nor is it the rural time of 
derived meteorological movements.  It has become the time of the city and nothing 
other, the pure order of time” (28).  Deleuze reads the implications of Kantian time in 
Hamlet, whom he views as “not a man of skepticism or doubt, but the man of the 
Critique” (30).  The “passive existence” of Hamlet is “eminently Kantian,” because 
“[Hamlet’s] own movement results from nothing other than the succession of the 
determination . . . [he] is the first hero who truly needed time in order to act” (28).  
Kant, on the other end of the Enlightenment from Newton, retains the notion that time 
is a sequential, spatial, means of determination, but relocates it inside the subject, and 
thus transposes the site of time (while retaining its form) from God the clockmaker to 
the modern subject. 
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 In “Time Matters: Marx, Negri, Agamben, and the Corporeal” Cesare Casarino 
shows the philosophical and cultural traditions out of which the modern temporality of 
clock time emerges and coalesces, and underlines how clock time is fully realized under 
industrial capitalism.  Casarino, via Agamben and Negri, historicizes and theorizes the 
“dominant conception of time in the West” as the “unhappy offspring of the arranged 
marriage between . . . the circular and cyclical time of Greco-Roman antiquity, and . . . 
the continuous and linear time of Christianity” (220).  “The two patriarchs arranging, 
presiding over, and officiating at such a marriage” Casarino continues, “turn out to be 
Aristotle and Hegel” (220).  Although the temporality of Christianity and the temporality 
of the Classical world are seemingly opposed to one another, the former represented by 
its linearity and the latter by its cyclicality, the two temporalities converge upon their 
privileging and enshrining of presence.  “These two conceptions of time,” Casarino 
observes, “intersect at one point, namely, the instant” (220).  Both of these 
representations of time regard time “as a homogenous and quantifiable succession of 
instants, in which each instant is understood as always fleeting and hence as 
inconsequential in and of itself, or, put differently, as acquiring significance only insofar 
as it negates itself” (220).  Western time’s privileging of the present is thus forged upon 
negation, in which “each instant can find its realization and fulfillment only in the next 
instant, and so on ad infinitum” (220).  Accordingly, time, in this formulation, is never 
had or seized, but rather endlessly deferred.  Casarino states, “during such a time, we 
are always waiting—as our redemption is always already being deferred to that 
impossible instant which will end all instants and abolish time altogether” (220).  
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Western time is thus “understood as lack, negation, and destruction that conspires 
against the works of human history by bringing them down to ruination and reducing 
them to a heap of dust” (220).  It is this sense of time, with its prioritization of the 
present, that prefigures and underwrites the clock time of modernity.  Casarino, 
paraphrasing Agamben, writes, “such a spatialized, measurable, quantifiable, 
homogenous, empty, and teleological time found its apotheosis with capitalist 
modernity and . . . the specular and complementary temporalities of industrial wage 
labour and of bourgeois historicism” (220).  Clock time is forged upon the traditions of 
western temporality, “a time against which humans must fight tirelessly by spatializing, 
measuring, and quantifying it” (220).   
In spite of its actual negation of temporality, clock time’s objectification of time 
represents time as that which is open and available.  The clock seemingly offers a new 
venue for being and a new time for action divorced from traditional cultural modes; 
however, this openness comes at a cost.  Casarino states, “it is then under capitalist 
modernity that time as productivity is at once exponentially intensified and denigrated, 
at once exponentially potentiated and objectified” (226).  Time freed up from traditional 
parameters affords new moments that can now be productively used, but those 
moments must now also be arranged along an external and infinite chain of moments, 
and therefore surrendered.  This “double-edged” nature of clock time—wherein 
moments are available, but are only available by virtue of their fundamental in-
availability—is encapsulated, Casarino argues, by Hegel’s remark, “Time is the thing 
existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not” (226, 237).  The “Aristotelian-
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Hegelian time” that underwrites clock time is the “homogenous succession of quantified 
instants in which each and every instant realizes itself only in the next instant, thereby 
negating itself in and as the present instant” (237).  Clock time makes time available 
through its spatial objectification, but in that objectification time for the subject is 
endlessly deferred and infinitely postponed. 
Clock time, like the modernity in which it blossoms, is inherently doubled or 
divided.  It offers time as open and available, but also defers and postpones time 
indefinitely through its irreversible sequence.  I argue that Romantic wander figures this 
exact duality.  Wander is the movement of clock time par excellence.  In its connotation 
as open and free, wander performs the promise facilitated by clock time’s 
objectification of time.  In this formulation, time is geometrically and sequentially set 
forth, made available, and waiting to be filled.  Wander as a free, spontaneous, and 
unstructured movement reflects the clock’s interpretation of time as open and awaiting.  
And yet, wander also figures the temporal dispossession that is underwritten by clock 
time.  Wander as an endless, forced, and alienated movement mirrors the experience of 
time as a homogenous and interminable sequence.  Wander, like clock time, is the 
movement of freedom in its formalization of openness; however, wander, like clock 
time, is the forced and ceaseless movement of alienation in its formalization of temporal 
deferral.  Romantic wander, as both an iteration of freedom and an iteration of 
dispossession, doubles the duality that characterizes clock time.   
The presentation of both the positive rhetoric of free wander and the negative 
experience of alienated wander, as they correspond to the positive and negative 
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valences of clock time, is exemplified by two of Wordsworth’s poems.  In “I wandered 
Lonely as a Cloud” and “Song for the Wandering Jew,” wander signifies clock time—the 
former through its positive rhetorical fashioning of wander as that which yields time, 
and the latter as the alienated experience of wandering through clock time.  “I 
Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” begins with what appears to be a veneration of free 
wander.  The speaker states “I wandered lonely as a cloud / That floats on high o’er 
vales and hills, / When all at once I saw a crowd, / A host, of golden daffodils” (1-4).  
Through the act of wander the speaker is placed in an open, unregulated, and natural 
space.  Moreover, this openness allows for a harmonious communion with the natural 
world, “a Poet could not but be gay, / In such a jocund company” (15-16).  Wander, 
then, engenders the experience of an open and unstructured temporality through this 
natural encounter.  Despite this, what appears to be an unfettered temporal experience 
is, in actuality, underwritten and structured by the sequence of clock time.  The 
experience which wander elicits for the speaker is actively deferred in the very moment 
at which the experience takes place.  The speaker states, “I gazed—and gazed—but little 
thought, / What wealth the show to me had brought” (17-18).  The experience itself, 
rather than occurring in and of itself, is, instead, projected onto an imagined future.  The 
moment of experience is, in effect, transposed onto a future moment, rather than 
actually and actively being seized.  The act of wander facilitates the delineation of time 
into a series and a sequence of moments, and in so doing, it inscribes the structure and 
sequence of clock time.  The final stanza of the poem demonstrates how clock time’s 
spatial organization of time enacts its endless deferral.  The speaker states, 
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For oft, when on my couch I lie 
  In vacant or in pensive mood, 
  They flash upon that inward eye 
  Which is the bliss of solitude; 
  And then my heart with pleasure fills, 
  And dances with the daffodils. (19-25) 
The final stanza is composed of a recollection, “For oft,” that is delivered in the present 
tense, “on my couch I lie,” that is then channeled into a future-oriented sequence, “And 
then my heart with pleasure fills, / And dances with the daffodils.”  This phrasing models 
time as a sequence of past, present, future, where each temporal space endlessly gives 
way to the next one.  Within that sequence, the speaker’s experience of the daffodils is 
put on hold indefinitely.  The experience of the speaker’s dancing heart remains 
temporally suspended, and altogether hypothetical or utopian, as the experience 
appears only as a deferred temporal projection.  It is only after the twice imagined “And 
then”—only after a future-oriented sequence has been established—that something 
approaching temporal realization can be posited.  The act of wander, rather than giving 
rise to a free and unfettered temporal experience, reveals how the seeming openness of 
time is, in fact, a surrendering of time to the sequential structure of the clock.  The 
speaker’s wandering is, after all, “lonely;” a loneliness that grows into a deeper 
alienation in the poem through the “vacant” or “pensive mood” in which the speaker 
“oft” finds himself.  The rhetoric of free wander as a point of access for undetermined 
time hides the structure of clock time it actively, if unconsciously, promotes.   
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In “Song for the Wandering Jew” Wordsworth stages the other version of 
Romantic wander—wander as alienation—and in so doing he demonstrates the 
temporality of modernity’s inherently dispossessive structure.  The Wandering Jew, the 
belatedly revealed speaker of the poem, recounts four examples of figures of nature 
finding a space of repose within the natural world, before describing his own inability to 
attain a resting place, as an uprooted wanderer.  The Wandering Jew observes how the 
“torrents from their fountains,” the roaming “chamois,” the wind-tossed “Raven,” and 
the cave-less “Sea-horse” are each subject to the chaos and flux of the natural world, 
and yet each finds its “Resting-places” within a seemingly inhospitable natural world (1, 
6, 9, 13).  The Wandering Jew, however, figures himself as the sole counterpoint.  The 
final stanza of the poem reads, “Day and night my toils redouble! / Never nearer to the 
goal, / Night and day, I feel the trouble, / Of the Wanderer in my soul” (17-20).  Unlike 
the water, chamois, raven, and sea-horse, there is no end to the “toils” of the 
Wandering Jew.  Moreover, the difference between the Wandering Jew and the natural 
examples he cites is articulated through the language of time.  Markers of temporality—
“Day and night” and “Night and day”—are only introduced in the poem when the 
Wandering Jew describes his existence; and they are absent altogether from his 
description of the natural world.  His own estrangement from nature is, in effect, 
conjugated through these markers of time, which render the Wandering Jew a temporal 
subject.  Furthermore, the time that is outlined by the Wandering Jew is successive, 
ceaseless, and alienating.  Rather than possessing time, he remains transfixed in a 
deferred temporal sequence, where he is “never nearer to the goal.”  Indeed, his 
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temporal alienation is reflected further in the disconnection that lies between the 
poem’s title and the poem’s speaker.  In spite of the Wandering Jew being the poem’s 
speaker, the title—a “Song for the Wandering Jew” and not a song by the Wandering 
Jew—denies the Wandering Jew that position.  The Wandering Jew is cast outside of his 
own lament; objectified in his temporal objectification.  The Wandering Jew’s wander 
shows his temporal alienation and reflects clock time’s ceaseless sequence of “day and 
night, night and day.” 
Through its two modalities, Romantic wander represents the fundamental 
restructuring of experience elicited by the temporality of modernity.  The rhetorical 
positioning of wander as free and positive signifies clock time’s promise of freeing up 
time and making it available as an open, objective, and sequential space of being.  
However, the experience of wander as dispossession and alienation figures the 
fundamental negation of time that underwrites this homogeneous temporal sequence.  
By reading four texts that feature explicit and emphatic figures of wander, I trace out a 
shift from the rhetorical fashioning of free wander to the representation of the 
alienating experience of wander.  I begin with Wordsworth’s The Excursion to show how 
the rhetoric of wander is presented as an antipode to modernity.  Wordsworth’s long 
poem tries to buttress free wander as a means of staving off the excessive solipsism of 
an encroaching, alienating modernity; however, his venerated old Wanderer advances a 
mode of purposive walking and economic time-management that shows the rhetoric of 
wander to be in the service of naturalizing an emerging economic liberalism—one that 
demands both productive movement and a thrifty stewardship of time.  Next, I look to 
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Frances Burney’s The Wanderer: or Female Difficulties to demonstrate how the rhetoric 
of free wander functions as an ideology that masks class and gender privilege.  Burney’s 
wandering protagonist—an initially nameless, connectionless exile of the French 
Revolution—strives to make use of clock time as an open means of attaining economic 
independence, but it proves to be a dead-end; then, Juliet attempts to live the Romantic 
rhetoric of wander as a mode of freedom, but that also fails.  The novel shows how 
access to free and open time is inherently class and gender dependent, and, as a result, 
the rhetoric of free wander is exposed as a fiction.  In spite of Juliet’s efforts, The 
Wanderer shows free time and free wander to be privileged modalities, possible only 
through the maintenance of authoritative social typologies of class and gender.  I then 
turn to Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, which shows the experience of 
wander to be the very movement of social and temporal alienation.  The Mariner’s 
killing of the Albatross encodes an ethos of modernity, with its individualism, scientific 
speculation, economic and cultural exploitation, and its geometric, cartographical 
organization of space and time.  The Mariner’s irreversible arrow performs the 
movement into the new, successive temporality of modernity, and the effect of his 
transition is a ceaseless, displaced, and alienating wander.  Finally, I look to Charles 
Robert Maturin’s 1820 Gothic novel Melmoth the Wanderer to demonstrate how the 
experience of wander signifies transparently the alienation and dispossession of the 
temporality of modernity.  The wander of the novel’s eponymous quasi-protagonist is 
coextensive with the transposition of his organic life and time for a temporally 
constrained sentence of 150 years, which he has brokered infernally.  The Wanderer’s 
	 40	
life is time as quantity, measure, and sequence; and the effect of his temporal alienation 
is figured through his wander.  However, the Wanderer’s wander is more than 
alienation, he is an anti-social figure of menace and anomie.  The Wanderer’s wander 
signifies the violent, instrumental rationalism of modernity—an excessive individualism 
that systematizes and tortures bodies, localities, and moments, into disciplinary and 
determinative chronological sequences.  The Wanderer is effectively the unrepentant 
Mariner, a figure whose wander encodes his membership and complicity in a violent 
modernity, which his heirs—both familial, as well as cultural and historical—must 
witness, heed, and strive to recover from.     
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Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
Chapter Two: 
 
Spending Time: The Excursion and the Rhetoric of Wander 
 
 Wordsworth’s 1814 dramatic poem The Excursion traces out the Poet’s, the 
Wanderer’s, and the Pastor’s attempts at the “renovation” and “healing” of the 
despondent, “wounded spirit” of the Solitary (9: 784, 785).  Having experienced 
individual tragedy, with the premature deaths of his wife and two young children, and 
then public, political tragedy, with the zealotry and corruption of the French Revolution, 
the Solitary has retreated to the “rugged hills” of remote, northern England “where now 
he dwells, / And wastes the sad remainder of his hours / In self-indulging spleen” (2:326-
328).  The excursion that constitutes The Excursion, then, becomes a means of 
redressing this excessive solipsism, where the Wanderer, Poet, Pastor, and Solitary 
wander, in order to reconnect the alienated Solitary to the “Mind’s excursive Power” (4: 
1259).  Despite this, the Solitary’s despondent withdrawal is rooted in his experience of 
an abrupt and incomprehensible mutability that is not unique to him alone.  Indeed, 
mutability and change stand as ominous spectres on the horizon of the pastoral space of 
The Excursion, from the loss of traditional economic and cultural relations, to the 
disruption and displacement caused by war, to the growth of “huge Town[s]” “from the 
germ / Of some poor Hamlet,” to the appearance of what Blake calls “dark Satanic mills” 
(8: 121, 119-120).  The mutability that strikes the Solitary—the same that levels Robert 
and Margaret in the Wanderer’s account of the ruined cottage of Book I, and the same 
that reappears throughout the poem to threaten traditional institutions—signals the 
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emergence and experience of a new temporal mode that formalizes time as a sequence 
of change, and externalizes time as a determinative and definitive venue of being in and 
of itself; namely, the temporality of clock time.  However, the wandering that is 
presented as a means of attenuating the despondency and dispossession of clock time 
turns out to be a decidedly more mandatory and purposive movement than one might 
imagine—a movement that actively re-inscribes clock time, rather than overturning it.  
Intentional and purposive wander becomes a means of occupying and spending time, 
and, in so doing, this wander reinstates the successive temporality of clock time it 
seemed intent on counteracting.  Rather than overcoming the mutability and alienation 
of clock time, wander in The Excursion is a purposive movement, the seeming freedom 
of which is, in actuality, an ideological underpinning of the movement of clock time. 
 Since the time of its publication The Excursion has been maligned by a critical 
tradition of “romantic humanism” that prioritizes a more visionary poetic stance 
(Galperin 31).  William Galperin writes, “from Coleridge to Hazlitt to Arnold to present 
day, it has become the ‘tradition’ of Wordsworth criticism to enlist the poem as a 
warning sign of Wordsworth’s decline” (29).  Geoffrey Hartman presents a softened 
version of this narrative of decline when he argues that “The Excursion offers us not a 
vision, but a voice,” and that it deploys a “visionary element” that is “almost denuded of 
visual supports,” wherein “the poet’s flight from vision causes a warp of obliquity felt 
throughout The Excursion” (292, 293).  This critical narrative draws its strength from the 
religious dogmatism it finds in some of the text’s speakers, and from the apostasy it 
locates in its writer—a critical impulse Galperin sees as “the efforts in the long run to 
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save Wordsworth from himself” (31).  Despite this, the poem, as more recent criticism 
shows, is far more dialogic than this critical narrative allows.  Frances Ferguson has 
shown that “the strangeness of The Excursion, is that it is the Reader’s rather than the 
Poet’s poem,” and that in the poem “perception and reading are allied (and occasionally 
identical) operations” (205, 204).  This “curious reversal of the Poet-Reader 
relationship,” Ferguson argues, presents a “challenge” to the “moral authority of 
poetry” (205, 206).  Ferguson writes, “One of the most striking features of The Excursion 
is the proliferation of near-poets.  The Wanderer (that poet sown by nature), the 
Solitary (a former preacher and political rhetorician), the Pastor (the pronouncer both of 
sermons and of ‘authentic epitaphs’), and the Poet overpopulate the rhetorical field” 
(208).  Richard Gravil also overturns this critical narrative and similarly paces the text’s 
rhetorical ground, by identifying the irony that underwrites this dramatic poem.  Rather 
than reading the poem as a monologic, Wordsworthian statement, Gravil finds an ironic 
staging of four subtly differentiated figures: the Wanderer, “to whom Wordsworth gives 
his own childhood and experience of nature;” the Solitary “in whom Wordsworth 
expresses his own experience of revolutionary sympathies and his own moral crisis;” the 
Poet “who is less Wordsworth than either of these;” and the Pastor, who is “(perhaps) 
Wordsworth as he might have been if he had followed the family expectations that he 
would take holy orders” (144).  Gravil goes on to show how the perceived identities of 
these poetic speakers are consistently undermined.  “It tends to be assumed that the 
Solitary is indeed a cynic, even a misanthrope,” Gravil writes, but “is he really as bad as 
that? And, come to that, is the Wanderer as good as that?” (145).  The Solitary “has 
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ample cause to be miserable,” and the Wanderer’s “unbending, almost Asberger’s—like 
discourse” should not be so readily taken at face value (145, 147).  Furthermore, the 
Wanderer and the Pastor, the two chief advocates of the poem’s seeming promotion of 
a naturalized English order, Gravil claims, might themselves be “at times, at least, ‘straw 
men’” (146).  For Gravil, the irony of the text’s speakers undercuts the poem’s perceived 
didacticism, and he claims the poem might be more productively read not as a 
“dogmatic poem,” but “as a quasi-dramatic contest of ideas, in which there is pointedly 
no outcome” (146).  Following this more recent criticism, I argue The Excursion presents 
a rhetorical space in which authority remains contested and contestable because it 
effectively maps out the transition from a more agrarian and homogeneous social 
compact to a rapidly industrializing, heterogeneous, and mutable world.  Accordingly, 
poetic authority necessarily becomes an un-authoritative and singular voice among 
many, and the visionary poetic utterance becomes yet another rhetorical prescription. 
To that end, The Excursion presents a rhetorical version of wander as a free and 
freeing movement that keeps one attuned to a rustic and natural life; a life immune 
from the perils of despondency.  This rhetoric of wander is personified and espoused, 
mainly, by the figure of the Wanderer himself—a figure “brought up in nature, by 
nature,” who “stands before us as the embodiment of natural wisdom,” as Geoffrey 
Hartman observes (305).  The Wanderer is introduced through the admiring perspective 
of the Poet, whose depiction of the Wanderer’s youth valorizes the pure and simple life, 
devoid of spatial and temporal restraint.  The Wanderer was raised “Far from sight the 
City spire, or sound / Of Minster clock!” (1: 140-141), was at a young age “sent abroad / 
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In summer to tend herds,” (1: 216-217), and as a youth “oftentimes deceived / The 
listless hour, while in the hollow vale, / Hollow and green, he lay on the green turf / In 
pensive idleness” (1: 279-282).  The bucolic wandering of the Wanderer’s life, the Poet 
shows, has bestowed upon him a natural wisdom—what Hartman reads as his ability to 
look “at nature as a seer” (303).  The Poet states, “From his native hills / He wandered 
far; much did he see of Men / Their manners, their enjoyments, and pursuits, / Their 
passions, and their feelings; chiefly those / Essential and eternal in the heart” (1: 369-
373).  And it is through “his habitual wanderings out of doors” that he comes to acquire 
“his religion,” “Self-taught, as of a dreamer in the woods” (1: 434, 439, 440).  As Richard 
Gravil argues, the Wanderer, imbued with Wordsworth’s “own childhood and 
experience of nature,” is “Wordsworth as he might have been had he not gone to 
Cambridge” (144).   
The Poet continues to position wander as essential to a naturally integrated life 
in his depiction of his and the Wanderer’s friendship.  As the Wanderer’s “chosen 
Comrade,” the Poet recalls how wander functions as a privileged point of access to a 
free and spiritually engaged life (1: 64).  The Poet states,  
On holidays, we wandered through the woods, 
A pair of random travellers; we sate— 
We walked; he pleas’d me with his sweet discourse 
Of things which he had seen; and often touch’d 
Abstrusest matter, reasonings of the mind 
Tuned inward; or at my request he sang 
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Old songs—the product of his native hills. (1: 64-71)    
Wander is linked with freedom, fellowship, lofty contemplation, and the prolonged 
revival of local and rustic customs.  The Poet maintains his own rhetorical veneration of 
wander as the excursion gets underway.  As the Poet and the Wanderer make their way 
to the Solitary’s valley, the Poet extolls the political virtues of wander, by identifying it 
as an egalitarian and democratic movement.  The Poet observes, 
The Wealthy, the Luxurious, by the stress 
Of business roused, or pleasure, ere their time, 
May roll in chariots, or provoke the hoofs 
Of the fleet coursers they bestride, to raise 
From earth the dust of morning, slow to rise; 
And They, if blessed with health and hearts at ease, 
Shall lack not their enjoyment: —but how faint 
Compared with our’s! who, pacing side by side, 
Could with an eye of leisure look on all 
That we beheld.  (2: 101-109) 
Not only does wander keep one naturally and culturally integrated, but it facilitates an 
economic freedom as well, where class hierarchies are overcome by eschewing horse 
and carriage for “the middle of the public way” (1:39).  Both the Poet and the Wanderer 
rhetorically establish wander as the movement of a naturalized liberty. 
 Wordsworth’s revision and transformation of the Pedlar from The Ruined 
Cottage to the Wanderer of The Excursion highlights The Excursion’s rhetorical praise of 
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wander.  Critics have shown how early reviewers took issue with the Wanderer’s former 
occupation of peddling.  Quentin Bailey observes that “critics objected to the 
Wanderer’s social status,” and, as proof, Bailey cites Hazlitt’s claim, “we go along with 
him, while he is the subject of his narrative, but we take leave of him when he makes 
pedlars and ploughmen his heroes and the interpreters of his sentiments” (113).  Sally 
Bushell shows that Francis Jeffrey’s review of The Excursion in The Edinburgh Review 
likewise rooted its censure “primarily in terms of class” (3).  Bushell writes, “Jeffrey 
famously began his review with the statement ‘This will never do!’ and went on to ask, 
‘Why should Mr Wordsworth have made his hero a superannuated Pedlar?’” (3-4).  
Bailey suggests that “Wordsworth’s caution” in distancing the Wanderer from his 
peddling was a response to “the disrepute in which pedlars were held” (114).  Pedlars, 
Bailey writes, had “for several decades been subjected to a number of regulations and 
were frequently harassed by magistrates and constables” because they “were widely 
held to be the backbone of the trade in pilfered and stolen goods; they were also 
implicated in the huge trade in counterfeit money” (114).  However, Pedlars were also 
“an essential part of the rural economy, providing goods and services no one else could” 
(Bailey 115).  Bailey attests to this by quoting Charles Lamb’s review of The Excursion, 
wherein Lamb praises Wordsworth’s “recognition that the pedlars of the period 
provided a spiritual as well as a material service to the communities they served” (115).  
Wordsworth thus emphasizes and escalates the spiritual dimension of the rustic pedlar 
in his upgrading of the Pedlar to the Wanderer.   
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The shift from pedlar to wanderer spiritualizes and de-commercializes the 
Wanderer.  The Poet stresses the past social centrality of pedlars, by observing that 
although “their hard service” might be “deemed debasing now,” it had “Gained merited 
respect in simpler times; / When Squire, and Priest, and they who round them dwelt / In 
rustic sequestration, all, dependent / Upon the PEDLAR’S toil” (1: 354, 355-358).  The 
Poet refigures this itinerant, commercial lifestyle as solid footing for a general 
understanding of British society.  The Poet furthers this by underlining the solemn and 
natural morality the Wanderer has acquired from his peddling: “In the woods, / A lone 
Enthusiast, and among the fields, / Itinerant in this labour, he had passed / The better 
portion of his time” (1: 376-379).  Peddling is figured as a vital precursor to the more 
spiritual act of wander.  Indeed, after retirement, the Wanderer continues to wander: 
“His Calling laid aside, he lived at ease: / But still he loved to pace the public roads” 
(1:414-417).  Wander becomes more than a calling, and that which one never lays aside.  
As Frances Ferguson states, “the biography of the Wanderer, which the Poet relates, 
does much less to establish the character of the Wanderer than to reveal the 
tenuousness of his links to the earth,” and “‘the excursive power’ of the Wanderer’s 
mind depends greatly upon the fact that he is no longer tied to any vocation—even one 
so peripatetic as that of a pedlar” (201). 
Although The Excursion presents a rhetorical fashioning of wander as a free and 
natural movement, it also reveals wander to be a rarified endeavour that is increasingly 
under threat.  At different times, both the Poet and the Solitary link the Wanderer to 
the tradition of medieval romance.  The Poet observes, “In days of yore how fortunately 
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fared / The Minstrel! wandering on from Hall to Hall, / Baronial Court or Royal; cheered 
with gifts” (2: 1-4).  By positioning the Wanderer as a living incarnation of this 
tradition—as one who “walked—protected from the sword of war”—the Poet couches 
the act of wander within an historical tradition of freedom and social mobility (2: 13).  
The Solitary similarly casts the Wanderer as a medieval figure of romance, although as a 
knight-errant, rather than a minstrel: “Errant Those, / Exiles and Wanderers—and the 
likes are These; / Who, with their burthen, traverse hill and dale, / Carrying relief for 
Nature’s simple wants” (8: 47-50).  The Wanderer’s placement within this tradition 
continues the rhetorical construction of wander as a free and historical right of way, but 
it also positions the Wanderer as a thing of the past.  Indeed, the Wanderer responds to 
the Solitary by declaring the disappearance of his former profession.  The Wanderer 
states, “But, if to these Wayfarers once pertained / Aught of romantic interest, ’tis gone; 
/ Their purer service, in this realm at least, / Is past for ever” (8: 86-88).  The Wanderer’s 
wander, romantic as it might be, is outmoded.  Clare A. Simmons argues that 
medievalism, as it develops later in the nineteenth-century through figures such as John 
Ruskin, functions as a means of articulating a distance between a glorified past and a 
present perceived to be in decline.  Simmons states,  
When Wordsworth wrote The Excursion the word ‘medieval’ was yet to 
enter the English language.  Examples of medievalism nevertheless 
appear as soon as thinkers and artists detected difference and distance 
between themselves and the Middle Ages, usually prompted by a need to 
find a critical distance from the present . . . medievalism looks for value 
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by contrasting the style, ethics, and society of the past with the present. 
(131)   
The “sentimental medievalism” elicited by the Wanderer compromises the tenability of 
the rhetoric of wander it supports, by couching that rhetoric within an inherently 
nostalgic discourse that takes issue with present (133). 
In addition to the potentially outmoded status of the Wanderer, the act of 
wander itself appears to be a privileged movement that is, for the most part, removed 
from, and out of touch with, everyday life.  The poem opens with an image of laboured 
walking that actively counteracts the rhetoric of wander established elsewhere in the 
text.  The Poet states,  
Across a bare wide Common I was toiling 
With languid feet, which by the slippery ground 
Were baffled; nor could my weak arm disperse 
The host of insects gathering round my face, 
And ever with me as I paced along. (1: 21-25)   
Rather than engaging in freeing and bucolic wander, the Poet struggles and stumbles 
through nature.  This is repeated, William Howard observes, as the Poet follows the 
Wanderer up the steep ascent to the Solitary’s valley: “here, too, he bemoans the 
topographical resistance to his progress,” and stands “in contrast” to the Wanderer who 
“appreciates the prospect of discovery and reward: he climbs” (520, 521).  The sheer 
physical challenge that constitutes rural ambulation calls attention to the idealism that 
informs the rhetoric of wander, and, hence, its removal from everyday life.  This 
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removal is furthered in the reversed allusion the poem makes in its opening lines to the 
concluding lines of Paradise Lost.  As David Simpson points out, the Poet reverses the 
ejection from the garden by crossing a plain under a hot sun “mounted high” in order to 
make his way back into a “grateful resting-place” (1: 1, 20).  Simpson writes, “the final 
lines of Milton’s poem have Adam and Eve descending out of Eden to a plain parched 
with punishing heat; Wordsworth who knew perfectly well that he was risking 
geographical incoherence to bring it about, has his poem begin there, and moves from 
thence to a landscape that is, for the narrator, Edenic” (205).  The figurative return to 
Eden undertaken by the Poet, therefore, casts the Wanderer, whom he finds there—
“Him whom I sought; a Man of reverend age, / But stout and hale, for travel 
unimpaired”—as a removed and sheltered figure of paradise (1: 33-34).  The idealness 
of the Wanderer is heightened further by the fact that before he is encountered he is 
proleptically envisioned as a “dreaming man / Half conscious of the soothing melody, / 
With side-long eye looks out upon the scene,” by the Poet as he labours across the 
ground swatting flies (1: 14-16).  Upon arriving at the “roofless Hut” under the “lofty 
elms” the Poet sees the Wanderer as an incarnation of the dreaming man: “Supine the 
Wanderer lay” (1: 470).  The Edenic, sheltered, and removed nature of the Wanderer 
troubles the poem’s rhetoric of wander, by raising questions as to its accessibility and 
viability.  Simpson goes on to point out how the poem tries to reconcile satanic 
individualism and freedom with Edenic collectivity and security through the act of 
wander.  The poem expresses the “desire to wander within safe limits,” and thus to 
have “the best of both worlds;” however, Simpson adds, this is “hard to achieve in a 
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world where the conventions of patronage have disappeared” (207).  This kind of 
“productive wandering” is only possible through the “supportive presence” of a “helping 
hand” (208).  Simpson argues that “the role of patron is now fulfilled by Lord Lonsdale, 
as the dedicatory sonnet makes clear,” and this patronage demonstrates how the 
“wandering powers of the poet’s mind are not independent of Lonsdale’s goodwill” 
(208).  Wander is thus a removed, idealized, and, indeed, patronized endeavour.  The 
rhetoric of wander as free and unencumbered, as promoted by both the Poet and the 
Wanderer, must be actively buttressed and protected.  
 The idea that wander in The Excursion is, in fact, far more rarified and contained 
than its rhetoric would suggest is evident in the Wanderer’s purposiveness.  Throughout 
the poem the Wanderer ensures that the excursion remains on task and free from any 
of the deviations and diversions one might expect from an act of wander.  Before 
heading to the valley of the Solitary the Poet describes his and the Wanderer’s wander: 
Such intercourse I witnessed, while we roved 
Now as his choice directed, now as mine; 
 Or both, with equal readiness or will, 
Our course submitting to the changeful breeze 
Of accident.  But when the rising sun 
Had three times called us to renew our walk, 
My fellow Traveler said with earnest voice, 
As if the thought were but a moment old, 
That I must yield myself without reserve 
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To his disposal. (2: 84-93)  
What begins as a free and directionless movement—where each takes turns leading, 
following, and deviating at will—becomes a directive to follow and to keep to one 
singular direction.  Early in Book II, wander gives way to teleological and purposive 
walking.  This more forceful and focused ambulation is continued as the two make their 
way towards the Solitary.  As the Poet and the Wanderer come across a Maypole 
celebration the Poet wonders, “shall we quit our road and join / These festive matins?’” 
(2: 146-147).  The Wanderer shuts down the prospect by stating “Not loth / Here would 
I linger, and with you partake, / Not one hour merely, but till evening’s close, / The 
simple pastimes of the day and place” (2: 147-150).  The Wanderer claims he would stay 
and happily deviate or wander from their course, but he tempers this desire by asserting 
the need to finish what one starts, and by offering a slight reprimand on the dangers of 
deviation:  
But know we not that he, who intermits 
The appointed task and duties of the day, 
Untunes full oft the pleasures of the day; 
Checking the finer spirits that refuse 
To flow, when purposes are lightly changed? 
We must proceed—a length of journey yet 
Remains untraced. (2:155-160)   
The Wanderer cautions against the dangers of wandering by presenting wander as an 
act that threatens the economical expenditure of time.   
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This injunction to stay on course is advanced by the Wanderer throughout the 
text.  As the Solitary hosts the Poet and the Wanderer at his abode, he brings “from the 
Cupboard wine and stouter cheer” (2: 933); however, the Wanderer waves this 
hospitality off, stating: “Nay, nay, / You have regaled us as a Hermit ought; / Now let us 
forth into the sun!” (2: 935-937).  Again, the Wanderer eschews dalliance and deviation, 
and ensures that the group keeps moving.  Tellingly, the Poet reports that the Solitary, 
“Our Host / Rose, though reluctantly, and forth we went” (2: 937-938).  The Solitary’s 
reluctance to move registers the obligation to move that comes from the Wanderer.  
This prodding is continued later on, as the Solitary plans to take his leave after the 
Wanderer delivers a lengthy discourse in Book IV: “Nay,” The Wanderer states, “The 
fragrant Air its coolness still retains; / The Herds and Flocks are yet abroad to crop / The 
dewy grass; you cannot leave us now, / We must not part at this inviting hour” (5: 65, 
66-70).  The Wanderer, like a shepherd, continues to herd and corral the group by 
proposing a visit to the village churchyard.  The Wanderer wanders less than he 
purposively walks, which reconfigures his wander as an act of productive expenditure. 
 Celeste Langan argues that walking in the early-nineteenth-century becomes a 
means of authorizing and performing an emergent liberalism.  Langan states,  
“the liberal subject is constituted as an essentially mobile subject, dispossessed of local 
attachments” (230).  This mobility, with its attendant severing of locality, however, 
becomes an injunction and a compulsion to keep moving.  Langan uses the example of 
the cost of a liberal education to underline the paradox of liberalism: “Liberal education 
frees the subject to travel (in a ‘liberal’ quasi-geographical space where ‘every road is 
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open’) but subjects him to debt, so deep a debt that digression is out of the question, 
since tenure or security is always already receding” (234).  The liberal subject’s freedom 
is forged, therefore, upon the directive of mobility that must be performed and enacted 
so as to mask and erase its obligatory nature.  Langan asserts that despondency—the 
kind experienced by Margaret and the Solitary—develops within an inability to perform 
the fiction of liberalism, where the desire for actual mobility is thwarted.  The 
restorative cure for this lapse, Langan argues, is walking.  Lagan writes: “what 
Wordsworth identifies as cause of despondency and default, the mistaken 
transformation of negative freedom (of movement) into positive right (expectation that 
‘open’ roads must yield advancement) is corrected by the recommendation to walk” 
(228).  Walking becomes the way in which the ethos of liberalism is constituted as a 
mode of being in and of itself.  The Wanderer’s purposive wander is precisely this form 
of productive walking that underwrites liberalism; it is that which “mime[s] the aesthetic 
virtue of ‘purposiveness without purpose’” (231).  The wander advocated by the 
Wanderer is not intent on aimless and radical freedom, but proffers instead a 
purposiveness that becomes a purposefulness in its performance of a productive, 
intentioned liberalism.  Within liberalism, Langan writes, “the cure for dispossession and 
unemployment—vagrancy—is walking” (238).  The Wanderer’s wander thus takes on a 
decidedly ideological turn, where what appears to be unstructured freedom is an 
injunction to adhere to a newly emerging socio-economic modality. 
 Following Langan I argue that the rhetorical fashioning of wander in The 
Excursion is effectively the promotion of a more disciplinary walking—a walking that 
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presents time as that which ought to be productively put to use.  The Wanderer, in his 
tramping, “had observed the progress and decay / Of many minds and bodies too; / The 
History of many Families” (1: 404-406).  The knowledge he gains from his walking is 
“gathered up from day to day,” and is a testament to time spent (1: 424).  After leading 
the Poet away from the Maypole festivities, the Wanderer justifies this persistence by 
yoking walking with the productive passing of time.  The Wanderer says to the Poet, 
“You will receive, before the hour of noon, / Good recompense, I hope, for this day’s 
toil—” (2: 164-165).  The connection between walking and the productive passing of 
time is evident in the Wanderer’s depiction of Margaret’s tale as well.  The Wanderer 
halts his narrative soon after beginning, to turn to the time of day, and to question 
whether or not recounting the sad story is its most fitting expenditure:  
’Tis now the hour of deepest noon,— 
At this still season of repose and peace, 
This hour, when all things which are not at rest 
Are cheerful; while this multitude of flies 
Is filling all the air with melody;  
Why should a tear be in an Old Man’s eye? (1: 623-628) 
The Poet soon after asks the Wanderer to “resume his story,” and the “Old Man” 
consents, but does so through language that promotes the useful expenditure of time 
(1: 654, 655).  The Wanderer claims that the wrong way to recount the tale would be for 
the purposes of a “vain dalliance” of “a moment pleasure,” and he chastises this more 
free and detached approach to storytelling—one that is more akin to wander (1: 659, 
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661).  Instead, he advances a more committed purposiveness in his storytelling, the aim 
of which is for “future good” (1: 662).  To that end, the Wanderer concludes his tale by 
rerouting the story’s pathos back into productive walking.  He states,  
That what we feel of sorrow and despair 
From ruin and from change, and all the grief 
The passing shews of Being leave behind, 
Appeared an idle dream, that could not live 
Where meditation was. I turned away 
And walked along my road in happiness. (1: 979-984) 
In his retelling, the Wanderer denies his own temporal experience—an experience that 
is necessarily deviating if not derailing—so as to fold Margaret’s narrative back into a 
past, which in turn powers the purposive walking of the present and future.  Rather than 
being affected or put off course by the sorrow he had experienced at the ruined 
cottage, he continues down the road, and in that continuance he converts his 
experience into a productive temporal expenditure.  The Wanderer’s insistence on 
moving on enacts a discipline of time-thrift that yields the productivity of the 
Wanderer’s state of peace, pleasure, and the sense of plenty.  To be sure, the 
Wanderer’s recounting of Margaret’s narrative is punctuated by markers of passing 
time, and, moreover, is structured by his own repeated walking visitations, where each 
return to the cottage—each increment of time passed—elicits further disorder and 
decline.  Each walk passes time and casts Margaret within a sequential and irreversible 
temporality starting with the very beginning of the tale: “Not twenty years ago, but you 
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I think / Can scarcely bear it now in mind, there came / Two blighting seasons” (1: 566-
568).  The purposive walking advocated by the Wanderer promotes a notion of time 
that is a forwardly-oriented and productive. 
The rhetoric of wander in The Excursion yokes productive walking with the 
productive spending of time as a means of offsetting the emergence and persistence of 
another response to clock time and its mutability: namely, “Despondency.”  Citing 
Coleridge’s suggestion that “the larger project of ‘The Recluse’” might operate as a 
“remedy for the ‘malaise’ of postrevolutionary depression,” Langan argues that this 
despondency is rooted in the seismic sociopolitical shift of the French Revolution (226).  
This “mental or emotional breakdown,” Langan writes, is “attributable, no doubt, to a 
multitude of causes, but chiefly to the collapse of what recent political theorists have 
named ‘the Jacobin imaginary’” (226).  Langan sees this collapse as a response to the 
change “much lamented by Burke, from a discourse of obligations to one of rights” that 
accompanies the Revolution (226).  “The subject,” Langan writes, “no longer knows 
himself by virtue of what he owes to past, present, and future generations” (226). 
Although the Solitary actually does suffer from the collapse of the Jacobin imaginary, as 
he becomes a “despondent subject and defaulted citizen,” I identify this despondency as 
an effect of another modal shift: the change in temporality from a more landed, 
agrarian, and seasonal time to the more modern, industrial, and mutable temporality of 
clock time (227).  Such a shift in temporal experience wrenches bodies from time tied to 
labour, seasonal, and cultural practices to time as time—as an external and 
independent, unidirectional and disciplinary horizon of being. 
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The Excursion presents a world in flux where change, mutability, and, indeed, 
catastrophe, are no longer containable within traditional social and cultural structures.  
In the post-French-Revolutionary and early-Industrial-Revolutionary space of the text, 
clock time becomes the means through which mutability is formalized and contained.  
Clock time presents time as a forwardly moving sequence of uniform and quantified 
moments.  The sequence at once gives time, as open and available units of expenditure, 
but it takes time as well, as each moment must be relinquished to the sequence of past, 
present, and future.  The positive stance of clock time thus seeks to fill and spend time 
as it appears in the sequence.  The negative stance, on the other hand, watches 
helplessly as time forever recedes into an irretrievable past.  Clock time, therefore, 
engenders two distinct temporal responses: the positivity of filing time as it becomes 
available, and the negativity of surrendering time to the unidirectional and interminable 
sequence.  Both of these responses to clock time are presented in The Excursion.  The 
Wanderer advances the positivity of clock time through his purposiveness, while 
Margaret and the Solitary display the negativity of clock time through their 
despondency.  Thus Margaret and the Solitary as well as the Wanderer function within 
the same temporal mode: they represent two distinct responses to, and sides of, the 
emergent temporality of clock time as sequential, formalized change.  Margaret’s and 
the Solitary’s response takes the form of despondency, as they register time as an 
irreversible sequence with an irretrievable and painful past.  The Wanderer, on the 
other hand, actively and productively passes time by filling each successive present.  The 
Excursion then pits one response against the other, as the Wanderer’s purposiveness 
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becomes the positive corollary to the two cautionary tales of Margaret’s and the 
Solitary’s despondency. 
 The dual response to clock time, as the temporality of mutability, presented by 
The Excursion is better understood through Paul De Man’s consideration of 
Wordsworth’s other figurations of temporality.  De Man shows how mutability in 
Wordsworth’s texts tends to signify temporality.  Time, he argues, can only ever be 
understood negatively because “the relationship between the self and time is 
necessarily mediated by death; it is the experience of mortality that awakens within us a 
consciousness of time that is more than merely natural” (17).  Only in seeing one’s self 
as a non-self—in realizing that the self “never exists in isolation, but always in relation to 
entities, since it is not a thing but the common center of a system of relationships or 
intents”—can one glean a sense of one’s authentic temporality (16).  The negative 
understanding of time, however, opens a gap between understanding and language.  
“This negativity is so powerful,” De Man observes, “that no language could ever name it 
for what it is; time itself lies beyond language and beyond the reach of imagination” 
(17).  Within this gap, De Man argues, Wordsworth “can only describe the outward 
movement of time’s manifestation, and this outward movement is necessarily one of 
dissolution” (17).  Accordingly, time becomes simply the movement of difference or of 
“dissolution.”  Therefore, negative temporal insight, when depicted in “the privileged 
language of the imagination,” becomes “the generalized statement of the truth of this 
experience in its universality” (17).  The insight of the self’s authentic sense of its non-
self—as an object caught up in a vast network—is the insight and authentic 
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understanding of temporality; however, when that insight is translated back into the 
imagination, as the discourse of the self, that insight becomes a grand and 
transcendental, but insufficient and somewhat banal statement about change.  De Man 
writes, “Dissolution thus becomes mutability, asserted as an unfailing law that governs 
the natural, personal, and historical existence of man” (17).   
Nonetheless, the insight remains in spite of being lost in translation.  “To name 
mutability as a principle of order,” de Man writes, “is to come as close as possible to 
naming the authentic temporal consciousness of the self” (17).  Wordsworth’s poetry is 
not about the eternal laws of nature—it is not a re-hashing of the universalizing figure of 
time’s remorseless scythe—but the necessarily independent problem of temporality.  
De Man states, “the bond between men is not one of common enterprise, or of a 
common belonging to nature: it is much rather the recognition of a common temporal 
predicament that finds its expression in the individual and historical entities that strike 
the poet as exemplary” (15).  What appear to be general and universal statements of 
nature as change are, in effect, specific, local, and untranslatable accounts of authentic 
temporality.  “Examples abound” in Wordsworth’s poetry, “from ‘The Ruined Cottage’ 
to ‘Resolution and Independence,’ and in the various time-eroded figures that appear 
throughout The Prelude” argues De Man (15).  What each of these examples “share is 
not nature but time, as it unfolds its power in these individual and collective histories” 
(15).  De Man is not writing about clock time, but his formulation of mutability, as 
authentic, negative temporal insight or as positive, imaginative statement, maps on to 
the dual responses that clock time produces, as the temporality of mutability.  If 
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mutability is a transfiguration of a particular temporal predicament, then the movement 
of this figure from an authentic negative temporal realization, through death, to a 
general affirmative temporal statement of the imagination reflects the two poles 
occupied by Margaret/the Solitary and the Wanderer.  The Wanderer becomes the 
imaginative translator of despondency converting the authentic understanding of the 
temporal predicament into a universal stance, while the other two experience a 
negative but authentic temporality that leaves them despondent. 
 The Excursion indexes and registers these two distinct responses to the 
temporality of clock time through its presentation of two distinct iterations of wander.  
David Simpson observes how the rhetoric of wander espoused by the Poet and the 
Wanderer is far from ironclad, for as the Poet “celebrates the apparently perpetual 
motion of wandering, so he recognizes it as the trope of alienation and displacement, 
and finds himself longing for a place at the fixed centre of a troubled world” (206).  
Margaret’s and the Solitary’s despondency in clock time is presented through their 
respective acts of displaced and alienated wander, while the Wanderer’s productive 
expenditure of clock time is presented through his affirmative rhetoric of free wander.  
Whereas Margaret and the Solitary are despondent objects of clock time who wander 
aimlessly, the Wanderer is an imaginary subject of clock time who wanders purposively.  
Paul Fry attests to how the presentation of wander in the poem is both negative and 
positive at once: “wandering too is as often as not a dubious pastime, and has been ever 
since the river in Milton’s Eden followed its mazy course.  Yet in one sense or another 
wandering is what everybody does, and Wordsworth seems for the most part relatively 
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uninterested in controlling the sometimes Spenserian or Miltonic ironies associated with 
the word” (168).  Margaret and the Solitary are the inverse of the Wanderer: while he 
productively spends time through positive, purposive wander, they experience this 
same time as alienation, and they wander negatively and listlessly as a result.  While the 
wander of Margaret and the Solitary is dispossessed and pained, the wander advocated 
by the Wanderer is ideological, in so far as it strives to replace authentic temporal 
insight with a universalizing productivity, where time as loss is transfigured into time 
spent. 
 The ruined cottage narrative of Book I dramatizes how clock time, as the 
formalization of the temporality of mutability, generates despondent wander.  The 
sweeping changes that visit Margaret’s life begin with the loss of her husband Robert, 
who likewise experiences the temporality of mutability, grows despondent, and 
becomes an alienated wanderer as a result.  The tale of the ruined cottage is presented 
through the language of clock time: “Not twenty years ago” occurred “Two blighting 
seasons” (1:566, 568); Margaret “Went struggling on through those calamitous years” 
(1: 580); and, it is “ere the second autumn” that Robert is “smitten with perilous fever,” 
and soon finds that what was stored to meet “the hour of accident or crippling age / 
Was all consumed” (1: 581, 583, 586-587).  It is clock time itself as the form of the 
temporality of mutability that befalls the cottagers.  The change that clock time 
discloses to the cottagers, moreover, is embodied by industrialization, which is itself 
underwritten by clock time.  Cottage production and local weaving are, at this time, 
under threat.  The Wanderer observes: it was “A time of trouble; shoals of Artisans / 
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Were from their daily labour turn’d adrift” (1: 589-590).  As Fiona Stafford shows, 
“commercial imperatives drove traditional cottage industry into decline, as Wordsworth 
observed in a series of poems on the silence of ‘the cottage Spinning-wheel’” (126).  
Clock time, therefore, doubly affects the cottagers.  Not only does it elicit unforeseen 
and uncontainable change, it underwrites and authorizes the large-scale industrial 
production that renders the cottage industry obsolete.   
The ascendance of clock time converts Robert into a despondent and temporally 
alienated subject.  The Wanderer recounts: 
  A sad reverse it was for Him who long 
  Had filled with plenty, and possess’d in peace, 
This lonely Cottage.  At his door he stood, 
And whistled many a snatch of merry tunes 
That had no mirth in them; or with his knife 
Carved uncouth figures on the heads of sticks— 
Then, not less idly, sought, through every nook 
In house or garden, any casual work 
Of use or ornament; and with a strange, 
Amusing, yet uneasy novelty. 
He blended, where he might, the various tasks 
Of summer, autumn, winter, and of spring (1: 598-607) 
Robert is uprooted from his own traditionally constituted temporality, as he becomes a 
detached, idle, and ironic figure—humming merry tunes without mirth, or tossing his 
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children “with a false unnatural joy” (1: 617).  Moreover his “uneasy” blending of tasks 
from all seasons at the same time stresses the fundamental temporal dispossession he 
experiences.  Robert is now removed from a more landed, seasonal temporality where 
labour and time are intertwined organically.  This temporal alienation and dispossession 
is ultimately figured through his alienated wander.  The Wanderer recalls how “day by 
day he drooped, / And he would leave his work—and to the Town, / Without an errand, 
would direct his steps, / Or wander here and there among the fields” (1: 611-614).  This 
is extended to the point where Robert’s temporal up-rootedness finds its full 
articulation in his complete conversion to the professional wander of soldiering.  
Ultimately Robert joins the military leaving behind the “pieces of money” he earns in so 
doing, and he departs in secret, lest Margaret “should follow with my Babes, and sink / 
Beneath the misery of that wandering Life” (1: 703, 713-714).  Robert’s enlistment is 
presented as a life of wander because his military regimentation completes his status as 
a dispossessed temporal object. 
 The same temporal dispossession that Robert experiences happens to Margaret 
as well, soon after Robert’s departure.  The Wanderer recalls her decline in time, which 
again stresses how it is time as mutability that is visited upon the cottagers.  Throughout 
his portrayal of Margaret’s narrative the Wanderer draws attention to the passage of 
time that indexes each of his visits: “We parted.— ’Twas the time of early spring” (1: 
723); “I journey’d back this way / Towards the wane of Summer” (1: 739); “I returned, / 
And took my rounds along this road again / Ere on its sunny bank the primrose flower / 
Peeped forth, to give an earnest of the Spring” (1: 848-851); “In bleak December, I 
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retraced this way” (1: 890); “Did many seasons pass ere I return’d / Into this tract again” 
(1: 905-906).  The Wanderer’s repeated visits to the cottage reveal Margaret’s status as 
cast within a forward-moving sequence of change.  This begins with her experience of 
Robert’s departure, which is also relayed through explicit markers of clock time: “two 
wretched days had pass’d, / And on the third” she noticed the packet containing the 
money from his enlistment (1: 695-969); and she learns her husband’s fate “ere that day 
was ended, / That long and anxious day!” (1: 706-707). 
The loss of Robert converts Margaret into an object caught within the sequential 
change of clock time, where for “Nine tedious years / From their first separation, nine 
long years, / She lingered in unquiet widowhood” (1: 906-908).  The despondency 
Margaret experiences in this temporal sentence of widowhood indicates her own 
alienation.  The Poem registers this temporal dispossession through the entropic decline 
of Margaret’s “poor Hut” which “Sank to decay” (1: 935, 936).  The Wanderer observes 
that her house  
Bespake a sleepy hand of negligence. 
The floor was neither dry nor neat, the hearth 
Was comfortless, and her small lot of books, 
Which, in the cottage window, heretofore 
Had been piled up against the corner panes 
In seemly order, now, with straggling leaves 
Lay scattered here and there.  (1: 856-863)   
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The disordered cottage, and the abandonment and neglect of her labours, show how 
Margaret becomes detached from her more local, seasonal temporality.  The Wanderer 
recalls how, “Alone, through half the vacant Sabbath-day” either in “yon arbour” or “On 
this old Bench / For hours she sate” (1: 912, 914-915).  Margaret’s despondency is 
caused and measured by the hours ticked out by the clock.  Indeed, upon one of his 
visits, the Wanderer finds Margaret has wandered off from the cottage, and as he 
awaits her return he notes, “Deeper shadows fell / From these tall elms;—the Cottage-
clock struck eight” (784).  The clock becomes the sole functioning object in the formerly 
productive and flourishing cottage.  In this declining rural space, the clock is the only 
thing that continues to work.  
The temporal alienation Margaret experiences in clock time is realized in her 
despondency and in her aimless wander.  She returns to her cottage to find the 
Wanderer waiting and says, “It grieves me you have waited here so long / I’ve wandered 
much of late” (1: 788-789); and soon after she declares, “I have been travelling far; and 
many days / About the fields I wander, knowing this / Only, that what I seek I cannot 
find. / And so I waste my time: for I am changed” (1: 797-802).  Margaret’s wander 
reveals a listlessness that she cannot help but vocalize as a waste of time.  In both cases, 
her wander is presented as the opposite of productive temporal expenditure.  Rather 
than having and productively spending time, Margaret’s wander wastes time and wastes 
the time of the waiting Wanderer.  The Wanderer expresses frustration at having to wait 
for Margaret’s return from her wander.  As he “waited her return” (1: 745) he recounts 
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his experience of waiting in time, which finally builds to his frustration and “sad 
impatience” (1: 770):  
Ere this an hour 
Was wasted.—Back I turned my restless steps, 
And as I walked before the door, it chanced 
A Stranger passed; and, guessing whom I sought, 
He said that she was used to ramble far.— 
The sun was sinking in the west (1: 764-769)   
The Wanderer subtly casts judgment upon Margaret for failing to become a functioning 
subject of clock time.  He notes the decline of the cottage and garden, which “appeared 
/ To lag behind the season” (1: 753-754), but also her “idle loom” (1: 886); and he recalls 
how on a visit “That very time / Most willingly she put her work aside, / And walked with 
me along the miry road” (1: 897-899).  Her reluctance to work in time is part and parcel 
of her increased detachment.  The Wanderer is disturbed by her unproductive use of 
time—a waste that causes the Wanderer to note, “the longer I remained more 
desolate” (1: 776).  William Galperin observes that Margaret herself becomes incapable 
of “trying to change her situation” because she grows too “‘self-occupied’” (360).  
Margaret is unable to “defend herself or her world from the ravages of subjectivism and 
desire” (360).  This “individuation” becomes an “inescapable and tragic state” Galperin 
suggests (360).  But the source of this individuation is a clock time that produces 
subjects accountable to a new and disciplinary frame of being.  Against such temporal 
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organization the Wanderer posits the reclamation and re-affirmation of individuation 
through the productive expenditure of time. 
 The Solitary’s tale of loss echoes that of Margaret’s, but the Solitary continues to 
live.  As an educated but lapsed liberal subject, the Solitary is not outmoded, like the 
cottage weavers, but he is in need of an active re-acclimatization to the temporality of 
clock time.  To be sure, the Solitary, in his past life, enjoyed the same belief and 
commitment to free wander as the Wanderer continues to espouse, and, like the 
Wanderer, the Solitary had linked that free wander to the productive expenditure of 
time.  The Solitary recalls how, “to endear the hours / Of winter, and protect that 
pleasant place. / —Wild were the walks upon those lonely Downs, / Track leading into 
track, how marked, how worn” (3: 538-541).  The Solitary and his wife were 
“unmolested Wanderers” whose free movement in nature was coextensive with their 
free movement in time, where “all the grove and all the day was” theirs (3: 548, 557).  
The equation of this wander with productivity is furthered in the Solitary’s claim that he 
continued to wander while domestic demands kept his wife at home.  The reproductive 
productivity of domesticity “Endeared [his] wanderings; and the Mother’ kiss, / And 
infant’s smile, awaited [his] return” (3: 590-591).  Free wander effectively underwrites 
the making of the Solitary’s family abode, and authorizes the temporal expenditure that 
constitutes that domestic life.  However, like Margaret mutability befalls him as his 
family dies in quick succession.  Tellingly, he figures the onset of this change through 
measured time when he states, “Seven years of occupation undisturbed / Established 
seemingly a right to hold / That happiness” (3: 631-632).  The shock of this change 
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oversees the Solitary’s shift into the other available temporal response of despondency.  
The battle for the heart and mind of the Solitary that constitutes The Excursion, then, 
can be read as a figure for the struggle to install the positive version of time as a 
productive expenditure, over and against the persistence of the negative experience of 
time as alienation and waste.  As Hartman observes “at the dramatic center of the poem 
stands the Solitary: can his mind be restored to health” (300).  The tension of the poem 
rests upon the reconversion of this lapsed subject: the “alter ego of the Wanderer,” as 
Paul Fry puts it, “a clinical exhibit of what happens when idealism fades” (166). 
Like Margaret, it is clock time—as the temporality of mutability—that strikes the 
Solitary, and rattles his notion of time as a productive expenditure.  The deaths of his 
children come as bolts from the blue: “But at once / From some dark seat of fatal Power 
was urged / A claim that shattered all.—Our blooming Girl, / Caught in the gripe of 
Death, with such brief time” (3: 645-648); and, “—With even as brief a warning—and 
how soon / With what short interval of time between / I tremble yet to think of—our 
last prop, / Our happy life’s only remaining stay— / The Brother followed; and was seen 
no more!” (3: 654-658).  The deaths evoke a crisis, but it is their unexpectedness in time, 
the idea that things can occur “at once” and “with what short interval of time,” that is 
equally unimaginable.  This mutability is uncontainable for the Solitary.  He states, 
“What followed cannot be reviewed in thought” (3: 689).  His response to this rapid and 
uncontainable change is to become an object of time, rather than a productive temporal 
subject.  His “Soul / Turned inward,—to examine of what stuff / Time’s fetters are 
composed; and Life was put / To inquisition, long and profitless!” (3:703-706).  The 
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Solitary grows “Hopeless, and still more hopeless every hour,” as time itself becomes an 
external and irreversible venue where he can only ever realize “what I myself have lost, 
/ Nor can regain” (3: 797, 968-969).   
Also like Margaret, the Solitary performs his temporal response of despondency 
through displaced and uprooted wander.  After his second disillusionment with the 
world—the violent cooption of the French Revolution—the Solitary flees Europe for 
North America to wander aimlessly: “Here may I roam at large;—my business is, / 
Roaming at large, to observe, and not to feel” (3: 899-900).  Indeed, this wander is 
linked to the feeling of powerlessness he experiences as a result of sequential and 
forward-moving time:  
Who, having o’er the past no power, would life 
No longer in subjection to the past, 
With abject mind—from a tyrannic Lord 
Inviting penance, fruitlessly endured. 
So like a Fugitive, whose feet have cleared 
Some boundary, which his Followers may not cross. (3: 881-886) 
The Solitary’s aimless wander is underwritten by the temporal dispossession he 
experiences as an object of clock time. 
 The Solitary lives on, but the life he lives might be characterized as a life-in-
death, or at least by the Wanderer.  The Solitary’s seclusion is designed to stave off the 
temporality of mutability.  He states that “Security from shock of accident” and “Release 
from fear; and cherished peaceful days” ought to be “the prime object of a wise Man’s 
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aim” (3: 370, 371, 369).  The Solitary fearfully marks time as ceaseless and irreversible 
change, and seeks to mitigate the blows of that change by preemptively severing his 
own attachments to life.  He states, 
Oh! tremble Ye to whom hath been assigned 
A course of days composing happy months, 
And they as happy years; the present still 
So like the past, and both, so firm a pledge 
Of a congenial future, that the wheels 
Of pleasure move without the aid of hope. 
For Mutability is Nature’s bane.  (3:459-465)  
The Solitary’s retreat has rendered him a passive and despondent object of clock time, 
rather than its active subject.  His association with clock time is laid bare as the group 
enters the cottage that houses his apartment.  “All within,” states the Poet “As left by 
that departed company, / Was silent; and the solitary clock / Ticked, as I thought, with 
melancholy sound.—” (2: 669, 670-671).  The Solitary and the solitary clock are 
aligned—they both tick out the passing of time.  The Solitary, “Beguiling harmlessly the 
listless hours,” views time as an external and passing sequence, and not a productive 
venue of being: “If I must take my choice between the pair / That rule alternately the 
weary hour, / Night is than day more acceptable (3: 140, 281-283).  The Solitary’s 
despondency arises from his authentic experience of the temporality of clock time as 
nothing more than a wearying sequence.  The Solitary, Frances Ferguson observes, 
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“forcefully locates the apocalyptic strain in the poem’s obsession with time and 
mortality” (209).  
 What is at stake for the Wanderer, then, is not simply the Solitary’s despondent 
state, but the threat his despondency raises to the Wanderer’s own project of a 
liberalized and naturalized clock time.  Hartman identifies the Solitary as “the Hamletian 
man in black, and a dangerous part of the Poet’s mind,” and the Wanderer’s goal is to 
attenuate the dangers this despondency brings to his configuration of clock time (307).  
The Wanderer’s own version of the Solitary’s tale, which he delivers to the Poet as the 
two make their way to the Solitary’s valley, censures the Solitary’s misspent time and 
misdirected wander.  The Wanderer recounts how after his tragedy the Solitary “wept, 
he prayed / For his dismissal; day and night” (2: 214-215), and how soon after “An 
uncomplaining apathy displaced / This anguish; and, indifferent to delight, / To aim and 
purpose, he consumed his days, / To private interest dead, and public care” (2: 219-
221).  The Solitary, the Wanderer observes, allows his days and nights to be consumed, 
rather than productively filling them himself.  Moreover, the Solitary’s wander, claims 
the Wanderer, has also been misguided: “After a wandering course of discontent / In 
foreign Lands,” the Solitary “Among these rugged hills” now “dwells, / And wastes the 
sad remainder of his hours / In self-indulging spleen” (2: 321-322, 326-328).  The 
wandering that the Solitary partakes in does not lead to the productive expenditure of 
time, but instead signifies and reifies his own position as an object of clock time—he 
wastes the time that the Wanderer deems must be productively spent.  For the 
Wanderer, it is more than just the Solitary’s social integration that is at stake in The 
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Excursion, it is the maintenance of the rhetoric of wander and the notion of time as 
productive expenditure, which that rhetoric serves.  
 The attempt to convert and restore the Solitary to public life is, therefore, also 
an attempt to reconcile the Solitary to clock time, and to re-naturalize clock time in the 
process.  In Book IV “Despondency Corrected,” a title Richard Gravil claims is valid only if 
we “construe ‘corrected’ as synonymous with upbraided,” the Wanderer roots this task 
in his call to the Solitary to reintegrate with nature (149).  The Wanderer states: 
Quit your Couch— 
Cleave not so fondly to you moody Cell; 
Nor let the hallowed Powers, that shed from heaven 
Stillness and rest, with disapproving eye 
Look down upon your taper, through a watch 
Of midnight hours, unseasonably twinkling 
In this deep Hollow; like a sullen star 
Dimly reflected in a lonely pool. 
Take courage, and withdraw yourself from ways 
That run not parallel to Nature’s course. 
Rise with the Lark! your Matins shall obtain 
Grace, be their composition what it may, 
If but with her’s performed; climb once again, 
Climb every day, those ramparts; meet the breeze 
Upon their tops,—adventurous as a Bee 
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That from you garden thither soars, to feed 
On new-blown heath; let yon commanding rock 
Be your frequented Watch-tower; roll the stone  
In thunder down the mountains: with all your might 
Chase the wild Goat; and, if the bold red Deer 
Fly to these harbours, driven by hound and horn 
Loud echoing, add your speed to the pursuit: 
So, wearied to your Hut shall you return, 
And sink at evening into sound repose. (4: 481-504) 
For the Wanderer, natural integration is the means through which social integration 
becomes possible.  The hermit’s life of late night, solitary contemplation runs counter to 
“Nature’s course.”  The Solitary, argues the Wanderer, needs to think less and do more.  
Accordingly, the Wanderer offers the rhetoric of natural wander as the means of 
facilitating this.  The Solitary needs to climb, roll, chase, and speed through nature—
taking his cue from the local fauna.  This reintegration with nature via a free and 
unencumbered movement, however, is also distinctly temporal.  The Wanderer’s 
harangue asserts the observance of a more normative, diurnal temporality—what Gravil 
identifies as the Wanderer’s overly simplistic philosophy of “early to bed, early to rise” 
(150).  By advocating the Solitary rise with the lark and turn in at evening, the Wanderer 
places the Solitary back in line with a productive temporal expenditure.  The Wanderer’s 
solution to the Solitary’s despondency is to reacclimatize him to clock time through the 
rhetoric of wander that naturalizes the productive spending of time.  Indeed, the 
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Wanderer’s urging of the Solitary to “roll the stone / In thunder down the mountains” 
invokes a classical equivalent to the monotony and disciplinarity of clock time: the 
Sisyphean punishment of eternal, repetitive labour.  However, the Wanderer occludes 
the monotony of Sisyphus, by calling attention only to the rock’s thunderous descent, 
and not to the ceaseless repetition of pushing it back up. 
 The Wanderer’s suggestion that the Solitary reconnect with nature is thus more 
clearly a directive for him to spend time.  The Poet echoes the Wanderer’s claim by 
likewise extolling “the liberty, for frail, for mortal man / To roam at large among 
unpeopled glens” (4: 514-515).  And, like the Wanderer, the Poet connects this free 
wander to a quantified temporality: “Be this continued so from day to day, / Nor let it 
have an end from month to month!” (4: 537-538).  The rhetoric of wander becomes the 
means through which the temporality of modernity, as alienation and despondency, is 
naturalized and converted into productive expenditure.  The Wanderer goes on to place 
this capacity to occupy time productively within a larger, purposive life narrative, where 
harnessing the power to spend time bestows the power to spend time.  The Wanderer 
states: 
  Whosoe’er in youth 
  Has, through ambition of his soul, given way 
  To such desires, and grasped at such delight,  
  Shall feel the stirrings of them late and long; 
  In spite of all the weakness that life brings,  
  Its cares and sorrows; he, though taught to own 
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  The tranquilizing power of time, shall wake, 
  Wake sometimes to a noble restlessness— 
  Loving the spots which once he gloried in.  (4: 540-547) 
Free wander enables a forward projection and a forward temporal movement that 
seems to retain the past as a continuously vital reservoir; however, the future-oriented 
movement of the language (shall feel, shall wake), ensures that past and future remain 
in their sequential order, and that time as a forward-moving sequence remains firmly 
intact.  The wandering life elicits the “tranquilizing power of time,” and anaesthetizes 
subjects to clock time’s external sequencing of time.  The Wanderer’s promotion of free 
wander is linked invariably to the expenditure of time: “Turn your steps / Wherever 
fancy leads, by day by night” (4: 552-553). 
 If the Wanderer’s efforts to reengage the Solitary turn out to be in the service of 
naturalizing clock time and of overriding its alternate response of despondency, then 
those efforts run the risk of becoming ideological.  But what ideology does the 
Wanderer serve?  The Wanderer’s Christianity and praise of rustic life, complete with its 
gendered hierarchies, would seem to align him with a traditional Tory paternalism; and 
yet, his natural supernaturalism and his rhetorical promotion of clock time also places 
him in league with an emergent bourgeois liberalism.  Hartman argues that the 
Wanderer veers towards propping up traditional interests: “religion and eloquence are 
still close enough so that as the Wanderer waxes in eloquence he also grows in religion.  
The poem, instead of keeping to the dilemma of the Solitary, becomes on occasion a 
defence of the Established church” (301).  This is furthered by the fact that the text 
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seems to surrender the Wanderer’s authority to the Pastor, in both the Churchyard 
Books and in granting the Pastor the final word in his closing vesper of Book IX.  
However, the High Church leanings of the Wanderer are compromised by his own self-
taught Calvinism and by the inflection of his religious views with natural, classical, and 
pastoral examples.  Both Hodgson and Galperin see the Wanderer, in spite of his 
characterization as a wise and venerable old man, as possessing an almost juvenile 
worldview.  Hodgson argues, “in too many such ways, the philosophical arguments of 
The Excursion, especially those of the Wanderer, are simply childish and naïve” (168).  
Accordingly, Hodgson continues, the text shows how “Wordsworth’s poetic decline after 
1807 results not from his loss of youthful spontaneity, his adoption of a transcendental 
creed, or his conversion to Christian orthodoxy, but from a basic philosophical naïvety 
and immaturity” (168).  Galperin also reads the Wanderer’s spiritual and ethical views as 
somewhat inchoate.  Galperin states,  
As his inability to correct the Solitary’s ‘despondency’ confirms, the 
Wanderer does less to remedy the Solitary’s problem than to ‘correct’ or 
reinscribe ‘despondency’ as a tendency toward secularization that shows 
the spirit of this age to be much like that of any other.  Correspondingly, 
the presence of the Solitary lets us appreciate how, in comparison to him, 
the Wanderer is a case of arrested development, whose recourse to the 
‘infancy of society’ as an exemplary moment in history is an outward 
token of his inability to grow up. (47)   
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Instead of offering a meaningful response, the Wanderer, Galperin shows, can only turn 
away from the present and recede into a nostalgic enchantment with the past.   
Andrew Hubbell, on the other hand, reconciles both the conservative and the 
liberal strains of the Wanderer by arguing that The Excursion, “skeptical of the 
established ideologies of both right and left,” strives to find a “hybrid vision” over and 
against the “dead-end discourse of political philosophy” (44).  Hubbell writes, 
Given . . . the political climate of the early Regency, The Excursion must 
begin by rewriting the rhetoric of poverty created by Burke and other 
major theorists of poverty, Thomas Malthus and Jeremy Bentham. The 
rewriting of this debate is necessarily going to be paradoxical, mixing 
conservative, liberal, humanist, religious, socialist, statist, and laissez-
faire language to create a new platform.  (47) 
According to Hubbell, the Wanderer’s blending of various religious, political, and 
rhetorical stances reflects the poem’s larger interest in “providing a dramatic contrast to 
the dominant language—utilitarian, statistical, abstract, allegorical—used at that time to 
describe the poor” (49).  This hybridized perspective, “a poetics of specificity that could 
account for the suffering of individuals,” Hubbell shows, “would not be welcomed by 
either the utilitarian radicals nor the paternalist conservatives because it is a radical 
challenge to a discourse shared across the political spectrum that dehumanized the 
poor” (49). 
 I argue that the Wanderer’s amalgamation of both Tory and Whig values is an 
attempt to contain and domesticate rapid social, cultural, and economic change within 
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traditional structures.  The Wanderer’s naturalization of clock time thus finds a way to 
couch this new temporal mode deep within a rhetorical configuration of traditional 
British culture.  The poem’s borrowings of pastoral and georgic tropes attest to this.  
Fiona Stafford argues that Wordsworth updates and renovates the tradition of the 
pastoral to address contemporary social concerns.  Stafford writes, “By avoiding the 
nymphs and swains, Wordsworth was able to recover some of Virgil's original pathos as 
well as his moral and social concerns” (123).  The Eclogues, Stafford argues, stress the 
onus that falls upon the poet to take on social and economic issues: “The Eclogues 
actually begin with lines on the poet's duty to meditate on rural matters, and contrast 
ideas of domestic attachment and rural plenitude with images of displacement and 
repossession” (123).  Wordsworth’s undertaking of the pastoral, Stafford shows, comes 
at a moment at which traditional rural life finds itself under erasure.  “By 1800,” Stafford 
writes, “the irreversible changes in rural communities brought on by successive 
enclosures, the movement of labour, the introduction of industrial methods into 
traditional crafts, the pull of new manufacturing centres and military recruitment, were 
widely recognized” (124).  Within this context of rapid social change Wordsworth draws 
upon the pastoral to create “an image of an ideal that can speak to everyone, 
irrespective of their own circumstances” (Stafford 125).  The pastoral then becomes a 
mode through which Wordsworth advocates a productive social, economic, and political 
agenda, and productively seeks “ways to counter the losses sustained by the rural 
communities” (Stafford 126).  The pastoral in Wordsworth’s hands becomes a purposive 
genre: “for just as it seems to be perpetually backward-looking and elegiac, it turns out 
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to be the form most concerned with continuity, with youth and with the future,” and 
thus becomes for Wordsworth “the mode for assuring cultural and national survival” 
(Stafford 132).   
Kevis Goodman shows how Wordsworth draws upon the georgic to advocate for 
the productive social work of mourning, over and against an individuated and 
despondent solipsism.  “The Excursion’s turn to the georgic, to the Virgilian background 
as mediated through Thompson, Cowper, and others,” writes Goodman, “imagines the 
verbal mediations that guide a response to history as collective labor, and it renders the 
work of mourning not as a private affair, a lyric moment, but as a communal 
undertaking” (167, 168).  Wordsworth draws upon the georgic in order to establish a 
communal poetic productivity that can offset and counteract the angst of solipsism.  
Focusing on the exhumation of the lives of the mountain churchyard undertaken by the 
Pastor, Goodman argues that “local storytelling and the transmission of tales between 
characters, which Walter Benjamin called ‘an artisan form of communication,’ become 
in the language of the poem as a whole, a form of georgic husbandry” (168).  “The 
Pastor,” Goodman writes, “attempts to close the wound of history, personal and 
national, that the melancholic Solitary has suffered, to combat the danger that the 
poem identifies as ‘uncomplaining apathy,’ or insensibility to history” (168).  
Wordsworth’s harnessing of the georgic links deep tradition with social productivity.   
The Excursion’s generic borrowings of the pastoral and the georgic channel the 
Wanderer’s call for a free and uninhibited wander through a socially productive turbine.  
Indeed, as Joshua Crandall observes, the pastoral has embedded within it a sociological 
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or ethnographical directive.  Crandall states, “In the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-
centuries, critics and poets approached the pastoral through ethnographic attempts to 
identify the properties of localized groups of people and an ethnological drive to 
compare these groups according to some sort of societal norm” (956).  This 
ethnographical turn in the pastoral forms a pivotal pretext in subsequent discourses of 
the social sciences.  “The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century development of pastoral 
comparison,” argues Crandall, “helps us recognize a concurrent ‘pastoral modernity’ 
cultivating a field of inquiry that would later be tilled by the sciences of culture and 
society” (957).  The Wanderer’s comments on economic change and on the social aims 
of education reflect this harnessing of the pastoral for socially scientific ends.  Crandall 
writes, 
In their attempts to define the environmental and customary features of 
their pastoral settings, these poets invited readers to ponder the relation 
between the practices and objects that distinguish a given society and to 
compare these cultural settings with one another.  In doing so they 
subjected social worlds to the kind of analysis that had hitherto been 
associated with the study of the natural world, anticipating the outlook 
and methods of the developing social sciences. (978) 
The Excursion’s use of the pastoral harnesses a genre that allows for development and 
change from within a traditional space.  The Wanderer can have his cake and eat it too, 
in advancing the new mode of temporal expenditure that is clock time, from within 
traditional, landed cultural identities.  He thus liberally bridges radical bourgeois change 
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(clock time and industrialization) with a traditional Tory world-view (seasonal and 
pastoral).  The poem uses the free and bucolic wandering associated with Arcadia for 
the productive temporality demanded by the rapidly industrializing landscape. 
 The Wanderer continues to walk this line between tradition and modernity in 
the critique he provides of the industrializing world.  The Wanderer offers several 
images of the loss of traditional, rural life at the hands of industrialization, but he does 
so in order to bring these more egregious instantiations of modernity into line with his 
rhetoric of a free and willing temporal expenditure.  The Wanderer observes and 
laments the social and cultural change that accompanies industrialization.  The factory is 
a dominating force that supplants rural labour with a uniform and disciplinary mode of 
production.  
Then, in full many a region, once like this 
The assured domain of calm simplicity 
And pensive quiet, an unnatural light, 
Prepared for never-resting Labour’s eyes, 
Breaks from a many-windowed Fabric huge; 
And at the appointed hour a Bell is heard— 
Of harsher import than the Curfew-knoll 
That spake the Norman Conqueror’s stern behest, 
A local summons to unceasing toil! 
Disgorged are now the Ministers of day; 
And, as they issue from the illumined Pile, 
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A fresh Band meets them, at the crowded door,— 
And in the Courts—and where the rumbling Stream,  
That turns the multitude of dizzy wheels, 
Glares, like a troubled Spirit, in its bed 
Among the rocks below.  Men, Maidens, Youths, 
Mother and little Children, Boys and Girls, 
Enter, and each the wonted task resumes.  (8: 167-185) 
Industrialization disrupts traditional economic practices, and overwrites long-standing 
domestic roles, where adult and child, and woman and man work machines side by side; 
but it also supplants traditional notions of temporality with a new and disciplinary clock 
time.  Summoned to work by the clock, and working around the clock, this new mode of 
industrial production violently wrenches bodies into an uprooted and detached 
temporality that channels work within set hours that commences and terminates at set 
times.  The changes wrought by industrialization are not just economic and 
environmental, but modal—the shift is a shift in the very experience of time itself.  
Indeed, the Poet’s inquiry as to “Where now the beauty of the Sabbath kept / With 
conscientious reverence, as a day” stresses the extent to which the changes of 
industrialization are fundamentally temporal (8: 248-249).  The Poet acknowledges the 
loss of a more heterogeneous, localized temporality when he asks, “and where the 
winning grace / Of all the lighter ornaments attached / To time and season, as the year 
rolled round?” (8: 248-253).    
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 Despite this, the factory, with its “unceasing toil,” is presented as a glaring 
example of an excessive and misguided interpretation of clock time, rather than proof 
positive of the need for its complete condemnation.  The factory is figured as a foreign 
and invading body—its call to work is harsher than the “Curfew-knoll / That spake the 
Norman Conqueror’s stern behest.”  Indeed, the Wanderer goes on to compare the 
factory to another “foreign” body, the Catholic Church.  The Factory is the new 
“Temple—where is offered up / To Gain—the Master Idol of the Realm, / Perpetual 
sacrifice,” and its practices and demands are figured as a continuation of medieval 
Catholic practices (185-187).  
Our Ancestors, within the still domain 
Of vast Cathedral or Conventual Church, 
Their vigils kept; where tapers day and night 
On the dim altar burned continually, 
In token that the House was evermore 
Watching to God.  Religious Men were they; 
Nor would their Reason, tutored to aspire 
Above this transitory world, allow 
That there should pass a moment of the year, 
When in their land the Almighty’s Service ceased.  (8: 188-197) 
The factory is in line with a long tradition of superstition, idolatry, slavishness and 
subjugation—a continued aftershock of the medieval foreign influence of the Norman 
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Conquest and the Papists.  The factory is problematic because its demands are 
perpetual and insatiable, and because of its capacity for enchantment and possession. 
David Simpson addresses the Wanderer’s ambiguous position regarding 
modernity, by showing how his critique of the rapid changes of industrialization is offset 
by other moments in the text that show how a simplistic belief in the rural idyll is no 
longer tenable.  Simpson states that the Wanderer takes on an “almost proto-Marxist” 
perspective in his analysis of “the labour patterns and consequent cultural profile of the 
factory economy” over and against “agrarian experience” (189); however, these views 
are tempered, if not neutralized, by the ways in which the poem makes it “implausible 
to suggest that the agrarian ideal is a potential solution for doing away with all forms of 
social disjunction and distinction” (195).  Indeed, rather than a “naïve utopianism” the 
Wanderer’s critique of industrialization, Simpson argues, is based more upon its 
implementation (195).  The Wanderer’s concerns address “woes of a variable human 
nature suffering the developments of a modern manufacturing society,” against which 
the Wanderer might posit a more incremental approach—the “‘trickle-down’ model of 
social reform that characterizes much of Wordsworth’s later thought” (196, 198). 
 Indeed, in the same breath the Wanderer turns from condemning 
industrialization to extolling its virtues.  The Wanderer is impressed with British 
ingenuity and the sheer power of industry.  After drawing a comparison between 
monastic rites and industrial rites, the Wanderer states:  
Triumph who will in these profaner rites 
Which We, a generation self-extolled, 
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As zealously perform!  I cannot share  
His proud complacency; yet I exult, 
Casting reserve away, exult to see 
An intellectual mastery exercised 
O’er the blind Elements; a purpose given, 
A perseverance fed; almost a soul 
Imparted—to brute Matter.  I rejoice, 
Measuring the force of those gigantic powers, 
Which by the thinking Mind have been compelled 
To serve the will of feeble-bodied Man. (8: 200-209) 
The Wanderer cannot help but be impressed by this new “inventive Age,” and is almost 
triumphant in his appraisal of the power of industry (8: 89).  There is a sense of awe and 
wonder in his tone as he observes this “new and unforeseen Creation rise/ From out the 
labours of a peaceful Land,” a technological capacity capable of “Wielding her potent 
Enginery to frame / And to produce, with appetite as keen / As that of War, which rests 
not night or day” (8: 92-93, 94-96).  Paul Fry argues that the Wanderer walks a fine line 
between the more conventional Wordsworthian concern for modernity’s erasure of 
traditional life, and a celebratory, proto-Victorian acclaim for industrialization.  Fry 
states that the Wanderer “has the largely negative feelings any Wordsworthian 
character must have about the coming of industrialization, but uniquely in his case these 
feelings are tempered by his curiously Heideggerian fascination with the machine’s 
imposition of authority—mastery—of the natural world” (165).  The Wanderer 
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expresses concern for the loss of traditional society, but at the same time his language 
reveals an awe-struck fascination with the capabilities of industry.  The Wanderer 
observes how the traditional “foot-path faintly marked” (8: 107) has “vanished, —
swallowed up by stately roads” (8: 111), and he notes how a small village, at “social 
Industry’s command,” can be “rapidly” converted into a “huge town, continuous and 
compact, / Hiding the face of earth for leagues” (8: 120, 118, 121-122).  Despite his 
concerns, the roads are “stately” and the towns are impressively and expediently built.  
Fry continues, “the Wanderer, like Heidegger, is of two minds . . . we can either harness 
the Rhine . . . or share Being with the river.  But as a social theorist, the Wanderer 
betrays the Coleridgean dream of a great philosophical poem transcendentally derived 
by extending the theme of mastery into a utilitarian dream of imperial Englishness” 
(165). 
 The Wanderer advances just such a vision of imperialism when he draws a link 
between Britain’s ascendant industrial power and what he deems to be its colonial 
imperative, in what amounts to an early iteration of “The White Man’s Burden.”  As 
Simpson observes, the Wanderer extolls the “virtues of colonialism,” by claiming that, 
“the ideal social life is something that it is Britain’s duty to export” (194).  The 
Wanderer’s “views of the benefits of colonialism,” Simpson continues, “are an early 
version of an ideology that would become extremely popular later in the century” (196).  
The softer and more subtle suggestion by the Wanderer in Book VIII that Britain’s 
industrial mastery might extend to “Men of all lands,” who “shall exercise the same / In 
due proportion to their Country’s needs,” is itself extended into an open call for a more 
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dominating imperialism (8: 214-215).  The Wanderer anticipates “the coming of that 
glorious time” when “this Imperial realm ”shall admit / An obligation, on her part, to 
teach / Them who are born to serve her and obey” (9: 292, 294, 295-297).  His 
endorsement of British capitalist and military interests, his claim that Britain “must 
complete / Her glorious destiny” in exporting its civilization, contradicts the defences of 
a traditional, parochial England he seems to make elsewhere (9: 410-411).  The 
Wanderer’s endorsement of British imperialism is ideological, and demonstrates his 
capacity to couch hegemonic interests within the context of traditional, British life.  His 
support for colonial endeavours—the line he draws from an essential English way of life 
to its largescale colonial exportation—is akin to the through-line he uncovers and 
develops between simple, English life and the clock’s mechanical rendering of time.  
Clock time becomes an acceptable mode of existence because the Wanderer presents it 
through the rhetoric of free and open wander, wherein time is freely available for 
spending. 
 Indeed, the Wanderer’s naturalization of clock time transfigures his rhetoric of 
wander into an ideology.  To be sure, the Wanderer explicitly embeds clock time deep 
within the rustic landscape.  Summoning a pastoral example, the Wanderer states: 
—The Shepherd Lad, who in the sunshine carves, 
On the green turf, a dial—to divide 
The silent hours; and who to that report 
Can portion out his pleasures, and adapt 
His round of pastoral duties, is not left  
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With less intelligence for moral things 
Of gravest import (4: 797-803) 
His example of the Shepherd Lad casts clock time back in time to a mythical and pastoral 
Britain, as an innate and natural mode of time.  The rustic Shepherd naturally uncovers 
clock time, as the quantified sequence of irreversible moments, in his roughly-made 
sundial, and he then proceeds to live according to its abstract delineation of the day.  
This figure of a naturally sanctioned clock time is elevated by the Wanderer into a moral 
law—a “measure and a rule” found “within” the shepherd—that governs an Imagination 
“left free / And puissant to range the solemn walks / Of time and nature, girded by a 
zone / That, while it binds, invigorates and supports” (4: 818-821).  The Wanderer thus 
retroactively entrenches this modern and sequential temporality inside a traditional 
rustic topoi, and in so doing he asserts that this structured temporality functioned as a 
“rock” upon which an integrated and connected life was forged (4: 812).  
 The Wanderer continues his ideological positioning of clock time as a deep-
seated element of traditional Britain in his depiction of a hardworking and elderly rustic 
couple in Book V.  For the third time in the poem a cottage clock is depicted, but unlike 
the clocks belonging to Margaret and the Solitary, both of whom experience clock time 
as dispossession via their despondency, the clock belonging to the rustic pair is warmly 
embedded as a fundamental component of economical and moral cottage life.  The 
Wanderer recounts staying with the couple, and notes how the following morning, 
“Rouzed by the crowing cock at dawn of day, / I yet had risen too late to interchange / a 
morning salutation with my Host, / Gone forth already to the far-off seat / Of his day’s 
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work” (5: 807-811).  The old man is an excellent steward of time-thrift and time-
management, as his hard work is rooted in an economical expenditure of time—he rises 
at the cock’s crow.  The crowing cock precedes the chiming clock, which is soon after 
depicted as a source of companionship to the old woman during her long, work-filled 
days.  The Wanderer quotes the old woman: 
  Save when the Sabbath brings its kind release, 
  My Help-mate’s face by light of day.  He quits 
  His door in darkness, nor till dusk returns. 
  And, through heaven’s blessing, thus we gain the bread 
  For which we pray; and for the wants provide 
  Of sickness, accident, and helpless age. 
  Companions have I many; many Friends, 
Dependants, Comforters—my Wheel, my Fire, 
All day the House-clock ticking in mine ear, 
The cackling Hen, the tender Chicken brood 
And the wild Birds that gather round my porch. (5: 819-824) 
The hardship and privation of the old couple is contained within an ideological narrative 
wherein hard work and productive temporal expenditure are the conditions of a happy 
domestic existence.  Life is challenging, but doable, and their hard work and time 
management signify their moral value.  Here cock and clock become interchangeable, as 
the clock is presented as simply an extension and continuation of an already naturalized 
temporal regulation.  The couching of the ticking clock within these other images of 
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rustic life works to install and inscribe clock time at the very hearth of English cultural 
life.  The Wanderer makes this ideology even more explicit.  After recalling the old 
woman’s speech, he ejaculates: “O happy! yielding to the law / Of these privations, 
richer in the main!” and goes on to state, “For you the hours of labour do not flag; / For 
you each Evening hath its shining Star, / And every Sabbath-day its golden Sun” (5: 839-
841).  Far from attenuating or even giving voice to this hard, rustic privation the 
Wanderer imposes an ideological narrative of hard work and productive temporal 
expenditure as the morally superior way of life.  The Wanderer projects an essential and 
simplistic joy upon the rural couple—in assuming their hours do not flag—and, in so 
doing, whitewashes poverty and privation; but he also hides clock time’s status as 
central to the industrializing and enclosing economy that actively places the very way of 
life he venerates at the brink of extinction. 
 The Excursion’s final Book presents an excursion within an excursion undertaken 
by the Wanderer, Poet, Solitary, Pastor, and the Pastor’s family.  This self-reflexivity 
underlines the poem’s self-perpetuating logic, where rather than enacting movement, 
development, or change, the poem becomes a closed-off, self-referential, and 
ideological statement unto itself.  Indeed, the ultimate destination of the group’s micro-
excursion reifies the reduced and contained version of wander the Wanderer advances.  
Simpson writes, “the island in the lake upon which they alight is a place of limited 
wandering” (210).  Having presented the rhetoric of free wander, the group then 
performs this rhetoric by actively passing the evening through their outing.  However, 
the self-reflexivity of the poem’s ideology is reflected tellingly in the image of the Ram 
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they encounter reflected in the lake.  As the group prepares to embark on their micro-
excursion they perceive 
  A two-fold Image; on a grassy bank 
  A snow-white Ram, and in the crystal flood 
  Another and the same! Most beautiful, 
  On the green turf, with his imperial front 
  Shaggy and bold, and wreathed horns superb, 
  The breathing Creature stood; as beautiful, 
  Beneath him, shewed his shadowy Counterpart. 
  Each with his glowing mountains, each his sky, 
  And each seemed centre of his own fair world (9: 443-451) 
The doubled Ram and landscape reflect the doubling back of the poem upon itself—the 
manufacture of an ideological system whose mirror imaging reveals its own illusoriness.  
The poem, like the image, remains a closed system—a simulacrum of English parochial 
life.  The image is an ideal and idealized framing of reality, but its sheer duality plays 
back upon the viewer and makes clear the viewer’s own ideological manufacture of 
reality—the doubled image reflects the doubling of reality undertaken by the 
Wanderer’s ideology.  The poem reaches its limits with the mirroring of the Ram, by 
showing the limits of its hegemonic representation of reality.  As Fry observes, the 
reflection “is a transitory trick of relation that cannot be reflected on because it reflects 
no authentic working of the mind” (172).  The Wanderer’s ideology will persist, but the 
desire that this fantasy is something other than ideology cannot—a “breath” can 
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“disperse” it (9: 457, 455).  The Pastor’s wife confides to the Poet, after seeing the 
reflected Ram: 
I love to hear that eloquent Old Man 
Pour forth his meditations, and descant 
On human life from infancy to age. 
How pure his spirit! in what vivid hues 
His mind gives back the various forms of things, 
Caught in their fairest, happiest attitude! 
While he is speaking I have power to see 
Even as he sees; but when his voice hath ceased, 
Then, with a sigh I sometimes feel, as now, 
  That combinations so serene and bright, 
Like those reflected in yon quiet Pool, 
Cannot be lasting in a world like ours” (9: 469-473) 
Like the Ram, the Wanderer’s rhetoric needs to be uttered to retain its coherence.  The 
Wanderer’s rhetoric is a fiction overlaid upon a shifting economy and a shifting 
temporality that fails to persist after being uttered.  His fiction of a free wander as the 
means of accessing a free time that might combat and abate the despondency of 
modernity falls dead as soon as it drops from his lips.  Indeed, the length of The 
Excursion, and of the Wanderer’s various speeches therein, arguably, attest to this.   
It is the Pastor who has the final say in the poem concluding with his High Church 
“Vesper service” (9: 753).  “The Wanderer,” writes Fry, “has now long since fallen silent, 
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and the eclipse of the visionary imagination he champions by the Pastor’s knowingly 
attenuated orthodox reflections restores the link, scorned by Wordsworth in earlier 
years, between the vocation of wandering and Picturesque tourism” (173).  The transfer 
of authority from the Wanderer to the Pastor completes the anesthetization of the 
rhetoric of wander.  The Wanderer’s ideology becomes a preamble to the doctrinal, 
High Church and Tory-sanctioned pronouncement of the Pastor.  However, the Solitary’s 
state remains undeterminable.  The Solitary 
took the slender path that leads 
To the one Cottage in the lonely dell, 
His chosen residence.  But, ere he turned 
Aside, a welcome promise had been given, 
That he would share the pleasures and pursuits 
Of yet another summer’s day, consumed 
In wandering with us through the Vallies fair 
And o’er the Mountain-wastes. ‘Another sun,’ 
Said he, ‘shall shine upon us, ere we part,— 
Another sun, and peradventure more; 
If time, with free consent, be yours to give,— 
And season favours. (9: 771-782) 
As Frances Ferguson observes “authority is never quite awarded . . . the Solitary’s 
despondency and his rhetoric are never decisively expunged” (208).  For Hodgson this 
marks a small redemption for the text: “the Solitary’s resistance to the combined and 
	 96	
blended arguments of the Wanderer and the Pastor represents a lingering philosophical 
honesty by which Wordsworth at least preserves, almost despite himself, a strong core 
of intellectual respectability” (169).  The Solitary does promise to engage again in the 
excursive powers of free wander, and yet his voiceless-ness—his promise is relayed 
indirectly by the Poet—and his own solitary walk home complicate and undermine that 
claim.  The final assertion of time at the end of the poem, however, is telling: the 
possibility of further wander is bound up and connected to the possibility and 
availability of more time.  The poem concludes by again linking wander to the 
productive expenditure of time.  Free consent and free time are mandatory 
prerequisites for wander.  Wander allows for free time, as long as one freely surrenders 
that time. 
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Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
Chapter Three: 
 
The Wanderer; or, Female Difficulties and the Limits of Wander 
 
 
There are two versions of wander present in Frances Burney’s 1814 novel The 
Wanderer; or, Female Difficulties.  The first depicts the movement of a subject displaced 
by the French Revolution, who strives and fails to find refuge in and around the 
provincial town of Brighthelmstone.  The second describes the seemingly free 
movement of a member of the aristocracy.  Both versions of wander are undertaken by 
the same figure: Burney’s eponymous protagonist, who changes from a nameless and 
abject stranger to the titled Juliet Granville as the novel unfolds.  The Wanderer charts 
this duality of wander onto the duality of clock time, where free wander encodes an 
open and available temporality of leisure, and where forced wander signifies clock 
time’s sequencing, structuring, and disciplining of experience.  The novel’s paralleling of 
wander and time reveals how wander articulates class and gender privilege in early-
nineteenth-century England.  To be wealthy and male is to have time, and thus to have 
access to free and permissible wander; to be working and female, on the other hand, is 
to lack time, and to experience wander as a form of dispossession.  The Wanderer 
demonstrates the power of this class-gender privilege by painstakingly detailing Juliet’s 
inability to leverage clock time in “good old true-blue nonrevolutionary common sense 
England” (Doody 361).  By harnessing a post-revolutionary, bourgeois subjectivity, Juliet 
strives to use clock time as a venue for productive self-maintenance; however, Juliet’s 
attempts at independence are halted at every turn by an economy that remains 
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beholden to landed, aristocratic interests.  Furthermore, Juliet’s access to free wander, 
and the independence it seems to offer, is possible, ultimately, only through a forced 
narrative intervention, which restores Juliet to her patronymic title and instantiates an 
anti-Jacobin, marriage plot.  Accordingly, the text shows how the notion of wander that 
posits solitary and unfettered movement as a viable post-revolutionary mode of being is 
a privileged fiction.  Wander, Burney reveals, does not convey a universal freedom, nor 
does it give rise to social mobility or independence; instead its significance depends 
upon the social and economic status of its agent, where one wanders freely if one is 
privileged, and one wanders mandatorily if one is not.  Wander is either freedom or 
alienation depending upon one’s gender and social standing, and The Wanderer shows 
how the movement between the two remains untenable. 
The Wanderer’s title draws attention to its borrowings from the mode of 
romance.  Although the eighteenth-century is regarded generally as the period that 
elicited the rise of the novel—to use Ian Watt’s influential term—the boundaries 
between the more medieval, aristocratic romance and the more modern, bourgeois 
novel of this period are difficult to maintain.  Barbara Fuchs argues that critical efforts 
from the eighteenth-century on down have tried to establish the modern, reality-based 
novel as separate and distinct from fanciful romance; however, this critical distancing 
has been challenging to uphold.  Fuchs writes, “an important aspect of romance as 
critical idiom in this period is its increasing marginalization as the less-favoured 
category, associated with fantasy and the past instead of the realism increasingly valued 
by critical taste” (105).  Despite this critical bias, Fuchs shows how classifications of the 
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novel and romance tend to break down, “with the terms used analogously . . . or with 
critics’ recognition that the traits considered exclusive to each kind of text actually 
appear in the other” (105).  Fuchs writes, “a survey of literary criticism from the period 
reveals that both authors and critics recognized the close similarities between romance 
and the novel,” and that “the categories were still in flux in the middle of the 
eighteenth-century” (106).  The very attempt to contrast and differentiate the novel 
from romance, however, shows the interests and desires of an emerging class, as it tries 
to define itself.  The rising middle class needed a more nationalistic, domestic, and 
economic mode of fiction that better reflected the materials and characters it perceived 
day to day.  Romance, with its continental and aristocratic associations, required a name 
change, and a renovation, to articulate the desires of the emergent bourgeoisie. 
Northrop Frye, before developing a more synchronic mythopoeia of romance, 
calls attention to the class interests that romance has historically and diachronically 
served.  Frye argues that romance is “nearest of all literary forms to the wish-fulfillment 
dream” (186).  “In every age,” writes Frye, “the ruling social or intellectual class tends to 
project its ideals in some form of romance, where the virtuous heroes and beautiful 
heroines represent the ideals, and the villains the threats to their ascendancy” (186).  
This has been the case, Frye shows, in each of the mode’s historical articulations, from 
its medieval origins, to its flourishing in early modernity, to its resurgence in the 
eighteenth-century.  The assertion of class interests was “the general character of 
chivalric romance in the Middle Ages, aristocratic romance in the Renaissance, 
bourgeois romance since the eighteenth century” (186).  Indeed, Frye finds in romance 
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the veritable engine of dialectical, historical change, where emerging groups define and 
project their desires, aspirations, and heroic qualities, and play out their ascendancy 
along the lines of romance’s trajectory.  Frye writes, “there is a genuinely ‘proletarian’ 
element in romance too which is never satisfied with its various incarnations, and in fact 
the incarnations themselves indicate that no matter how great a change may take place 
in society, romance will turn up again, as hungry as ever, looking for new hopes and 
desires to feed on” (186).   
Frederick Jameson echoes Frye in his claim that romance functions as a more 
shadowy analogue to ideology.  Focusing on romance’s structuring of good and evil and 
its inherent nostalgia—both of which are recounted by Frye—Jameson argues that 
romance is the mode through which radical social change is articulated.  Jameson shows 
how romance’s clear delineation of good and evil derive from a pre-modern “magical 
thought mode,” “which springs from a precapitalist, essentially agricultural way of life” 
(141).  This more Manichaean worldview makes romance the optimal mode for 
addressing and rectifying class tensions forbidden by contemporary ethical parameters.  
Jameson writes,  
This genre is dependent for its emergence on the availability of a code of 
good and evil which is formulated in a magical, rather than a purely 
ethical, sense.  This code finds its expression in the vision of higher and 
lower realms in conflict, yet it does not seem inconsistent to suggest that 
it is itself dependent on a kind of historical coexistence within the social 
order itself between two distinct moments of socioeconomic 
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development.  Romance as a form thus expresses a transitional moment, 
yet one of a very special type: its contemporaries must feel their society 
torn between past and future in such a way that the alternatives are 
grasped as hostile but somehow unrelated worlds. (158) 
Romance provides the language to address and attenuate internal class conflict.  Re-
scripting one group as good and the other as evil formalizes and dramatizes social and 
economic tensions, while the nostalgia of romance maps out the return to a more 
harmonious and homogeneous world.  Romance appears at moments of dialectical 
change, where political, social, and economic tensions begin to buckle.  Romance 
possesses the “symbolic answer to the question of how my enemy can be thought of as 
being evil, that is, as other than myself and marked by some absolute difference, when 
what is responsible for his being so characterized is simply the identity of his own 
conduct with mine” (161).  Romance, then, becomes an ideological vehicle, by 
undertaking the symbolic work of an emerging class-consciousness.  The “persistence of 
romance,” Jameson writes, “raises something like an aesthetic counterpart to the 
problem of ideology” (162).  Romance appears as a “deep-rooted ideology which has 
only too clearly the function of drawing the boundaries of a given social order and 
providing a powerful deterrent against deviancy or subversion” (140).   
 If romance is the venue within which the desire for social change is performed 
and played out, then it becomes a fitting mode for The Wanderer’s delving into post-
revolutionary English society.  Like The Excursion, The Wanderer presents a world in the 
throes of deep socio-economic change.  Transpiring “during the dire reign of the terrific 
	 102	
Robespierre,” the text traces out the effects of the French Revolution as they lap up 
upon the English shore (11).  The town of Brighthelmstone—which doubles the seaside 
town of Brighton made fashionable in the late-eighteenth-century by the Prince 
Regent—presents a heterogeneous social world, in which aristocrats, such as Lord 
Melbury, Lady Aurora, Sir Jaspar Herrington and the Iretons, rub shoulders with 
members of the gentry, like Elinor and Harleigh, with social upstarts and the newly 
moneyed, like the Miss Bydel (“a collateral and uneducated successor to a large and 
unexpected fortune”) and the self-made grocer Mr. Tedman, and with members of the 
working class, like Gooch, the young farmer, and Flora, the young shop girl, whom Juliet 
strives to save from the rake Sir Lyle Sycamore (80).  Juliet, Burney’s initially nameless 
and origin-less protagonist, becomes the quester of this romance that effectively brings 
this social heterogeneity to a boil.  However, Burney’s use of romance in The Wanderer 
is far more ironic, and far less cut and dried, than it is a straightforward, allegorical, 
wish-fulfillment of the bourgeoisie.  The nobility in the novel are by no means the sole 
source of evil.  Indeed, in the end, “the youthful aristocrats, Lord Melbury, Harleigh, 
Lady Aurora, Lady Barbara, and Juliet are unequivocally the most virtuous figures in the 
novel, and the happy ending assigned to Juliet derives explicitly from her lineage and 
integrity,” as Tara Czechowski observes (700).  Moreover, the heterogeneous Juliet, who 
is both English and French, both aristocratic and bourgeois, both decorum-minded and 
independent, is not a middle-class hero.  The antagonistic wrongdoers of The Wanderer 
occupy both the right and the left of the political spectrum.  The decadence, selfishness, 
and cruelty of the aristocracy is represented by characters like the Iretons and Lord 
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Denmeath, who polices the boundaries of the nobility by blocking Juliet’s rightful claim 
to her title.  But this more conservative evil is matched on the left by the brutish Jacobin 
Commissary, whom we later learn has forced Juliet’s hand in marriage to secure the 
dowry offered in the relinquishment of her title.  These competing class interests are 
echoed, but softened, by the Burkean Harleigh and the Wollstonecraftian Elinor, who 
both aim to help, but more often hinder Juliet in her quest.  
While The Wanderer’s complicated politics stands as its most enduring critical 
legacy, which I detail below, I argue that the novel harnesses ironically the wandering, 
questing motif of romance in order to show that wander is incapable of dialectically 
overturning socio-economic structures.  The text demonstrates this through the 
language of time, where wander reflects alternately one’s experience of time as a 
halting and disciplinary structure, or one’s experience of time as a free and open venue 
of being.  Burney’s novel shows the disruptive, alienating, and harried experience of 
time that working-class, and working-class women in particular, experience in this 
changing world; while showing at the same time the glut and excess of time enjoyed by 
the wealthy.  Wander is not productive or generative of time, but that which underlines 
the temporality one is always already allotted by virtue of one’s economic standing.  
Wander in the text is not the heroic bourgeois overcoming of the stodgy aristocracy; 
instead, it is the means through which both the pains and the privileges of class and 
gender are experienced.  As the engine of romance and, increasingly, the movement of 
Romanticism, wander is ironically repurposed by The Wanderer to show how it is not 
productive of social change, but representative of two irreconcilable and calcified social 
	 104	
categories, in the freedom it offers to the wealthy, and in the alienation it reveals for 
the working class.  
The text’s ironic refashioning of the mode of romance is evident from Juliet’s 
first appearance, where she begs passage aboard a ship fleeing Reign of Terror France.  
Disguised as a beggar in blackface, Juliet is the romance protagonist writ-large—the 
outsider, with obscure birth and origins making a fateful and destined oceanic crossing.  
Frye argues that generally the romance-quest begins with an allusion to the flood: “the 
infant hero is often placed in an ark or chest floating on the sea . . . from there he drifts 
to land . . . or is rescued from among the reeds and bulrushes on a river bank” (198).  
Additionally, Frye shows how romance’s central concern of rebirth might be displaced 
onto a hero who eventually “returns from a quest disguised, flings off his beggar’s rags, 
and stands forth in the resplendent scarlet coat of the prince” (187).  The opening of the 
text repurposes both of these tropes, in Juliet’s status as a disguised beggar, and in her 
being plucked off the shore and restored to England by boat.  However, the novel 
ironizes directly these tropes of romance.  The passengers on board the boat at first 
ignore Juliet’s pleas for help, and when, after a brief debate, she is admitted, they gawk 
at and mock her appearance.  Indeed, the passengers on board appear as dutiful 
readers of romance by trying out various literary genres upon the relatively silent Juliet.  
Juliet’s fellow English passengers, prompted by her disguised “dusky hue” and “large 
black patch, that covered half her left cheek,” take turns projecting various narrative 
identities upon her (19, 20).  Elinor claims that the mystery surrounding Juliet offers 
“the vivifying food of Conjecture,” and she proceeds to figure Juliet as a character in a 
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romance (12-13).  Elinor says to Harleigh, “you are such a complete knight-errant, that 
you would just as willingly find her a tawny Hottentot as a fair Circassian,” and claims 
that Harleigh is “such a very disciple of Cervantes” so as to give Elinor “no doubt” that 
the “tattered dulcinea has secured [his] protection for the whole voyage” (12, 13).  After 
seeing Juliet “at prayers” Elinor casts her as a romance heroine: “she’s a nun, then, 
depend upon it.  Make her tell us the history of her convent,” and she continues the 
device by stating that Harleigh “must fall in love with her, I suppose, as a thing of 
course” (13, 18).  Harleigh partakes in his own projection, by imagining Juliet to be the 
victim of Jacobin violence in supposing Juliet’s bandages are the result of her 
“scrambling from some prison” (20).  Additionally, the Admiral, who later turns out to 
be Juliet’s uncle, imposes upon Juliet the more patriarchal narrative script of the chaste, 
pious young woman, whom he praises as a “good example” for giving “thanks” (14).  
However, soon after landing the Admiral modifies his narrative, by inscribing Juliet with 
the equally patriarchal script of the fallen woman.  Alongside his benevolence of 
granting her a guinea the Admiral instructs her to “conduct [her]self in a becoming 
manner,” in spite of how, he assumes, she had “demeaned” herself “up to this present 
date” (36).  Mrs. Maple, on the other hand, regards Juliet as an object of her snobbish 
derision bristling at having “such company as this,” and states, “we did not pay such a 
price to have” the boat “made a mere common hoy” (20).  The novel begins with a self-
reflexive positing and rejecting of various romance plots through the ironic identification 
and projection of the genre back upon itself.  
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The novel continues its ironizing of romance by converting the conventional 
obscurity of the romance hero into the very problem that Juliet faces as she tries to 
make her way in a society that demands the qualifications of name, family, and 
recommendation.  Juliet’s outsider-ness aligns her with the traditionally heroic role of 
the romance heroine, and yet, the codes of the social world she enters use exactly this 
obscurity as a means of denigrating and mocking her.  This is made manifest by the way 
in which the word “wanderer” takes the form of an ironic and insulting moniker for 
Juliet in the first part of the novel.  Juliet’s status as an “unfathomable ‘other,’” as Sara 
Salih puts it, places her under rigorous scrutiny, and transforms her from a literal 
wanderer into a nefarious, predatory, and enterprising huckster (302).  In the early 
pages of the text, the narrator repeatedly refers to Juliet as “the Wanderer” (54, 59, 67), 
and Juliet herself uses the word to describe the difficulties she faces: “I am in so forlorn 
a situation . . . a poor destitute Wanderer, in search of any species of subsistence” (49).  
But in addition to this more benign and descriptive designation, the word is also applied 
to Juliet as an insult.  Elinor, soon after first encountering Juliet, calls her “so glaring an 
adventurer . . . a Wanderer—without even a name!” (33).  The use of the word as a 
slight is interchangeable with the numerous other insulting monikers levelled at Juliet: 
“dingy, dowdy heroine” (50), “black fugitive” (50), “maimed and defaced Dulcinea” (50), 
“wandering Creole” (50), “frenchified swindler” (57), “unknown pauper” (59), “bold 
young stroller” (74), “female fortune hunter” (75), “illegitimate stroller” (86).  The 
feminine pejorative appellation of wanderer—which Margaret Doody reminds us is also 
slang for prostitute—is how Juliet is identified by this social world.  It is not until her 
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more refined, aristocratic gifts and her familial lineage are revealed, that the appellation 
of wanderer takes on its more positive connotations. 
The title of Burney’s text further underlines the disjunction between the word 
wanderer, replete with its heroic, romance connotations, and the figure to whom it is 
applied.  Like Burney’s other novels The Wanderer is named after its protagonist; 
however, unlike Evelina, Cecilia, and Camilla, The Wanderer’s title withholds the identity 
of its protagonist in her very naming.  Juliet’s namelessness—her marked absence of a 
social identity—challenges the premise and scope of the novel as a form that projects 
individual development.  Moreover, the novel’s full title—The Wanderer; or, Female 
Difficulties—qualifies the word wanderer, and the singularity of its placeholder, in order 
to make a more generalized statement about female subjectivity.  Indeed, Julia Epstein 
reads the novel as a universal articulation of female experience in late-eighteenth-
century England: Burney “traces and analyzes the lot of women in every class of life, 
from pampered aristocrat to comfortable bourgeoisie to respectable working woman to 
starving shopgirl to farmer’s wife to rural cottager” (191).  However, the “or” of the title, 
coupled with the semicolon, rather than the more transparent equalization of a colon, 
stops short of equating Juliet as a wanderer, with female difficulties.  The paused, 
alternative offering of “female difficulties” prevents the universalizing of Juliet’s 
narrative with the narratives of all women, and in so doing resists the establishment of a 
totalizing and essential female subjectivity.  Interestingly, the words “female difficulties” 
appear in the text in block letters on two separate occasions.  The first comes as an 
aside to herself: “Deeply hurt and strongly affected, how insufficient, she exclaimed, is a 
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FEMALE to herself! How utterly dependent upon situation—connexions—circumstance! 
How nameless, how for ever fresh-springing are her DIFFICULTIES, when she would owe 
her existence to her own exertions!” (275).  The words “FEMALE” and “DIFFICULITES” 
are joined here through association, rather than by a singular, universalizing statement.  
These difficulties are contextual and social, and not essential.  The explicit articulation of 
the subtitle appears again, later, when Juliet is speaking with Elinor.  When Juliet 
“lamented the severe DIFFICULTIES of a FEMALE, who, without fortune or protection, 
had her way to make in the world,” the term is contested vehemently by the more 
overtly feminist Elinor (397).  Elinor “with strong derision, called out, ‘Debility and folly! 
Put aside your prejudices, and forget that you are a dawdling woman, to remember that 
you are an active human being, and your FEMALE DIFFICULTIES will vanish into the 
vapour of which they are formed” (397).  Elinor’s stern rebuke of Juliet’s well-earned 
observation relies upon a universalism predicated on the rights of man.  Because her 
own privilege affords her independence, she assumes a universal equality amongst men 
and women, and lays the blame of women’s inequality on women’s own inability to get 
over the essentialized weakness she imbues them with.  In this light, the plurality and 
multiplicity implicit in the words “female difficulties” as used by Juliet offers a non-
essential and non-universal stance on the social and economic inequality experienced by 
women; which Elinor, who deals in universals, fails to grasp.  Moreover, the de-
essentializing subtitle conveys, again, Juliet’s status as an ironic romance heroine—she 
is not the lone hero indicative and representative of the aspirations of an entire class, 
but one particular individual.   
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Perhaps the most explicit ironic repurposing of the quest-romance that The 
Wanderer partakes in is in the prolonged stasis that characterizes Juliet’s quest—a stasis 
that is formally reified by the sheer length of the novel.  Despite the complexity and 
extent of Juliet’s history, her story remains concealed from readers and characters alike 
for the bulk of the narrative.  Juliet’s real name is not revealed until nearly halfway 
through the novel, and the details of her aristocratic origins, the circumstances of her 
disinheritance, her forced marriage in France, and her subsequent escape, are withheld 
longer still.  In prolonging and sustaining the lack of origin and namelessness of her 
protagonist, Burney breaks with the more developmental conventions of late-
eighteenth- and early-nineteenth century prose fiction.  Frye argues that romance “at its 
most naïve” “is an endless form in which a central character who never develops or ages 
goes through one adventure after another until the author himself collapses” (186).  
And yet, Frye continues, “as soon as romance achieves a literary form, it tends to limit 
itself to a sequence of minor adventures leading up to a major climactic adventure, 
usually announced from the beginning, the completion of which rounds off the story,” 
which comprises the quest; or, “the element that gives literary form to the romance” 
(186-187).  The quest economizes romance, by reducing the narrative to “two main 
characters, a protagonist or hero, and an antagonist or enemy,” and by producing a 
“dialectical” mechanism that ensures “everything is focused on a conflict between the 
hero and his enemy” (187).  The Wanderer, however, actively eschews this dialectical 
economy, by repeatedly staging Juliet’s refusal to disclose her identity—to the 
frustration of the local gentry and the novel’s contemporary critics alike.  Instead of 
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placing Juliet upon a developmental narrative arc, The Wanderer, for the first half of the 
novel, concerns itself with the immediacy of the present.  Julia Epstein observes, 
“Burney keeps even the reader of The Wanderer and virtually all of the characters in the 
dark, asking us to accept her protagonist on faith as a woman without a history, radically 
present tense in the story but supported by no narrative framework until very late in the 
work” (176).  Accordingly, for much of the text Juliet’s quest is her own daily 
maintenance, rather than the pursuit of some future-oriented utopia.  Juliet’s time in 
England is exactly that: a period of time that she strives to pass without notice or event, 
until her and her guardian the Bishop’s safety might be guaranteed.  Juliet describes her 
charge in England as a directive to do nothing but pass time.  Juliet states, “the 
Marchioness conjured me, nevertheless, to forbear applying to my family; or avowing 
my name, or my return to my native land, till I should be assured of the safety of the 
Bishop” (750).  Her action for much of the novel consists of her own daily maintenance, 
so she might pass this “dread interval of suspense” (752). 
The Wanderer’s focus upon its protagonist’s present represents, Stuart Sherman 
argues, a “new kind of novel” (264).  Sherman observes that the interruptions and 
interventions Juliet faces in her attempts to exist in time are so pervasive that they 
constitute “the novel’s chief source of significant repetition” (266).  Juliet, Sherman 
states, “finds that no time is her own: whenever she enters a room in search of a 
moment’s solitude, she finds there a new figure, usually a new antagonist” (266).  
Sherman claims it is exactly this crucial and innovative component of the novel that 
Hazlitt succinctly identifies, but fundamentally misreads, when, in his censorious review 
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of the novel he writes, “the reader is led every moment to expect a denouement, and is 
as constantly disappointed on some trifling pretext.  The whole artifice of her fable 
consists in coming to no conclusion” (264).  Sherman observes that the novel’s 
“principle of structure” that frustrates Hazlitt is exactly what Burney had intended in 
constructing a more experimental text that was based upon the “reality of time” as 
“interruptive, ongoing, repetitious” (264, 265).  The novel’s concluding description of 
Juliet as a “female Robinson Crusoe,” Sherman claims, amounts to a doubly apt 
metaphor.  Crusoe reflects a “masculine privilege” “taken to a painful extreme,” 
wherein “All his time is his own, to dispose and record as he will;” however, women are 
placed “in a particular, uninhabitable bind” because, like Crusoe, they must still reckon 
with the deep isolation of existence, but lack adequate time and space to grapple with 
that solitude (267).   
The Wanderer’s sustained deferral of Juliet’s past suspends readers in a 
successively unfolding present.  Suzie Asha Park observes that Juliet retains her silence 
so pervasively “that it is no wonder critics from Burney’s time to our own have 
complained that the novel goes nowhere” (135).  By standing mute on her past, Juliet, 
Park claims, undermines an emerging Romantic imperative of self-disclosure; the 
palpability of which is evident in the endless calls Juliet faces to provide an account of 
herself.  Park states, “the wanderer’s reserve instead questions and challenges the very 
pressure to disclose depths that an increasingly Romantic culture both exerts and 
manages to veil as a gentle invitation to express the self freely” (127).  The significance 
of Juliet’s “elusiveness and reticence,” Park continues, “is not to produce the illusion of 
	 112	
depth but to reveal the illusory basis of authoritative forms imposed upon character” 
(130).  Juliet’s silence on her past challenges what Park calls the “rubric of Romantic 
expression,” wherein the “demand for disclosure elicits narratives that merely reinforce 
prior assumptions” (134, 130).   
Rather than ebulliently obliging and enabling narrative typologies through self-
expression, Juliet’s silence foreshortens the developmental scripts these typologies map 
out.  Accordingly, Juliet is marked and observed successively in time—a motif that 
recurs throughout the text.  To return to Juliet’s crossing of the English Channel, her 
shipmates’ sustained projection of genres upon Juliet necessarily remain 
unsubstantiated and unverified by Juliet’s silence, which results in their continuous 
observance of Juliet in an unfolding present.  Her muteness forces the “group of 
provincials,” as Doody calls them, back from their various narrative projections that 
gather no momentum from Juliet’s silence, to the present of her body in time (328).  
The passengers observe: “just then the stranger, having taken off her gloves, to arrange 
an old shawl, in which she was wrapt, exhibited hands and arms of so dark a colour;” 
and moments after, “the wind just then blowing back the prominent borders of a French 
night-cap, which had almost concealed all her features displayed a large black patch that 
covered half her left cheek” (19, 20).  Both of these unveilings occur suddenly—“just 
then”—and happen explicitly in time, and both elicit further inquiry; but the continued 
lack of response from Juliet forces their gaze back to the present of her person.     
The projection of typologies upon Juliet, whether they are radical and feminist or 
anti-Jacobin and patriarchal, has been doubled by critical conceptions of the novel since 
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the time of its publication.  Critics of The Wanderer have been divided on its politics.  As 
an independent woman compelled to earn her living, Juliet exposes and criticizes a 
rigidly narrow socio-economic world that polices female subjectivity; and yet, Juliet’s 
unmistakable aristocratic refinement, her inherent virtue and decorum, and the novel’s 
more patriarchal conclusion, that recounts her restoration to her patronymic lineage 
and her subsequent marriage, seem to re-enforce the values of traditional society.  The 
critical divide over The Wanderer’s politics dates back to its politicized reception.  Doody 
argues that the political context of 1814, “just after the defeat of Napoleon,” was one of 
“right-wing triumph,” and was unreceptive to “pleas for more social justice or appeals 
for a better understanding of France” (332).  Accordingly, the “first reviewers of 
Burney’s novel,” Doody continues, “were not simply enlightened persons of taste   . . . 
they had axes to grind” (333).  This censure was not exclusive to either the left or the 
right.  The “subversively Romantic and democratic” spirit of the novel—its assertion that 
“England ought to change”—was perceived to be an “affront” to “public guardians of 
the Right;” while its calling out of Britain’s misogyny rankled the “radical democrat” 
Hazlitt, whose radicalism, Doody recalls, “most definitely” did not apply “to women” 
(333).  The critical context in which the novel was published thus demanded from the 
book a clear and unambiguous political stance, which both the right and the left found 
wanting.  Doody observes that “for feminist readers in the later twentieth century, as 
for male conservatives in the Regency era,” the novel remains troublesome and 
perplexing for failing to align itself with either a straightforward conservatism or an anti-
hegemonic radicalism (335).   
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Julia Epstein views The Wanderer as a radical feminist text, where “Juliet’s 
stripped-down female status (stateless, placeless, and penniless as well as nameless, 
married yet not married, of high birth yet not recognized) raises explicitly Burney’s 
political analysis of the position of women” (177).  Similarly, George E. Haggerty argues 
that the novel forges a strong gender critique in its representation of the entitlement 
and privilege that men enjoy over women.  The male characters “assert in mere insult 
and bravado” what they “lack in authority,” and Juliet is constantly beleaguered by men 
of all classes as “every male character presents a challenge” to her “independence and 
sense of self determination” (33).  Debra Silverman likewise underlines the novel’s 
feminist politics, by arguing that “The Wanderer addresses most explicitly, and at times 
brutally, the difficulties that face women who want (out of both desire and necessity) to 
attain some amount of independence and economic self-sufficiency” (68).  Through 
Juliet, Silverman continues, Burney “offers a critique of a society in which a woman 
without a ‘name’ is subject to bigotry and callousness” (68).    
However, the decorum and propriety Juliet exhibits throughout the narrative, 
coupled with the fact that, in the end, “the novel restores an aristocrat to her proper 
place,” as Tara Czechowski puts it, places the text in a far more conservative light (700).  
This conservatism is amplified by the neutralizing of the Jacobin Elinor—a narrative 
outcome that would seem to position Burney as yet another of “the nineteenth-century 
promoters of domestic ideology” (Burgess 142).  Indeed, Deborah Kennedy argues that 
in spite of “its realistic examination of questions of women’s rights and women’s work,” 
the novel’s reinstatement of Juliet to her proper social class and its denigration of 
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Elinor’s radicalism renders it a “conservative fairy tale” (9).  The Wollstonecraftian Elinor 
articulates explicitly a radical feminist point of view, but her perspective is undermined 
by her characterization as excessively passionate, brash, and suicidal.  In comparing 
Juliet and Elinor, Catherine Frank shows that the two characters present competing 
versions of female subjectivity, which the novel reconciles conservatively by rewarding 
and restoring Juliet, and by staging Elinor’s ultimate enticement into the virtues of a 
High Church conservatism by Harleigh.  Frank argues that Elinor disavows “the proper 
feminine desire for marriage and domesticity” in her “revolutionary fervour,” and 
therefore “provides an object lesson in the contaminating influence of French thought,” 
which the novel ultimately purges (431-432).  Juliet, on the other hand, signifies the 
corruption of the “English body politic . . . under siege,” which necessitates her marriage 
to Harleigh for the “recuperation of national security through domestic stability” (433).  
Frank states, “Juliet must be recuperated into the upper-class” through her “innately 
genteel and retiring qualities,” which “entitle her to be there” (445).  William Galperin 
also finds that the comparative representations of Juliet and Elinor expose a lingering 
conservatism in the novel.  Galperin argues that The Wanderer offers a “foreshortened 
Romanticism” that transposes real social change for the appearance of social change 
(385).  “Burney’s is a reconstruction or taming of romanticism to more hegemonic 
purposes,” in its suppression of the radically liberating Romanticism offered by Elinor 
(Galperin 385).  “Even as Burney allows Elinor her critical function in this text,” Galperin 
states, “she is much more intent upon writing a narrative that effectively traces one 
woman’s odyssey from beggar (indeed a beggar in blackface) to aristocrat” (385).  
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Burney thus “demonizes” Elinor “by depicting her as both obsessive and deranged,” and 
undermines Elinor’s offering of a romanticism that “entails an abandonment of virtually 
all vocabularies and typologies of change and their attendant narratives” (Galperin 384).  
Juliet’s transition from beggar to aristocrat is not a critique of class structures, but the 
ideological containment of the counter-hegemonic claims to freedom presented by 
Elinor.  “To see a beggar become a duchess, or a duchess become a beggar,” Galperin 
writes, “is not to witness productive social change but to be diverted from liberty by 
maintenance of narratives that are interchangeably progressive and aristocratic . . . 
where mobility and change coexist comfortably and seamlessly with the usual—and still 
arbitrary—gradations of status and authority” (385). 
Juliet’s initially disguised appearance of darkened skin has also divided critics on 
the novel’s politics.  Tara Czechowski argues that the novel’s alignment of Juliet with 
blackness works to draw out and critique a “persistent aspect of racialist thinking in its 
early phases: the correlation between crime and blackness” (679).  Through her 
exoticism, the suspicion of her character, her alias, and the work she undertakes, Juliet 
is associated with “the black poor” and the increasingly racialized and criminalized body 
of the “buskers and beggars of the street” (691).  Juliet, Czechowski observes, is, like a 
slave, “renamed,” and is “compelled to make a living in occupations traditionally 
assigned to people of African descent” (691, 692).  For Czechowski, Juliet figures, in a 
radical and critical way, the “bigotry” that is an “integral aspect of late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century social organization, which had become especially fraught in 
light of the French Revolution” (700).  Sara Salih, however, argues that the novel 
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appropriates and repurposes problematically the violence of slavery, in order to draw 
parallels for white women.  Salih states, “The Wanderer does not document the 
inhumanities of the slave trade, but rather the plantocratic tendencies displayed by the 
English characters establish the opportunistic textual connection between the sufferings 
of middle-class English women and slaves labouring overseas” (312).  Salih claims that 
the “issue of enslavement is never directly canvassed in the novel,” and so “its 
invocation of ‘negritude’ is cursory, opportunistic, and disturbing in its racial 
implications” (313).  For Salih, the novel “leaves existing racial and social hierarchies 
intact, forcing the reader to accept that the novelist's attitudes, as manifested in her 
fiction at least, are more conservative than radical;” a reality that is overlooked because 
it remains “unpalatable” for “Burney commentators who would like to incorporate the 
author into a socialist feminist ‘canon’” (314). 
Margaret Doody reconciles these critical divisions by asserting that Burney 
consciously and performatively combines radicalism and conservatism because she 
understands how narratives necessarily encode political desires.  “Burney has stock 
tropes of both right and left novels of the 1790s—radical and anti-Jacobin,” Doody 
writes, and Burney “deliberately mixes ideological elements—knowing that the plot 
situations themselves are ideological elements” (325).  Burney, aware that politics are 
produced and advanced through narratives, constructs a narrative that stages and 
dramatizes this very politicization.  Indeed, as Park argues, the “criticism ends up 
exerting the very pressure to disclose legible motives that the novel works against” 
(139).  “One of the major strengths of this dark novel,” Pam Perkins writes, “is that 
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Burney refuses to endorse fully either the radical or the conservative point of view or to 
give any easy answers to the intractable problems caused by a society which defines 
‘woman’ by her supposed exclusion from the public, economic world which she is 
perforce dependent upon” (79).  The novel stages this politicization, therefore, to 
demonstrate how women’s bodies are necessarily sites of political inscription.   
In this light, Juliet’s refusal to disclose her identity signifies her attempt to forge 
and occupy an identity independent of those prescribed by politicized typologies.  Juliet 
is striving for anonymity in England, as she attempts to carve out her own space and 
inscribe her own independence.  However, as a hybridized, liminal figure Juliet is denied, 
again and again, the independence she seeks in an economic mode that functions 
exclusively upon stable notions of family and class.  Juliet displays an unmistakeable 
aristocratic refinement—a “language,” “air,” and “manner” that indicates her having 
“received the education” and “lived the life of a gentlewoman” (75) as Harleigh 
observes—and yet, at the same time she “must work for a living” and “[struggle] to pay 
for lodgings, food, and clothing” (Epstein 181).  This duality—her apparent aristocratic 
refinement and her apparent need for work—shuts Juliet out of an economy in which 
refinement precludes one from having to work in the first place.  “To acquire 
independence, that belongs, physically, to sustaining life by her own means, was her 
most earnest desire,” the narrator observes, and “her many accomplishments invited 
her industry, and promised its success;” however, “to bring them into use was difficult” 
(146).  As the narrative progresses, “difficult” proves to be an understatement.   
	 119	
Unable to allay suspicions about her character and her motives, Juliet is 
compelled to leave Mrs. Maple and the Jodrells, and to take an apartment and earn her 
own living in Brighthelmstone.  In so doing, Juliet takes on and harnesses what amounts 
to a bourgeois subjectivity, where, in both rhetoric and practice, she espouses its chief 
tenets: fair and contractual dealing, interpersonal relationships that are governed by a 
belief in mutual self-interest, a dedication to hard labour, and a careful and economical 
management of her time.  By working dutifully in time, Juliet hopes she might find the 
means to secure the independence she seeks.  Juliet comes by this bourgeois ethos 
honestly.  In spite of her noble lineage, Juliet also possesses a bourgeois pedigree 
through her mother, the “orphan and destitute daughter of an insolvent man of 
business” from Yorkshire (641).  However, the bourgeois subjectivity Juliet comes to 
inhabit is more immediately the result of her experience of the French Revolution.  Both 
Juliet and her fellow émigré Gabriella, who also has an aristocratic lineage, have 
experienced firsthand the violence of the Revolution, and they espouse its values of self-
maintenance, self-reliance, and equality through labour, as a result.  Indeed, when 
questioned about working in their London haberdashery Gabriella replies, “the French 
Revolution has opened our eyes to a species of equality more rational, because more 
feasible, than that of lands or of rank; an equality not alone of mental sufferings but of 
manual exertions” (639).  This belief in a value and worth measured by individual 
exertion breaks with the aristocratic worldview of inheritance and title.  Juliet embodies 
the same commitment to independence and self-fashioning, and becomes the very 
emblem of the Protestant work ethic.  Indeed, Juliet’s namelessness reflects her 
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inclusion in the expansion and enfranchisement of a class characterized by its absence 
of name and title.  Furthermore, the name that Juliet ends up adopting ties her to the 
lifeblood of the emerging bourgeois economy: money.  Upon arriving in England Juliet 
enquires for a “letter directed for L.S.,” which is later misheard as the surname “Ellis” 
(31).  Juliet conveniently adopts this name in lieu of having to disclose her actual identity 
(31).  The initials L.S., however, carry the monetary resonance of pounds, shillings, and 
pence: Lsd (Doody 329).  The name figures Juliet as a sign of the ascendant capitalist 
economy, wherein hard currency comes to displace landed wealth and title. 
The Wanderer foregrounds the transformative power of Juliet’s post-
revolutionary spirit in the radical transformation she makes from her disguised state, as 
a pauper in blackface, to a naturalized English woman.  Upon attending Mrs. Ireton to 
London after landing on British soil, Juliet slowly loses the traces of her disguise in a 
passage focalized through the eyes of Mrs. Ireton:   
This was a manifest alteration in the complexion of her attendant, which, 
from a regular and equally dark hue, appeared on the same morning, to 
be smeared and streaked; and, on the third, to be of a dusky white.  This 
failed not to produce sundry inquisitive comments; but they never 
succeeded in obtaining any explanatory replies.  When, however, on the 
fourth day, the shutters of the chamber, which, to give it a more sickly 
character, had hitherto been closed, were suffered to admit the 
sunbeams of a cheerful winter’s morning, Mrs. Ireton was directed, by 
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their rays, to a full and marvelous view, of a skin changed from a tint 
nearly black, to the brightest, whitest and most dazzling fairness. (42-43)  
Juliet’s transformation is almost incomprehensible to the more traditional and static 
worldview of Mrs. Ireton.  Indeed, Mrs. Ireton is almost unable to see it—she “[stares] 
at this unexpected metamorphosis” with “unmingled amazement”—until the change 
cannot be denied (43).  Mrs. Ireton struggles with marking Juliet’s alteration, because 
her worldview altogether disallows for the possibility of individual alteration.  Mrs. 
Ireton can only see fixed and changeless identities, such as birth, title, and nation.  Juliet 
lies “beyond what [Mrs. Ireton] could have conjectured,” because in Juliet Mrs. Ireton 
encounters a subject who lies beyond the organizational confines of traditional identity 
(43).  Juliet accentuates this when she dismisses herself from Mrs. Ireton, who is 
pressing Juliet to provide an account of herself.  Juliet departs “without deigning to 
make any answer,” and leaves Mrs. Ireton “in speechless rage at this unbidden retreat” 
(44).  As a self-defining subject, Juliet is unaccountable to the world of rank and tradition 
that organizes Mrs. Ireton’s mode of being.  It is significant, moreover, that Juliet’s 
alteration transpires over time—it begins the “same morning” and is completed on the 
“fourth day.”  Juliet’s transformation takes place in an unfolding present, the efficacy 
and modality of which are altogether alien to Mrs. Ireton’s more traditional worldview. 
Despite this, the novel reveals almost immediately the incommensurability of 
the bourgeois notion of economic production and exchange, adopted by Juliet, with the 
economy of the nobility.  This is first exemplified in Juliet’s inability to collect payment 
for the music lessons she provides to the fashionable young women of Brighthelmstone.  
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Because traditional economic relations of class and connection continue to overpower 
the efforts of rational individuals producing and exchanging goods in the context of a 
rational market, Juliet finds her ability to collect payment for her services almost 
impossible.  Lady Arramede, because of her wealth, cannot “possibly attend . . . to such 
pitiful claims,” and recommends Juliet “apply to her steward at Christmas, which was 
the time, she believed, when he settled her affairs” (298).  “The aristocrats who owe 
Juliet money,” Andrea Henderson argues, “tend to delay payment or neglect it 
altogether, and they justify themselves by belittling the service or product they have 
received from her” (11-12).  Juliet’s attempts at exchanging her time and her labour for 
money are incongruous with an aristocratic notion of payment that settles accounts 
along more traditional lines.  Juliet, Henderson writes, “has no place in a system of 
blood and patronage relations” (16).  In Brighthelmstone, Juliet does not find rational 
economic actors pursuing their own self-interest; rather, she finds herself continuously 
stymied by an economic mode that is deeply rooted in traditional social connections.  
The same challenges overwhelm Juliet and Gabriella’s needlework business.  
Both regard time as a productive venue within which they can find the means for self-
determination.  Their “project of needle-work” is figured as an act of “industry” and 
“independence,” and their commitment to their “youth and strength” is regarded as the 
means through which they might be preserved from “pecuniary obligation” (400, 401).  
Indeed, their bourgeois productivity is realized through the metric of clock time.  The 
initial success they experience is indexed by their economical use of time.  The two had, 
at first, “more employment than time, though they limited themselves to five hours for 
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sleep; though their meals were rather swallowed than eaten,” and their labour gives 
them “not a moment for any kind of recreation, of rest, or of exercise” (402).  Despite 
their total absence of rest, this time becomes for Juliet the most fulfilling to her since 
“her arrival on the British shores” (402).  Through their commitment to the bourgeois 
productivity of clock time they find, however precarious, the means of self-preservation.   
They do enjoy some success initially, but the hasty departure of Gabriella signals 
the end of their business.  Juliet tries to not let this blow “consume her time;” however, 
her economical time-thrift is soon overwhelmed (402).  Juliet’s clientele consists of 
“every rich female at Brighthelmstone,” and they view their relationship with Juliet as 
one of benevolent patronage, rather than one of rational economic exchange (404).  As 
with her music lessons, Juliet cannot obtain payment for her services from these 
“careless triflers,” who “seemed to estimate her time and her toil as nothing” (405, 
404).  Juliet’s patrons place no value upon her time, and they “ordinarily condemned” 
her “to wait in passages, or anti-chambers, for whole hours, and even whole mornings” 
(404).  Within this aristocratic economic mode, time remains the privilege of class, 
which leads an exasperated Juliet to question: “the time which they thus unmercifully 
waste in humiliating attendance, however to themselves it may be a play-thing, if not a 
drug, is, to those who subsist but by their use of it, shelter, clothing, and nourishment?” 
(405).  Juliet draws a parallel between time and individual maintenance, and in so doing 
draws a distinction between her own bourgeois modality and the aristocratic economy.  
When payment is secured for her labour, it is done so “with the parade of generosity,” 
and not through the due recognition of “debts of common justice” (404).  Furthermore, 
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the patronage and connection that characterizes this economy places Juliet in a double 
bind.  She can only get business through personal introduction, but because of that 
direct social connection, she then cannot expect payment by virtue of the fact that she 
“was brought forward by recommendation” (404).  It is revealing that Juliet bases her 
critique of this economic mode through her figurative appeal to “common justice” and 
to “common humanity, nay, common sense” (405).  Her appeal to commonality reflects 
her desire for a common market, for a shared understanding of economic value and of 
the protocols of economic exchange. 
Burney, Pam Perkins argues, underlines the economic limitations Juliet faces by 
“[refusing] to palliate either her heroine’s poverty or the steadily increasing difficulties 
that she encounters in trying to earn her living” (73).  In revealing the challenges Juliet 
endures, the novel shows the tension in post-revolutionary England between an 
ascendant bourgeois class and a reactionary, conservative nobility.  Andrea Henderson 
argues that through Juliet’s economic struggles the novel strives to imbue the 
“labourer/producer” with her own “political independence,” “over against the 
aristocrat/consumer” (3).  The Wanderer does this, Henderson writes, through a 
“mystification of the commodity, by insisting on the aloof independence of both labour 
and its products,” and “uses the apparent autonomy of things—which Marx decries—as 
a means to argue for the autonomy of the makers of those things” (3).  Despite this, in 
the economic world of Brighthelmstone, Henderson continues, “economic interactions” 
are not as yet based on the value of production, but remain “inevitably complicated by 
considerations of rank, family connections, and other social relations” (14).   
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The Wanderer indexes Juliet’s inability to leverage a bourgeois subjectivity in an 
economy controlled by landed interests through the language of clock time.  Rather 
than facilitating Juliet’s independence, clock time in the economy of the nobility 
becomes a dispossessing structure.  Because the power brokers of this economy have 
time as an open venue of leisure, clock time fails to allow for Juliet’s self-preservation, 
and becomes, for her, an instrument of alienated labour.  This is made explicit when 
Juliet goes to work as a mantua maker.  Here she finds clock time, and the new form of 
industrial labour it regulates, to be dispossessing and monotonous.  Doody attests to 
this when she writes, “Burney seems to be the first novelist to investigate at any depth 
the phenomenon now known to us as ‘alienation,’ the state in which the worker feels no 
personal participation in the labor by which he—or she—earns a livelihood but is simply 
a devitalized functionary performing perpetual routine tasks” (356).  Juliet desires to 
work for Miss Hart in a casual manner, free from any traditional commitment that might 
bind her to “learn the art of mantua-making as a future trade, or employment” (451).  
She wants only to be “serviceable” and “to continue, or to renounce her engagement, 
from day to day” (451).  Juliet eschews the more traditional, artisan-apprentice 
approach to labour, with its more permanent engagements, for the “self-dependence” 
she believes might be gained from contracting one’s labour in time (451).  However, 
upon taking up her position Juliet notes how this daily work is both monitored and 
monotonous.  Juliet finds that “the unremitting diligence with which she had begun her 
new office, had advanced her work with a rapidity, that made the smallest relaxation 
cause a sensible difference in its progress” (453).  In an almost assembly-line fashion, 
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Miss Hart monitors the pace of production, and grows disappointed when she 
“[observes], how much quicker business had gone on the first week” (453).  Henderson 
notes the proto-industrial character of Juliet’s work as a mantua maker: “while we never 
see Juliet working with industrial machines, we do see her working in factory 
conditions—i.e., as part of a group of workers gathered under a single roof whose 
labour is overseen by a supervisor” (17).  Instead of releasing Juliet from traditional and 
confining economic relations, clock time ushers in a new form of alienation.  Juliet 
wonders, “what is the labour that never requires respite?  What the mind, that never 
demands a few poor unshackled instants to itself?” (453).  “To be a labourer,” 
Henderson observes, “is to be reduced to a machine, attached inescapably to the world 
of made objects but also to the world of production in general” (17).  Juliet is “deadened 
by uninteresting monotony . . . the unvarying repetition of stitch after stitch, nearly 
closed in sleep her faculties, as well as her eyes,” and she characterizes the work as 
possessing a “fatiguing uniformity” (454).  Moreover, Juliet finds that clock time 
engenders precariousness in addition to alienation.  Juliet is free from “all continued 
constraint” and “set freshly at liberty every evening,” but she becomes “a stranger to 
security” as well, and is “subject to dismission, at the mercy of accident, and at the will 
of caprice” (455).  Indeed, she ultimately loses her position when demand for her 
services declines after the termination of some “work of importance just ordered for a 
great wedding in the neighbourhood” (450).  Within an aristocratic economic mode, 
clock time cannot deliver economic independence. 
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Clock time might fail those striving for independence within the economy of 
nobility, but for the wealthy it provides and enables time as an ever-unfolding venue of 
leisure and consumption.  Juliet’s stint at the milliner’s shop shows its wealthy patrons 
to be decadent and extravagant wasters of time.  Time for these patrons is a privilege of 
their wealth: “the ladies whose practice it was to frequent the shop, thought the time 
and trouble of its mistress, and her assistants, amply paid by the honour of their 
presence” (426).  The wealthy demonstrate a “total absence of feeling and of equity . . . 
for the indigent and laborious,” and display the “most callous disregard to all 
representations of the dearness of materials, or of the just price of labour” (428, 427).  
Time is a privilege of wealth, and those who are forced to work for their living must 
enable and encourage this privilege.  Juliet observes that the shop greets the wealthy 
and their “strolling . . . instantly, and with fulsome adulation,” while the “meaner, or 
economical, whose time had its essential appropriations, were obliged to wait patiently” 
(428).  “The rich and grand” are “capricious, difficult, and long in their examinations, 
because their time was their own” (428).  Time for the affluent is there for the 
spending—a privilege underwritten by the very absence of time available to those in 
their service.  
The temporal inequality of the economy of nobility reveals clock time to be a 
function of power, one that authorizes the wealthy and disciplines working people.  
After the failure of Juliet’s numerous occupations the only means of preservation that 
remains available to her is to become a “toad-eater;” or, “a person who would swallow 
any thing, bad or good; and do whatever he was bid, right or wrong; for the sake of a 
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little pay” (520, 521).  The designation of “toad-eater” for one who would do something 
for “a little pay” reveals the ethos of a traditional economy that finds the very idea of 
exchanging labour for money to be a revolting proposition.  Juliet’s status as a labourer 
and Mrs. Ireton’s position as her aristocratic employer are each registered by time, 
where, via a zero-sum structure, Juliet’s lack of time signifies Ireton’s surplus.  While in 
Mrs. Ireton’s service, Juliet is endlessly beleaguered by her wealthy charges, as “the 
encroachments upon her time, her attention, her liberty” are never ending (495).  
“Every moment of time, and consequently all means of comfort” lie at Mrs. Ireton’s 
“disposal,” and she views Juliet as yet another object over which she might extend her 
temporal privilege (491).  Juliet, in her service to Mrs. Ireton, becomes a means of 
occupying her time, “a treasure, which might rescue [Mrs. Ireton’s] unoccupied hours 
from weariness and spleen” (491).  The decadence of time displayed by the Iretons is 
encapsulated in the small building on the Ireton grounds dubbed the “Temple of the 
Sun” (496).  This building “like every place which Mrs. Ireton capriciously, and even for 
the shortest interval, inhabited” is “filled with materials for recreation, which, 
ingeniously employed, might have whiled away a winter; but which, from her fluctuating 
whims, were insufficient even for the fleet passage of a few hours” (496).  The objects 
that populate the Temple of the Sun are all diversions and distractions with which to 
pass the time: “books; various pieces of needle-work; a billiard-table; a chess-board; a 
backgammon-board; a cup and ball, &c. &c.; all, in turn, were tried; all, in turn, rejected” 
(496).  It is significant that after all of Juliet’s failed attempts at securing her 
independence—from music instructor, to public performer, to needle-worker, to 
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milliner’s shop attendant, to mantua maker—she ends up in a position that most 
transparently reveals the power structure that underwrites the economy of the nobility, 
and makes most apparent the decadent expenditure of leisure time that characterizes 
that economy.  In drawing this sharp contrast, the novel shows how clock time reaffirms 
more readily existing class dynamics, than it allows for the promotion of independence.  
The Wanderer demonstrates how clock time for the wealthy is the open and available 
time of leisure and consumption; while for those who must work, clock time is 
alienating, monotonous, and disciplinary.  
The productive bourgeois ethos channeled by Juliet ultimately fails her as a 
means of attaining independence within the economy of the nobility.  Her inability to 
leverage clock time results in her “again” becoming a “Wanderer,” after she is detected 
at her final occupation of haberdasher with Gabriella in London (655).  In the text’s most 
explicit and literal presentation of wander, Juliet seeks “concealment” in the area of the 
New Forest, by hoping to find lodging “with a rustic family . . . in so retired and remote a 
spot” (659).  Unable to find traction with the bourgeois ethos, Juliet is ejected 
effectively from the town economy, with its aristocratic underpinnings, and is cast into 
the “rawer world” of the English countryside (Doody 359).  Juliet wanders this 
countryside not as a self-styled figurative outcast, nor as a pejoratively figurative female 
adventurer, but as a literal wanderer—a displaced and alienated outcast unable to find 
a space of repose.  Wandering through the “rough and violent” world of rural England, 
Juliet’s wander is neither freeing, spiritually engaging, nor bucolic; it is dangerous 
(Doody 359).   
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The Wanderer, Carmel Murphy claims, shows how “Britain is erroneously 
identified as a site of liberty, failing to provide the heroine with the safe-haven that it 
had represented in anti-jacobin novels” (495).  Indeed, “Burney’s heroine,” Murphy 
continues, “narrowly avoids rape on more than one occasion in the novel” (495).  Juliet’s 
movement through the town of Romsey underlines the lack of freedom and the 
endangerment that her displaced wander exposes her to.  Upon entering Romsey, Juliet, 
mistaken for a girl with whom she swapped bonnets to better blend in, is accosted with 
“terms of coarse endearment” by a passing carter—a sexual threat that is repeated as 
she leaves town, and later as she enters the New Forest (666).  In Romsey, Juliet finds 
she can remain “aloof of all intrusive impertinence” by keeping a “deep care in her 
countenance, which, to the common observer, seemed but an air of business,” as she 
moves through town (667).  To be sure, her practised bourgeois subjectivity finds a 
home as she makes her way through what is presented as a bustling site of economic 
productivity: 
Carts, wagons, and diligences, were wheeling through the town; market-
women were arriving with butter, eggs, and poultry; work-men and 
manufacturers were trudging to their daily occupations; all was alive and 
in motion; and commerce, with its hundred hands, was every where 
opening and spreading its sources of wealth, through its active sisters, 
ingenuity and industry. (666-667) 
Romsey, in sharp contrast to Brighthelmstone, is figured as a locus of economic 
production characterized by ingenuity, industry, and commerce.  Juliet is at home in the 
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bourgeois-inflected Romsey, and she is able to pass as one of its citizens, “nearly 
unnoticed, and wholly unmolested,” because she, like the town, espouses the same 
productive work ethic: “everyone, like herself, alert to proceed, and impressed with the 
value of time, because using it to advantage, pursued his own purpose” (656, 667).  
However, as Juliet begins to note a “general desertion” signaling the onset of “the rural 
hour of repast” upon leaving town, Juliet is again solicited sexually (668).  Juliet is thrice 
deterred from appealing for assistance from “countrymen” at various cottages (668).  
The first offers to grant her water if she were to “pay him with a kiss;” she has “not 
courage to make her demand” from the second cottage peopled by “some men” 
“smoaking at the door;” and the third offers “a familiar invitation to partake of a cup of 
cyder” (668).  As soon as Juliet leaves the commercial space of the town, her movement 
becomes a wander that leaves her open to danger.  Indeed, Juliet’s movement is viewed 
as the wandering of a prostitute.  The apparent aimlessness of Juliet’s movement comes 
to resemble the “strolling” of prostitution:  
Now, too, her distress received the tormenting augmentation of intrusive 
interruption; for, in losing the elasticity of her motions, she lost, to the 
vulgar observer, her appearance of innocence.  Her eye, eagerly cast 
around in search of an asylum, appeared to be courting attention; her 
languor seemed but loitering; and her slow unequal pace, wore the air of 
inviting a companion. (668) 
Juliet’s fatigued walking is misread as the active wandering of sexual solicitation.  
Moving beyond the prescribed commercial space of Romsey opens Juliet up to danger, 
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and reveals the complete impossibility of her own self-determination.  In her displaced 
wander Juliet becomes a marked object, rather than a self-possessed wandering 
subject. 
The Wanderer emphasizes Juliet’s sheer distance from a more subjective, 
freeing, and aesthetically enabled iteration of wander, by exposing and eliminating the 
illusions that inform the Romantic rhetoric of wander.  Juliet first enters the New Forest 
with the perspective of the removed, urban, aesthetic observer.  She “mount[s] a hillock 
to take a general survey of the spot,” which is described as “sublimely picturesque,” 
complete with “richly variegated woods, whose aged oaks appeared to be spreading 
their venerable branches to offer shelter from the storms of life” (676).  The scene also 
offers the prospect of gentle “zephyrs,” the sun setting in the “benignant west,” and 
“the extatic wild notes, and warbling . . . of the feathered race” (676).  Initially, Juliet 
views the landscape for its aesthetic value.  She imbues the natural world with a moral 
beauty and a timelessness that is capable of restoration and benevolent shelter.  
However, Juliet is soon cured of this misconception when she seeks shelter at the 
cottage of Nat Mixon and his family.  She encounters at the cottage not a scene of 
natural, rustic liberty and vitality, but one of squabbling, meanness, and crime.  The 
cottagers “answered morosely” to her request for hospitality, by explaining “that they 
had neither bed nor room for travellers,” and “they went on with their supper, now 
helping, and now scolding their children, and one another” (678).  Juliet places “half-a-
crown upon the table” to “quicken their attention,” and they rise “bowing and 
courtsying and each offering her their place, and their repast” (678).  In spite of offering 
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the money, Juliet feels “mortified that so mercenary a spirit could have found entrance 
in a spot which seemed fitted to the virtuous innocence of our yet untainted first 
parents; or to guileless hospitality of the poet’s golden age” (678).  Juliet’s fantasy of 
rural life bursts, as she realizes that it too is governed by a more crass commercialism.  
Indeed, in perhaps a moment of willful denial—a denial that maintains her fantasy of 
rustic morality—Juliet has to “with difficulty persuade herself that she was not eating 
venison,” when served “slices of such fine-grained mutton,” and, in so doing, she 
convinces herself that the cottagers are not engaged in illegal poaching (679).  The 
cottagers are “rough to their children, and gross to each other; the woman looked all 
care and ill humour; the man, all moroseness and brutality,” and they fall “below 
[Juliet’s] expectations,” which disrupts Juliet’s removed and idealized fantasy of rural life 
(679). 
The bursting of this idyll is achieved finally as Juliet awakes in the night with the 
fear that she has “fallen” into a “den of thieves” (679).  Upon overhearing the couple 
discussing how to get past the sleeping Juliet, Juliet becomes a Gothic heroine 
entrapped by banditti, and she plays the part by feigning sleep.  Juliet hears “something 
fall, or thrown down, from within, weighty, and bearing a lumpish sound that made her 
start with horror;” an attentiveness that is “perceived by the hostess,” and Juliet 
“struggle[s] vainly to resume her serene appearance of repose” (681).  Juliet misreads a 
“large clot of blood” and the “bloody spots” that mark the passageway as signs of “some 
victim of murderous rapacity” with which she grows “wholly absorbed” (682).  Poaching 
becomes murder in Juliet’s naïve understanding of the rural world.  But her temporary 
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shift into the Gothic underlines, for Juliet, the disconnection between distanced 
pastoral, idealizations of rustic life, and its reality.  Juliet makes her way out of the 
cottage and eventually “[seats] herself upon the stump of a large tree, where deaf, from 
mental occupation, to the wild melody of innumerable surrounding singing birds, she 
shudderingly, and without intermission, bathed her bloody hand in the dew” (684).  The 
trees, which previously had the effect of making “heaven and eternity seem in full 
view,” are now reduced to a “stump,” and the transport of the singing birds becomes a 
more ominous “wild melody” (676, 684).  Juliet’s cleansing of her hand in the early 
morning dew signals how she has been marked by the abject materiality of nature, and 
her repetitive and unstoppable wiping stresses the indelibility of this materiality.  This 
awakening of Juliet is coded through her better understanding of her wander as an 
uprooted and alienating experience.  As Juliet regains the road, the narrator notes how 
the forest has lost its natural wonder for Juliet: “where, now, was the enchantment of 
its prospects? Where, the witchery of its scenery?” and observes how Juliet can now see 
“nothing but her danger” and can “make no observation but how to escape what [the 
forest] menaced” (685-686, 686).  To be sure, the text reveals the sheer physical 
challenges, difficulties, and dangers of wander.  As she makes her way through the 
forest “she wandered sometime in this fruitless research” (656), and later she goes 
“wandering on, by paths unknown to herself, with feet not more swift than trembling” 
(662); later still she notes “how little fitted to the female character . . . this hazardous 
plan of lonely wandering” (671); and soon after, “she wandered thus for some hours, 
now sinking into marshy ground, now wounded by rude stones, now upon a soft smooth 
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plain, and now stung or torn by bushes, nettles, and briars; till she concluded it to be 
about midnight” (704).  Wander for Juliet is not the means of attaining a bucolic liberty, 
it is an exhausting, dangerous, and relentless pacing of difficult ground.  Again “and 
again,” Juliet goes “in search of a new asylum,” and again and again “[becomes] a 
Wanderer” (703).  Mrs. Ireton who mockingly referred to Juliet, when in her employ, as 
“a person of another century.  A wandering Jewess,” was making a prophetic 
statement—Juliet is far closer to the abject, itinerant figure of the Wandering Jew than 
she is to the masculine poet bounding through the natural world in pursuit of individual 
freedom (485). 
Juliet’s experience of dispossessed wander thus provides her with the means of 
critiquing the literary and discursive celebrations of rustic life she had commenced with.  
The novel shows how these acts of praising rural life are rooted, more often than not, in 
a disconnected and wealthy urban fantasy.  Those who view shepherds and peasants 
“through their imaginations,” Juliet observes later in the text, fail to see how the 
working, rural poor “are the instruments” for the wealthy (701).  The “enlightened 
rambler, or affluent possessor” might be “charmed” by “the verdure of the flower-
motleyed meadow; the variegated foliage of the wood; the fragrance and purity of the 
air, and the wide spreading beauties of the landscape,” but the “labourer” remains 
entirely devoid of these pleasures (700-701).  The labourer’s experience with the natural 
world is centred upon the hardship of toil and production, and not upon some 
disinterested beauty.  “If the vivid field catches” the labourers’ “view,” Juliet observes, 
“it is but to present to them the image of the scythe, with which their labour must mow 
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it; if they look at the shady tree, it is only with the foresight of the ax, with which their 
strength must fell it” (701).  Perkins states, “Even rustic life and labour, which Juliet 
initially views with the sentimentality encouraged by popular writing and art, palls when 
she views it firsthand and realizes that the Romantic taste for nature, no less than 
society’s taste for art is a leisured one supported by the hard work of the less privileged” 
(77).  Unlike “those who are born and bred in the capital,” Juliet notes how “the most 
delightful view which the horizon can bound, affords not to the poor labourer the joy 
that is excited by the view of the twilight through which it is excluded; but which sends 
him home to the mat of straw, that rests, for the night, his spent and weary limbs” (700, 
701).  Perkins writes, “the Wordsworthian idea that peasants achieve moral exaltation 
through ‘honest labour’ is, Juliet concludes, a pernicious fiction of the intelligentsia” 
(77). 
Accordingly, through Juliet’s rough and dangerous experience of wander, The 
Wanderer challenges the rhetoric of wander aligned with Romanticism taking root in 
early-nineteenth-century Britain.  Published the same year as The Excursion, the novel 
offers a counter-narrative to the unstructured and freeing movement posited by the 
Romantic rhetoric of wander, by underlining how free wander is necessarily 
underwritten by class and gender.  Doody argues that Juliet is the novel’s “truly 
Romantic figure, ‘The Wanderer’—the very phrase is in the Romantic mode,” but she 
observes also how that figure is gendered male, and pejoratively gendered female (328).  
Doody writes, “Juliet is a Wanderer, like a beggar, like a Romantic poet, or—in a 
woman’s case—like a prostitute” (329).  Juliet’s wander places her alongside the many 
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“lonely wanderers, from Rousseau’s ‘Solitary Walker’ to Wordsworth’s poetic 
population of ‘wanderers,’ like the Old Cumberland Beggar, the Female Vagrant, the 
Leech Gatherer,” but in so doing it ironizes the masculine individualism elicited by 
Romantic wander (328-329).  Perkins also demonstrates how wander in Romanticism 
tends to reflect male privilege: “readers of 1814 were familiar with works by authors 
from Rousseau through Wordsworth to Byron which focused on the private reflections 
of wandering heroes . . . beggars and gentleman alike commune with nature, drawing 
irreproachable moral conclusions about society and human nature from their solitary 
musings” (73).  Women, however, are unable to access wander as a space of solitary 
contemplation.  What constitutes individual development and growth for men becomes 
a questioning of character for women.  Wander “grants spiritual freedom to male 
romantic figures from the Leach Gatherer to Childe Harold,” Perkins argues, but it 
signifies prostitution or destitution for women (74).  Wander, writes Perkins, “only leads 
Juliet into ever narrower social and economic options,” and the “isolation and 
anonymity” that she faces underlines how “this paradigmatic romantic activity—
wandering—is incompatible with femininity” (74).  Maria Jerinic shows similarly how 
Juliet’s wander differs from more stock representations of Romantic wander.  Jerinic 
claims that unlike one of Radcliffe’s heroines, for whom wandering is “of particular 
importance because it signifies the heroine’s desire to gain liberty, both physical 
freedom and the freedom to marry the man of her choice,” Burney’s use of the figure 
has the opposite effect (71). “While in Radcliffe’s novels, wandering is integral to the 
power and success of her heroines,” Jerinic states, “for Burney, Juliet’s status as a 
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‘Wanderer’ is a problem, as the novel’s subtitle, Female Difficulties, suggests” (71).  
Wander fails to “provide Juliet with liberty,” and “while she runs from the ever-present 
threat of economic and sexual exploitation, her wanderings only intensify her 
vulnerability” (71).  Far from being the freeing and transformative means for attaining 
independence wandering for Juliet is downright dangerous. 
 The sustained challenges Juliet faces in her wandering underscore how the 
rhetoric of Romantic wander is underwritten by a class and gender privilege.  As an 
interesting counterpoint, Elinor, whose wealth affords her a freedom of mobility and, 
moreover, a freedom to perform the vagrant tramping of a wanderer, undertakes the 
anonymous wander that Juliet is unable to do.  Earlier in the text as Juliet is about to 
perform publicly, as a means of fulfilling her mounting pecuniary obligations, her 
performance is halted before it begins by “a strange figure, with something foreign in 
his appearance” (356).  The manner and clothing of this stranger, who speaks “broken 
English,” code him as the exotic outsider (356).  
His dress and figure were equally remarkable.  He was wrapped in a large 
scarlet coat, which hung loosely over his shoulders, and was open at the 
breast, to display a brilliant waistcoat of coloured and spangled 
embroidery.  He had a small, but slouched hat, which he had refused to 
take off, that covered his forehead and eye-brows, and shaded his eyes; 
and a cravat of enormous bulk encircled his chin, and enveloped not 
alone his ears, but his mouth.  Nothing was visible but his nose, which 
was singularly long and pointed.  The whole of his habiliment seemed of 
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foreign manufacture; but his hair had something in it that was wild, and 
uncouth; and his head was continually in motion. (357-358) 
The figure turns out to be Elinor who disrupts the performance with a dramatic suicide 
attempt, accompanied by a declaration of her devotion to Harleigh.  Elinor has the 
resources to actively perform the role of the exotic Wandering Jew—a performance she 
can launch publicly from the gallery to carry out her own desires.  Indeed, we learn soon 
after that Elinor had devoted significant time and resources to her performance of the 
exiled wanderer: “Elinor had travelled post to Portsmouth, whence she had sailed to the 
Isle of Wight.  There, meeting with a foreign servant out of place, she engaged him in 
her service, and bid him purchase some clothes of an indigent emigrant.  She then 
dressed herself grotesquely yet, as far as she could, decently, in man’s attire” (395).  
Elinor’s disguised vagrancy ironizes a statement she makes earlier in the text that could 
well stand as a distillation of Romanticism at its most radical: “I detest all aristocracy: I 
care for nothing upon the earth but nature; and I hold no one thing in the world worth 
living for but liberty! and liberty, you know, has but two occupations,—plucking up and 
pulling down.  To me, therefore, ’tis equally diverting, to see a beggar swell into a 
duchess, or a duchess dwindle into a beggar” (110-111).  But this sentiment is undercut 
by the fact that she performs this transition for self-serving purposes.  Elinor possesses 
the class freedom to perform exactly the kind of social demotion her politics call for, but 
undertaking such a transition is underwritten by her wealth in the first place.  Her class 
privilege allows her to espouse and enact an independent wander and a political and 
class freedom, which remains untenable for unknown, working women. 
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The Romantic rhetoric of wander is revealed therefore to be a fiction—a fiction 
that reifies the distance between the nobility and the peasantry.  Whether it is the 
wander of romance or the wander of Romanticism, wander is incapable of generating 
independence or social change in The Wanderer.  As if to drive this point home, The 
Wanderer enacts a form of Deus ex Machina to restore forcefully Juliet to the nobility to 
which she always already belongs, and to engage performatively a more purposive, anti-
Jacobin, marriage plot to carry out the novel’s resolution.  After being detected in the 
New Forest, Juliet tries to make her escape from the pursuant “Mounseer, the 
smuggler,” who is working on behalf of the Commissary for “a great reward” (721).  
However, as Juliet escapes, she is corralled back from her anonymous wander.  The text 
delimits her wandering by channeling her into an unavoidable and inevitable track that 
leads directly to Harleigh and the Commissary.  As Juliet tries to flee, she sees 
In a short time, the sight of several hostelers, helpers, and postilions, 
before a large house, which appeared to be a capital inn, [that makes] 
her cross the way.  She wished to turn wholly from the high road; but low 
brick-walls had now, on either side, taken place of hedges, and she 
searched in vain for an opening.  Her earnestness to press onward, joined 
to her fear of looking up, made her soon follow, unconsciously, an 
ordinary man, till she was so close behind him, as suddenly to perceive, 
by his now well known coat, that he was the pilot! . . . turning short back, 
speeded her retrograde way with all her force . . . she heard footsteps 
following.  Hopeless of saving herself, if watched or suspected by flight; 
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as she knew that there was no turning for at least half a mile; she darted 
precipitately into the inn; which seemed alone to offer her even a 
shadow of any chance of concealment.  (723) 
Juliet is funneled back towards the inn, and her wander is foreshortened and curtailed, 
as she is pushed into the building that contains the revelation of her history, and the 
means of reinserting her back into a narrative trajectory.  This channeling, moreover, is 
continued at the inn itself, where Juliet frantically strives to find a means of egress, as 
she flees the voices of her pursuers she hears around her.  Fumbling from one hall to 
another Juliet finally manages to find an obliging door. 
She seemed to herself a mere composition of terror.  She flew up the 
stairs, meaning to regain her little chamber; but mistaking her way, found 
herself in a gallery, leading to the best apartments.  Glad, however, 
rather than sorry, in the hope she might here be less liable to be sought, 
she opened the first door; and, entering a large vast room, locked and 
bolted herself in, with such extreme precipitance, that already she had 
sunk upon her knees, in fervent prayer, before a shadow, which caught 
her eyes, made her look round; when she perceived, at a distant window, 
a gentleman who was writing. (725) 
Juliet is able, at last, to locate a room of her own in which to hide, only to find it already 
occupied by Harleigh.  Juliet can only escape one male pursuer by running 
unintentionally into the arms of another.  Indeed, as soon as she exits Harleigh’s room 
she runs headlong into the pursuing Pilot, who “with arms wide extended, to prevent 
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her passing, loudly calls, ‘Citoyen!’ Citoyen! Venez Voir! C’est Elle!’” to the Commissary 
(726).  Juliet, in spite of her attempts at independence, is reinstated forcefully to a more 
conventional, anti-Jacobin, marriage plot, wherein her experience of Revolutionary 
violence, her aristocratic origins, and her marriage to Harleigh all begin to lurch into 
action. 
To be sure, the debate that ensues between the Commissary and Harleigh, soon 
after Juliet’s capture, maps out the stakes of an anti-Jacobin narrative.  The men’s 
debate over the fate of Juliet doubles the highly politicized Revolutionary debate over 
rights.  Harleigh demands to know “by what right” the Commissary claims Juliet, while 
claiming her himself “by the rights of humanity,” to which the Commissary responds: “‘il 
y a d’autres droits!’” (727).  The language of rights that is played out over the 
“prostrate” Juliet is ironic, as her own rights conspicuously fall by the wayside (727).  
The Commissary, who is “dressed with disgusting negligence” and bears “an hideous 
countenance,” figures Jacobinism as brutish and repugnant, but Harleigh’s brand of 
natural English liberty is not beyond reproach (727).  After Juliet is taken away, Harleigh 
sits alone and thinks despondently of how Juliet is “indisputably married! and can never, 
never—even in my wishes, now, be mine!  A sudden sensation, kindred even to hatred, 
took possession of his feelings.  Altered she appeared to him, and delusive” (730).  
Harleigh’s own misogyny seeps to the surface after the debate over rights is definitively 
answered by the revelation of Juliet’s nuptial ties.  Despite this, the anti-Jacobin 
narrative jumps into action, as if spring-loaded, as Sir Jaspar appears out of nowhere, as 
the dutiful old aristocrat, to prevent Juliet’s transport back to France, by arranging for 
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the Commissary to be “imprisoned for trial, or sent out of the country, by the alien-bill” 
(756).   
Under Sir Jaspar’s protection Juliet at last reveals her recent history and explains 
her forced marriage as well as her mysterious and nameless exile in Britain, which 
signals the end of her alienated wander.  However, at the exact moment at which Juliet 
provides an account of herself, and becomes realigned with her family and title, Sir 
Jaspar begins referring to her as a wanderer.  Sir Jaspar’s repeated designation of Juliet 
as a wanderer performs the transition Juliet makes from literal, alienated wander to 
figurative, free, and privileged wander.  However, this final figurative state of wander is 
denuded of any real independence, and becomes, instead, a diminutive that downplays 
Juliet’s struggles and obfuscates her ultimately confined status.  “This forlorn, but most 
beautiful Wanderer,” Sir Jaspar states, “—this so long concealed, and mysterious, but 
most lovely incognita, is the daughter of the late Lord Granville, and the grand-daughter 
of the Late Earl of Melbury” (641).  Sir Jaspar calls her a wanderer in the same breath as 
he identifies her patriarchal lineage, and converts her lived experience into an ironic 
appellation.  When Sir Jaspar calls Juliet a wanderer a second time it completes the 
word’s ironization.  Sir Jaspar recounts how he planned to “fix the matchless Wanderer 
in her proper sphere” (757).  The designation of wanderer is here entirely fictional, if not 
ideological, as Sir Jaspar wishes to “fix” Juliet—a word that signifies the complete 
opposite of wander—at the very centre of British society.  In calling Juliet a wanderer, 
Sir Jaspar contains and confines her—she is no longer alienated, but she is devoid of 
freedom.  
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With Juliet’s identity revealed and her mysterious namelessness accounted for, 
she is granted finally the due space and time that goes with her station, but she loses all 
agency in the process.  The ending of the novel oversees the transference of action from 
Juliet to a self-appointed male protectorate consisting of Sir Jaspar, Harleigh, Lord 
Melbury, and her uncle the Admiral.  She is now temporally and spatially free—free to 
wander—but she is also far more circumscribed.  This is evident upon Juliet’s visit to 
Stonehenge, where Sir Jaspar takes her soon after her rescue.  Juliet, “struck with 
solemn wonder,” is free to roam throughout Stonehenge, and “for some time wandered 
amidst these massy ruins, grand and awful, though terrific rather than attractive” (765).  
However, her wander is closely monitored and impeded upon by Sir Jaspar.  At 
Stonehenge, Juliet is lost freely “in deep and melancholy rumination,” that is “till she 
was joined by the Baronet” (766).  Sir Jaspar disrupts Juliet’s own impressions of 
Stonehenge, and he goes so far as to suppose and even narrate her own experience.  Sir 
Jaspar states, “You picture yourself perhaps, in the original temple of Gog and Magog? 
For what less than giants could have heaved stones such as these?” (766).  Juliet is 
compelled out of her own sublime meditations by the interruptive Sir Jaspar, who forces 
Juliet to try “but vainly, to make a civil speech” until “Sir Jaspar, after having vainly 
awaited it, went on” (766).  Juliet is pulled forcefully out of her freeing, wandering 
thoughts—in which there “was room for ‘meditation even to madness’”—by this male 
intrusion that insists on regulating and controlling her experience (766).  Additionally, Sir 
Jaspar colonizes and repurposes the “romantic spot” of Stonehenge to re-inscribe 
patriarchal hierarchies, and to reify Juliet as an object of desire (767).  Sir Jaspar erects 
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his own Stonehenge consisting of “a large band-box, and a square new trunk, placed as 
supporters to an elegant Japan basket, in which were arranged various refreshments” 
(768-769).  In the box are gifts for Juliet—“a complete small assortment of the finest 
linen” and “a white chip bonnet of the most beautiful texture”—that reaffirms 
masculine power and control over feminine bodies (769).  Sir Jaspar offers space and 
time to Juliet in which to wander; but he also delimits, organizes, and controls that 
space and time in its very offering.  Through her re-association with her patriarchal title 
Juliet grows entitled to wander freely, but it is a free wander that is, in actuality, 
rigorously policed.  
 With Juliet’s newfound free and open wander comes free time; and yet, the 
freedom and openness of both her wander and her time are always already restricted.  
While awaiting word of her and the Bishop’s safety in the “perfect retirement” of 
Milton-abbey Juliet “passed her time in deep rumination” and “wandered, as usual, in 
the view of Milton-abbey” (774).   Juliet now has the freedom to wander and to “wear 
away the hours devoted to anxious waiting,” but this time and space are limited.  In her 
wandering, Juliet “permitted not, however, her love of the country to beguile her into 
danger by the love of variety; she wandered not far from her new habitation, in the 
vicinity of Milton-abbey; of which she never lost sight from distance” (774).  She may 
wander freely, but only within the prescribed confines of the abbey.  Her temporal 
freedom is likewise curtailed.  Juliet’s reunion with Lady Aurora near the novel’s end is 
depicted through a figuration of the experience of time before clock time:  
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While time was yet a stranger to regulation, and ere the dial shewed its 
passage; when it had no computation but by our feelings, our weariness, 
our occupations, or our passions; the sun which arose splendid upon 
felicity, must have excited, by its quick parting rays, a surprize nearly 
incredulous; while that which gave light but to sorrow, may have 
appeared, at its evening setting, to have revolved the whole year.  This 
period, so long past, seemed now present to Lady Aurora and to Juliet; so 
unaccounted flew the minutes; so unconscious were they that they had 
more than met, more than embraced, more than reciprocated their joy in 
acknowledged kindred; that each felt amazed as well as shocked, when a 
summons from Mrs. Howel to Lady Aurora, told them that the day was 
fast wearing, away. (822)  
The passage reminds readers of the fundamental shift in temporal experience brought 
about by the clock.  Prior to the “computation” of time by the “dial,” temporality was a 
more embodied experience felt on an emotional, physical, and cultural level.  This kind 
of temporal being, characterized by flux, and by intermittent bursts of acceleration or 
stasis, is rooted more immediately in experience.  The advent of the clock, however, 
imbues time with an homogenous, repetitive monotony.  Juliet and Aurora, if only 
briefly, are free to feel time as devoid of all quantification.  However, their experience of 
a non-quantified time ends with the abrupt re-quantification of time.  Their free time 
ends when the authoritative governess Mrs. Howell reasserts time as a sequenced 
structure, by announcing that “the day was fast wearing, away” (822). 
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 With the recognition of Juliet’s name and title comes the privilege of having 
time, but this privilege is at the expense of Juliet’s loss of autonomy.  Murphy argues 
that, “at the close of the novel, Burney’s wanderer is saved not through her own 
exertions, but by her re-assimilation into society through the establishment of a fixed 
identity and her subsequent marriage with Harleigh” (497).  In spite of, and in sharp 
counterpoint to, the great lengths to which Juliet had gone towards her own self-
deliverance, the novel concludes with her taking on the position of a domestic object.  It 
is Harleigh, Lord Melbury, and the Admiral who effectively oversee both the safe return 
of the Bishop, and Juliet’s marriage to Harleigh.  This concerted male resolution of 
Juliet’s fate undermines Juliet’s experience in the narrative.  Indeed, Melbury delivers 
Harleigh’s plan for Juliet’s rescue in a particularly pedantic and patriarchal manner.  
Melbury says to Juliet, “your scruples we both think a little chimerical . . . Mr. Harleigh 
has found a way to reconcile all perplexities.  He will save you, he says, in honour as well 
as in person” (852).  Melbury continues this sense of entitlement over her fate in 
claiming that Harleigh “would rather endow [the Commissary with Juliet’s] whole thirty 
thousand . . . than let [her] fall into his clutches” (852).  Juliet is distanced and estranged 
from her own preservation and resolution (852).  This is continued by Harleigh’s 
revelation of the Commissary’s arrest in France for “treasonable conspiracy,” which 
presents “Harleigh vehemently break from the group by which he had been surrounded, 
rush precipitately forward to meet them, and, singling out Lord Melbury, encircle his 
lordship in his arms, exclaiming, ‘My lord! my dear lord! Your sister is free!’” (855).  
Juliet is rendered a mere bystander to her own fate, as she becomes simply a secondary 
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spectator to the news of her own release (855).  Anderson notes the constraint and 
powerlessness that characterizes Juliet in the subsequent arrangement of her marriage 
to Harleigh.  The text, Anderson writes, “exposes the pain and frustration that women 
experience and the external restraints imposed on them.  Even the lucky bride must 
articulate her love and pleasure from within a ‘chastened garb of moderation’ and only 
after Harleigh’s suit has been authorized by her brother, her guardian, and her uncle” 
(648).  The fact that the details of the marriage are ironed out in the homo-social 
bathing machine attests to this: “the impatient Harleigh,” we are told, “besought Lord 
Melbury to be his agent with the guardian and the uncle of his lovely sister” who were 
presently in a “bathing-machine; in which the Admiral was civilly, though with great 
perplexity, labouring to hold discourse with the Bishop” (864).   
Juliet becomes, effectively, the anti-wanderer at the novel’s end, as she is 
spatially limited through her entrenchment in domesticity.  After the safe arrival of the 
Bishop Juliet awaits the celebratory dinner “in the beautiful verdant recess, between 
two rocks, overlooking the vast ocean, with which she had already been so much 
charmed” (859).  The solitude she experiences here again recalls how the privilege she 
has regained grants time and space; but it is a time and space that remains delimited, as 
Juliet is hemmed in on all sides by the rocky recess and the ocean.  Furthermore, her 
containment is patrolled by Melbury, and then by Harleigh, who agrees to act “as 
sentinel” (860).  The enclosure of Juliet is continued at the celebratory dinner, where 
Juliet is “seated between her revered Bishop and beloved brother, and facing her 
generous uncle, and the man of her heart” (867).  The fixity of Juliet is what 
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characterizes her married life with Harleigh as well.  Juliet becomes a prototype of the 
nineteenth-century angel in the house, as the domestic angel of “Harleigh Hall” (871).  
The house is presented as the centre of an inner circle of social inclusion of the 
characters that have proven themselves worthy throughout the course of the novel.  
“The dearest delight of Harleigh,” the narrator continues, “was seeking to assemble 
around his Juliet her first friends” (871).  As such Lady Aurora, Lady Barbara, Lord 
Melbury, Sir Jaspar, and Giles Arbe are all frequent guests “under her roof” (871).  At 
the novel’s end Juliet remains transfixed within the domestic sphere.  She has ample 
time for leisure, but always within the prescribed space of “the Happy Hall” (872).  
Indeed, the narrator emphasizes Juliet’s domestication at the novel’s end by explicitly 
stating how her role as wife and mother ensures she will wander no more: “a rising 
family . . . put an end to foreign excursions” (871). 
The domestication of Juliet undermines and counteracts problematically the 
suffering she has experienced throughout the narrative, and the critical insight yielded 
by that suffering.  The final pages of the novel recount the retroactive rewriting of 
Juliet’s displaced and alienated wander.  Juliet’s wandering footsteps are retraced, her 
debts repaid, and her status reaffirmed as a form of noblesse oblige:  Harleigh “paid, 
with high interest” “three half-guineas” to Mr. Tedman, and “no one to whom Juliet had 
ever owed any good office, was by her forgotten, or by Harleigh neglected,” and the two 
“visited, with gifts and praise, every cottage in which the Wanderer had been 
harboured” (871, 872).  In retracing Juliet’s wandering steps, the couple reclaims and 
repurposes her abjection as simply the preamble to their inevitable, aristocratically 
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sanctioned marriage.  For Harleigh this becomes an act of appropriation, particularly 
when “Harleigh bought of the young woodcutters, at a high price, their dog Dash” (871, 
872).  Harleigh’s purchasing of the dog Dash negates symbolically Juliet’s hard-won 
autonomy.  Juliet’s encounter with the dog had figured, during her wander, her own 
ability to assert her independence and will over a symbolic predatory male.  Juliet had 
stood her ground when approached by the growling dog while “bewildered in a thicket,” 
and “the dog, caught by her confidence . . . surveyed her, wagged his tail in sign of 
accommodation, and, gently advancing, stretched himself at her feet” (686, 687).  
Juliet’s mastery over the dog had signaled her attainment of self-possession, which she 
had then proceeded to enact over the dog’s owners, by thwarting their predatory, 
sexual advances with an “air and mien” that “caused, involuntarily, a suspension of their 
facetious design” (689).  Harleigh’s buying of the dog, which then becomes his “new 
master’s inseparable companion in his garden, fields, and rides,” claims and contains 
this sign of Juliet’s independence, and repurposes it as an object of aristocratic leisure 
(872).  By retracing Juliet’s steps, and making good on any of her outstanding 
obligations, the couple cancels out Juliet’s alienated wander, and reasserts and 
reaffirms a social and economic structure the novel had just spent several volumes 
critiquing. 
 Despite this, romance requires marriage for its resolution, and The Wanderer 
obliges.  “It is written within the formula of the romance paradigm,” Silverman 
observes, “that no matter what the hardships of the Incognita, she will be rewarded in 
the end by a name and by marriage” (75).  Sara Salih adds, “although Juliet slides to the 
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bottom rung of the social ladder where she finds herself reduced to the condition of a 
penniless vagrant, her ascent is relatively rapid, and at the end of the novel her 
experiences as a poor, homeless refugee are no more than bitter memories” (314).  
Juliet does get married, and social change in the novel is abandoned for social 
promotion, or, more accurately, social confirmation.  However, there is something pre-
emptive and forced in The Wanderer’s conclusion.  As Margaret Doody argues, Burney’s 
“England presents not a pattern of cheerful order, but a complex structure of pain,” 
which makes the dissonance of the obligatory happy ending all the more audible (Doody 
361).  Juliet’s marriage cannot negate the decadence and corruption of the nobility she 
has witnessed, nor can it undo the vivid depictions of the challenges faced by women 
when negotiating public, economic space.  The overlaying of the obligatory happy 
ending upon the lengthy detailing of female difficulties indicates a desire for social 
change that remains unattainable for Burney in 1814.  In this light, the closure becomes 
mandatory because of an absence of an organic or formal means of realizing the social 
change that Juliet’s experience in the text seems to call for.  
 The sheer length of The Wanderer attests to the tension between the call for 
change that emanates from the narrative and the happy ending of the marriage plot 
that calls the narrative belatedly but prematurely to a close.  Miranda Burgess argues 
that the novel displays Burney’s unease with the ascendant commercial economy and its 
reliance upon credit.  Burgess claims that Burney is uneasy with social and economic 
changes that uproot traditional conceptions of value and worth aligned with family, 
land, and title; however, Burgess argues that Burney’s texts are ultimately powerless in 
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arresting and correcting this change.  Burney views the rise of credit and the commercial 
economy as that which obfuscates and blurs true, essential value, because credit 
“depended largely on the fashionable appearance of the debtor—an appearance easily 
assumed through pretense” (139).  The Wanderer shows in detail, Burgess claims, how 
the “true character and worth (Juliet’s virtue and her noble birth) get lost in the system 
of financial and social credit” (145).  Burney opposes the “layered representations” that 
constitute the superficial and artificial value of the commercial economy, and she 
advances instead a more traditional notion of fixed worth, thus “[countering] the 
triumph of commerce by a thorough retreat into the bosom of the genteel family” (146, 
142).  However, Burgess shows how Burney can only attempt to arrest this historical 
shift, she cannot stop it altogether.  Rather than generating new alternatives to the 
changes of capitalism, Burney tries “escaping the march of commercial history only 
through a fictive historical return” (148).  The novel is long because it cannot posit 
organically or formally a solution to the problems it identifies.  
Helen Thompson similarly finds in The Wanderer the desire to restore 
naturalized and embodied nobility in a world in which the performance of nobility 
threatens to eclipse actual aristocratic being.  Burney, Thompson argues, “reconstitutes 
the wanderer’s body in the interest of a postrevolutionary reconstitution of rank” (966).  
Accordingly, “the wanderer . . . suspends the prerevolutionary materiality of aristocratic 
display in an ineffable, but still material, modality of anonymous refinement” (967).  
Juliet remains a provoking and perplexing figure because she actively inscribes an 
aristocratic modality in spite of the work she must necessarily do to support herself.  
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However, this distinction threatens the essence it performs in the first place.  Thompson 
writes,   
The chance that labor and rank might be merely two competing 
performances, whose arbitration can only be settled by narrative 
insistence, represents the deepest historical threat to the wanderer's 
imagined transmutation of aristocratic being.  In her efforts to support 
herself, the wanderer is in danger of affirming the bourgeois radical 
“ethos of the self-made individual,” whose de-essentializing promise is, 
paradoxically, also based in practice. (979) 
The novel, them, aims to mitigate and “stabilize the difference between essentializing 
(aristocratic) and de-essentializing (bourgeois radical) practice” (979).  Juliet’s 
embodying of nobility reflects a conservative desire to render the traditional, 
aristocratic political order self-evident—where Juliet is better because one’s social 
betters are naturally constituted and endowed.  Despite this, Thompson points to the 
seeming endlessness of the novel to indicate the never-ending performance that is 
required to reify what is supposed to be naturally apparent: “this novel’s historical and 
formal failure” is its “interminable attempt to render revelatory the ideally self-evident” 
(981).  The Deus ex Machina of the marriage plot is the formalization of the failure of 
aristocratic being to make its case organically.  Both Burgess and Thompson concede 
that Burney’s conservative response to the rise of the bourgeois class implodes, or 
rather explodes, in its proliferation of narrative events—the former in a nostalgic dream, 
the latter in a never-ending reality.   
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But where these critics see failure might just as easily be identified as 
performance.  I argue, the length of the text and its marriage plot resolution function as 
a formal systematic critique of a stagnant and corrupted aristocracy, and a revelation of 
the palpable absence of a narrative language with which that social mode might be 
taken to task.  Juliet’s attempt to harness a bourgeois modality and a neutral and 
productive temporality are done in good faith—her limitations and frustrations are 
palpable.  These attempts articulate a desire to break with traditional class affiliations, 
and a need to establish an economic and social mode in which actual merit, emptied out 
of class and gender bias, might be measured.  The seeming interminability of the novel 
in recounting the failure of that subjective mode, and in presenting Juliet’s ensuing 
experience as an alienated and abject wanderer, reflects just how pressing that desire 
has become.  Moreover, the novel’s underlining of the privilege that entails free wander 
presents a strong critique of a Romanticism that would claim to present solutions to 
Juliet’s difficulties.  Elinor’s Romanticism and Juliet’s own Romanticism turn out to be 
privileged fictions, which either remain untested, in Elinor’s case, or are proven to be 
un-roadworthy, in Juliet’s case.  If, as Murphy observes, “The Wanderer presents the 
French Revolution as an event of ‘world historical’ significance in the Lukacsian sense” 
and “offers a meditation on the irrevocable impact that the French Revolution has 
exerted on Burney’s time and society,” than the novel in its great length is more direct 
in indicating the pitfalls that lie ahead (491).  Rather than positing free wander as a 
viable post-revolutionary stance, Burney shows how wander is not universal, but class 
and gender contingent.  As such, the novel shows that the transposition of one 
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economic mode for another requires a thorough sounding of these material 
considerations, instead of the simplistic substitution of one set of universal claims for 
another.  The Wanderer’s performance of a conservative ending concedes that the 
violence and patriarchy that plague Juliet throughout the narrative cannot be denied or 
negated, and that the aristocratic system upon which that patriarchy is propagated can 
no longer organically be sustained.  
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Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
Chapter Four: 
 
Wandering through Modernity: Clock Time and The Rime of the Ancient Mariner 
 
 
 The Rime of the Ancient Mariner presents a shocking and irreversible encounter 
with modernity.  The Mariner’s experience at sea maps his departure from a more 
traditional social world into modernity, untethered from the bedrocks of King, country, 
and Christianity.  The Mariner’s abrupt and seemingly unmotivated execution of the 
Albatross shatters traditional, feudal notions of fellowship and hospitality, and sets the 
Mariner adrift in a world characterized by quantified and sequential space and time, and 
consisting of individuated and distinct subjects and objects.  However, far from finding 
himself in a functioning and orderly world, the Mariner experiences this modernity as a 
form of systematic chaos, as he becomes suspended within a succession of events that 
he is incapable of controlling, and unable to understand.  Meaning and significance 
elude the Mariner, as he becomes a subject of chronological time afloat in the 
homogenous space of the ocean.  The Mariner remains indelibly marked and altered by 
his experience, and he continues to wander ceaselessly, and to repeat his tale with a 
“compulsive technique of total recall” (Empson 308).  The Mariner is unable to 
understand the modernity he has inaugurated inadvertently, and so he wanders and 
retells his tale endlessly.  Wander in The Rime is not the quintessentially Romantic 
movement of freedom, but the movement of a worrisome modernity that ushers in 
social, cultural, spatial, and temporal alienation.  The Rime is thus a cautionary tale of a 
subject—indeed the first subject—caught within modernity’s homogenous and 
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sequential space and time; one who lacks entirely the subjective technology required to 
orient one’s self within such a brave new world.  Finding himself unequipped to 
comprehend a world devoid of divine order, the Mariner wanders, and iterates his own 
alienation and temporal dispossession within a modernity he fails to grasp. 
 The Mariner’s transgression, and his subsequent state of penitent guilt and 
endless wander, aligns him with the figure of the Wandering Jew.  Harold Bloom sees 
the Mariner as an iteration of the “major Romantic archetype” of the “Wanderer,” 
which itself belongs to “the tradition of the stories of Cain and of the Wandering Jew;” 
“a tradition of seemingly motiveless malevolence” (1, 2).  Indeed, Humphrey House 
recalls how The Rime emerged in the wake of an attempted “collaboration with 
Wordsworth in a poem about Cain,” which, Coleridge recollected, had ultimately 
“‘broke up in a laugh: and the Ancient Mariner was written instead’” (214).  House 
claims that the transition from a poem about Cain to the writing of The Rime “shows 
how the subject of terrible guilt, suffering, expiation and wandering was already in 
Coleridge’s mind before the various hints which were to form the outline of the 
Mariner’s story came together” (214).  House argues that the Mariner, through his guilt, 
bears traces to the “two traditional figures, Cain and the Wandering Jew,” and he notes 
how Coleridge had reviewed Lewis’ The Monk, which also features a Wandering Jew, in 
“The Critical Review for February 1797” (215).  Bryan Fulmer likewise reads the 
Mariner’s crime and his subsequent wandering atonement as being cut directly from the 
“fabric of the Wandering Jew legend” (812).  Fulmer argues that Coleridge’s “readings in 
Schiller and Lewis, and probably in Scott and the Reliques ballad, and his joining the 
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character with Cain in the fragment” were “transmuted into the Mariner” (802).  
Coleridge’s narrative of the Mariner becomes a “transformation and retelling of the old 
adventure,” through its “recreation of the Wandering Jew’s crime, curse, punishment, 
and penitent wanderings” (799).  Fulmer develops this connection in his identification of 
both the Mariner’s and the Wandering Jew’s transgressions as affronts to hospitality: 
the Wandering Jew’s crime was his refusal of “succour to Christ when He passed the 
unfortunate man’s door” (806).  The Mariner, like the Wandering Jew, “acts without 
considering either the nature of the deed or its possible consequences,” and “his 
inhospitality to a member of the One Life separates him from the rest completely until 
he learns to feel and think” (806).  The Mariner’s violation of hospitality (“he rejects the 
associations which the albatross has with Christ and Christian rituals and murders 
sanctity itself”) effectively re-enacts “the Jew’s repudiation of Christ,” which, Fulmer 
argues, casts him, like the Jew, into a perpetual state of penitence (807).   
 I argue that Coleridge harnesses the trope of the Wandering Jew to figure the 
condition of modernity—a condition characterized by relativity, itinerancy, and 
alienation.  The Wandering Jew’s isolation and expiation results from his having to 
reckon with and provide significance to his own individual act of will—no matter how 
insignificant that act might be. Coleridge’s adaptation of this trope evinces the 
dispossession, isolation, and alienation within which subjects of modernity must contest 
with their own individual, subjective, and volitional acts—acts that necessarily bring 
unintended consequences and uncontainable significance.  The solitary and endless 
penitence of the Wandering Jew then becomes a crucial pretext for grappling with not 
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just a world in which God is cruel, but a world in which God does not exist; a world in 
which subjects must continuously determine the significance of their own actions.  The 
trope of the Wandering Jew becomes, for Coleridge, the urtext of modernity, wherein 
individuals are determined by their actions, and are no longer guided by divine 
ordinance.  Fulmer observes the difference between Coleridge’s iteration of the 
Wandering Jew and Shelley’s; a difference that reifies two discernable stances of 
modernity.  Fulmer writes, the “Mariner is not a Promethean figure of daring, an 
inquiring Spirit like Faust, a symbol of liberty, or a Romantic rebel from society,” but “an 
object of pathos” because of “the relativity of his guilt and his exorbitant suffering” 
(814).  The heroic, Baudelairean, or Nietzschean stance of modernity is anticipated by 
Shelley’s Wandering Jew; while Coleridge uses the trope to figure modernity’s more 
dispossessing and isolating implications.  The Mariner iterates the Wandering Jew to 
articulate a world in which subjects must independently, and neurotically, determine 
meaning in the void of divine intervention.  Wandering is neither heroic nor freeing, but 
the very movement of this solitary alienation. 
Despite the aimless wander that characterizes the Mariner, The Rime is a 
product of walking.  In The Fenwick Notes Wordsworth recalls how the poem derived 
from a conversation had during a walk, and, moreover, how its publication was intended 
to facilitate further excursions.  Wordsworth writes,  
In the Spring of the year 1798, [Coleridge], my sister, & myself started 
from Alfoxden, pretty late in the afternoon, with a view to visit Linton & 
the Valley of Stones near it, and as our united funds were very small we 
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agreed to defray the expense of the tour by writing a poem to be sent to 
the New Monthly Magazine set up by Phillips the Bookseller and edited 
by Dr. Aikin.  Accordingly we set off and proceeded along the Quantock 
Hills, towards Watchet, and in the course of this walk was planned the 
Poem of The Ancient Mariner, founded on a dream, as Mr. Coleridge said, 
of his friend Mr. Cruikshank.  Much of the greatest part of the story was 
Mr. Coleridge’s invention; but certain parts I myself suggested, for 
example, some crime was to be committed which should bring upon the 
Old Navigator, as Coleridge afterwards delighted to call him, the spectral 
persecution, as a consequence of that crime and his own wanderings.  
(39-40) 
The Rime was created in the act of walking; and it was done so with the express purpose 
of financing future walks.  Indeed, Wordsworth claims that from this productive 
pedestrianism sprang the whole of the Lyrical Ballads project.  Wordsworth writes, “We 
returned by Dulverton to Alfoxden” and “The Ancient Mariner grew & grew till it 
became too important for our first object . . . and we began to talk of a volume, which 
was to consist as Mr. Coleridge has told the world, of Poems chiefly on supernatural 
subjects taken from common life but looked at, as much as might be, through an 
imaginative medium” (41-42).  On Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s collaborative planning 
of Lyrical Ballads, Paul Magnuson writes: 
On November 12, 1797, Dorothy and William and Coleridge started on a 
walking tour, the expenses of which they planned to earn by writing a 
	 161	
ballad that they hoped to send to the New Monthly Magazine.  There had 
been previous attempts at collaboration—“The Three Graves,” which 
Wordsworth began and gave to Coleridge, and ‘The Wanderings of 
Cain’—and in both instances Coleridge worked enthusiastically and 
Wordsworth eventually withdrew . . . “The Ancient Mariner” quickly grew 
beyond the limitations of magazine verse.  At the end of their tour, they 
“began to talk of a volume, which was to consist, as Mr. Coleridge has 
told the world, of Poems chiefly of natural subjects taken from common 
life, but looked at, as much as might be, through an imaginative 
medium.”  Wordsworth thus confirms Coleridge’s account of the plan of 
Lyrical Ballads, although the plan was probably not firm until late the 
following spring. (70) 
The fact that The Rime emerged from this episode of productive walking and social 
exchange, but was then derailed as a collaborative project, and gave way to the 
inception of Lyrical Ballads, is oddly performative.  The wandering that constitutes The 
Rime becomes the repressed of the walking that constitutes Lyrical Ballads.  Coleridge 
and the Wordsworths strike out of the past and strive for new economic and aesthetic 
mobility in their walking, but there remains a lingering danger that such a break, and 
such a gamble, might turn out to be aimless and alienated wander.  Coleridge’s Mariner 
signifies the other side of this modernity.  Their own financial independence, 
underwritten by their walking and aesthetic work, is the productive antipode to a 
wander that reifies the rejection of and ejection from traditional life.  Walking and 
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wandering, then, are two sides of the same coin, as each becomes a response to a 
modernity that is freeing and mobile; or, inherently dispossessing.  Wander is the 
spectre that haunts the more liberal fiction of productive walking.  Coleridge’s poem 
dramatizes the stakes of Romanticism, where individual and purposive walking, with its 
dreams of economic and aesthetic freedom, might very easily, and unintentionally, veer 
into dejected wander. 
 Coleridge’s own account of the inception of Lyrical Ballads also shows how his 
own poetic production—both The Rime and his overall contribution to the collection—
stands as a wandering reminder and remainder to the productive and purposive walking 
of Wordsworth’s texts.  In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge indicates the division of labour 
behind the planning of Lyrical Ballads: “in this idea originated the plan of the ‘Lyrical 
Ballads’; in which it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and 
characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward 
nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these 
shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which 
constitutes poetic faith” (314).  While Coleridge is to focus on rendering the 
supernatural palpable and real, Wordsworth’s aim is “to give the charm of novelty to 
things of everyday, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening 
the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom” (314).  The difference in their 
respective poetic scopes is telling.  Effectively, Wordsworth is to re-enchant what has 
become a deadened, rationalized world; Coleridge, in exhuming the supernatural and 
the romantic, is to make real the enchantment.  Wordsworth fictionalizes reality, while 
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Coleridge realizes fiction.  Their respective tasks amount to a difference between 
ideology and textuality—both will undo the “film of familiarity,” but Wordsworth will do 
so prescriptively and programmatically, while Coleridge will reveal, in an expository 
manner, the reality of these social fictions (314).  To borrow the language of Lacan, 
Wordsworth reinforces the imaginary, while Coleridge pulls back the gauze that 
obfuscates the real.  Confronted with a potentially deadening modernity, Wordsworth 
adopts the heroic stance of the artist who revisions the world, while Coleridge sees 
things as they are.  It is no wonder that Coleridge was unable to complete many of his 
poetic projects: in the wake of the French Revolution, his was an unenviable task, while 
Wordsworth had his work cut out for him.  Wordsworth becomes a poetic machine 
engaged in purposive aesthetic production; Coleridge, tasked with revealing the 
textuality of life, does not.  Coleridge writes, “with this view I wrote the ‘Ancient 
Mariner,’ and was preparing among other poems, the ‘Dark Ladie,’ and the ‘Christabel,’ 
in which I should have more nearly realized my ideal, than I had done in my first 
attempt.  But Mr. Wordsworth’s industry had proven so much more successful, and the 
number of his poems so much greater, that my compositions, instead of forming a 
balance, appeared rather an interpolation of heterogeneous matter” (315).  While 
Wordsworth is characterized by industry, Coleridge characterizes himself by marginality 
and heterogeneity.  Wordsworth walks, while Coleridge wanders. 
 Despite this, Coleridge did walk.  His walks put into practice the Romantic theory 
of reintegration through natural imagination; a cure that William Empson notes 
Coleridge was in serious need of.  Empson writes, “Coleridge found that walks in hilly 
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scenery could do a good deal to palliate neurotic guilt; and this was the main basis in 
experience for the doctrine of the healing power of Nature through Imagination” (307).  
However, these walks were effective primarily in their ability to channel and discipline a 
more in-born and troublesome wandering.  Coleridge was more acutely aware of the 
line between walking and wander, between resolution and neurotic guilt, than 
Wordsworth was.  Empson recalls how, “in his charity blue-coat gown, [Coleridge] 
explored London and found a shoemaker willing not only to take him as apprentice but 
also to come and tell the headmaster.  The headmaster threw out the man and beat the 
child (for being an infidel), and Coleridge in later life amused himself by saying that this 
was the only just beating of all his beatings at school” (312).  In Coleridge’s childhood 
walking is wandering—it amounts to error, and to going astray.  In the opening pages of 
Biographia Literaria Coleridge attests to the erroneousness of his boyhood wanderings.  
Coleridge writes, “In my friendless wanderings on our leave-days, (for I was an orphan 
and had scarce any connections in London) highly was I delighted, if any passenger, 
especially if he were dressed in black, would enter into conversation with me” (164).  He 
goes on to identify his solitary wandering as a “preposterous pursuit” that was “beyond 
doubt, injurious, both to my natural powers, and to the progress of my education,” and 
he states that it “would perhaps have been destructive, had it been continued” (164).  In 
Coleridge’s own experience wander carries the connotation of error, and of isolation.  
 Between Coleridge’s prescribed purview for Lyrical Ballads, and his own sense of 
what wander means, emerges a version of wander aligned more closely with despair 
than with what Coleridge envisions for the future Hartley in Frost at Midnight, or 
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imagines of his friends in “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison.”  This is dramatized in 
“Christabel,” in which the more heroic connotations of wander and romance are unable 
to attenuate and arrest whatever it is that ails Christabel.  All of Christabel’s would-be 
protectors are associated with romance and heroic wander.  Christabel’s protecting 
mother, ostensibly espied by Geraldine, is a wanderer: “‘Off, wandering mother! Peak 
and pine! / I have power to bid thee flee’” (205-206).  Similarly, Bard Bracy, haunted by 
a dream that “seems to live upon [his] eye,” says to Leoline, “And thence I vowed this 
self-same day, / With music strong and saintly song / To wander through the forest 
bare, / Lest aught unholy loiter there” (560-563).  Both the mother’s and the Bard’s 
would-be heroic wandering are to no avail.  This failure of the tropes of romance to 
protect Christabel is furthered by the impotence and ignorance of her father, Sir Leoline.  
A former knight-errant, his chivalry ensures that he rallies to Geraldine’s defense, by 
dispatching Bard Bracy “with music sweet and loud,” “two steeds with trappings proud,” 
“harp” and “solemn vest” to alert Geraldine’s father (485, 486, 488, 489).  Sir Leoline 
also offers a martial, chivalric response to right his perceived wronging of Geraldine, by 
thrashing Geraldine’s assailants in his “tourney court” (441).  Sir Leoline’s romance 
modality thus fundamentally misreads the situation, and cannot understand, let alone 
redress, Christabel’s ills (441).  Indeed, when Christabel manages to break the spell 
enough to plead for Geraldine’s ejection, Leoline is incensed at her request: 
“Dishonoured by his only child, / And all his hospitality / To the wrong’d daughter of his 
friend / By more than woman’s jealousy” (643-646).  Leoline’s feudal and patriarchal 
code fails to properly comprehend and address what has happened to Christabel.  
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Because Christabel’s problem is internal—a sign of her own individual interiority—it 
cannot be understood, nor attenuated, by wandering spirits, wandering bards, or 
wandering knights.   
William Empson suggests that the Gothic’s strain of anti-Catholicism was simply 
beyond Coleridge, and, absent that energy, he was unable to complete “Christabel.”  
Empson writes, “the sensational Gothic tradition was derived largely from anti-Catholic 
propaganda, too sectarian for Coleridge, and after rejecting that (I think) he just could 
not see any point in his medieval witch” (317).  However, I argue that the poem’s 
incompletion effectively performs its tension: the fundamental incongruence between 
the feudal world and modernity.  This tension, between two mutually exclusive social 
modes, is unresolvable.  The poem’s incompletion, then, is an irresolution that 
demonstrates the limits of cultural, historical, and epistemic understanding.  Karen 
Swann observes that Coleridge presents “a world stocked with cultural artefacts” (539).     
Before Geraldine even appears [“Christabel”] is haunted by the ghosts of 
old stories: familiar settings and props function as portents, both for the 
superstitious and the well-read.  The wood and the midnight hour are the 
‘moment’s space’ where innocence is traditionally put to the test, or 
when spirits walk abroad; other details—the cock’s crow at midnight, the 
mastiff’s unrest, the contracted moon—we know to be art’s way of 
signifying nature’s response to human disorder.  These so-called ‘Gothic 
trappings’ ensnare us because they mean nothing (‘Tu-whit, tu-whoo’) 
and too much. (539) 
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Through its overt artifice “Christabel” stages the limitations of the worldview to which 
that artifice organically belongs—both its plots and possibilities are circumscribed by its 
own historical parameters.  Swann continues, “although we may think of genres as 
vessels which successive authors infuse with original content, ‘Christabel’s’ originality is 
to expose them as the means by which significance is produced and contained” (542).  
Wander is yet another cultural artefact, one whose very limits are reached when it 
cannot keep at bay the emerging and nameless danger Christabel finds herself ensnared 
by.  To be sure, the opening lines of the poem mark the epistemic shift thematized 
throughout: “’Tis the middle of the night by the castle clock, / And the owls have 
awakened the crowing cock” (1-2).  Clock time is already threatening to supplant and 
subordinate more traditional modes of temporality and authority, as Christabel’s own 
wandering beyond feudal lines—a “furlong from the castle gate”—is marked by the 
tolling clock (26). 
  Tim Fulford sees Coleridge’s supernatural poems as critiques of power that, 
through their distancing, work to unmask ideologies perpetuated in the name of the 
British body politic. By setting “Christabel” “in medieval times,” and by writing it “in the 
style of a courtly romance,” Fulford argues, “the poem seems backward-looking;” 
however, chivalry “was a burning political issue when Coleridge wrote, as the Gothic 
novelists also knew” (55).  In the wake of the French Revolution, Burke lamented 
programmatically “the end of a European order, an order sustained by the chivalric code 
in which the aristocracy, in exchange for their hereditary monopoly of power, governed 
with courtesy and dutiful paternalism” (Fulford 55).  The supernatural medievalism of 
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“Christabel” allowed Coleridge to take to task the power structures that forged their 
legitimacy upon deep-seated chivalric tradition, while seemingly writing about the 
fictional and the fantastic.  Coleridge, Fulford argues, “was able to explore the power-
relations produced by chivalry without fear of arrest for making political attacks on 
Britain’s rulers . . . using the Gothic genre, in which superstition and the supernatural 
were expected, allowed him to locate in the nobility the same kinds of irrational and 
slavish desires that he had placed, in ‘The Three Graves’ and ‘The Rime,’ amongst the 
lower classes” (56).  “Ostensibly apolitical,” Fulford writes, “‘Christabel’ was in fact one 
of the eras most profound investigations of the social and sexual relations on which the 
state was based” (57).  Coleridge uses the same distancing of the supernatural in The 
Rime to call out Britain’s sustained participation in the slave trade.  The Rime harnesses 
the “popular narrative of exploration,” but subverts and repurposes the form to attack 
“the imperialism which British voyages of discovery had spread” (49).  In so doing, 
Coleridge reframed Britons as purveyors of the savagery and pestilence that discourses 
of imperialism used to justify slavery and colonization in the first place.  Fulford writes,  
In the interests of sustaining its slave colonies, Britain exposed thousands 
of black Africans and British sailors to yellow fever, small pox, yaws, 
plague, and other fatal infections.  Coleridge had pitied these slaves and 
sailors in a public lecture on the evils of the slave-trade.  In ‘The Rime’ he 
returns to the images of infection he had used in that lecture: the 
mariner, like a sailor on a slave-ship bound for the West Indies, enters a 
zone where all becomes tainted with the diseases of empire. (49-50) 
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The supernaturalism of The Rime smuggles in a critique of the slave-trade, through its 
presentation of the mariner’s experience of the fantastical.  The poem eschews an 
explicit political message, and makes use of the popularity of the “sea story,” “to make 
the supernatural seem so rooted in human psychology that readers would choose, for 
the space of their reading, to ‘suspend their disbelief’ in it” (50).  Coleridge, by 
“distancing himself from contemporary events,” was able to more directly “find terms 
which would let readers share the mental state that, he argued, was produced by, and 
in turn reproduced, those events” (50).    
 The Rime’s critique of slavery and empire speaks to an increasingly rationalized, 
instrumentalized, and operationalized state.  Thomas Pfau argues that The Rime 
responds to the emergence of a regimented world.  Pfau claims that modernity is 
characterized by “the dominance of methodical analysis” emanating from “the scientific 
revolutions wrought by Bacon, Descartes, and Newton,”—a mode of inquiry and 
investigation that oversees the “fragmentation of knowledge into so many discrete 
institutional and disciplinary sub-specializations” (952).  This instrumental, rational 
configuration of knowledge, Pfau argues, troubled writers like “Blake, Coleridge, 
Goethe, and Schopenhauer,” as they marked “the gradual extension of modernity’s 
analytic and methodical conception of science to all areas of knowledge,” which risked 
“fragmenting the world as a whole, to the point that the resulting, utterly particular 
insight is all but certain to have eroded the human and spiritual significance of the 
knowledge so obtained” (951-952).  The powerful methodology of modernity runs the 
risk of obliterating the universe it claims to render verifiable, by delimiting the possibility 
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of more local and intuitive modes of understanding.  The Rime, however, “powerfully 
throws into relief the ontological indeterminacy of the modern, self-actualizing, and 
self-realizing individual” (975).  Pfau reads the Mariner as a subject of modern, western 
scientific scepticism and inquiry.  “From the very outset the mariner’s seafaring is 
depicted as a transgressive pursuit,” writes Pfau.  The Mariner’s transgression, then, is 
not an individual affront to nature, but the exercising of the new enterprise of scientific 
modernity.  “What troubles Coleridge,” Pfau claims, “is not the occasional, wayward act 
of injustice but sin as a systemic, institutional practice—viz., as the very essence of 
modern instrumental reason” (978).  An instrument to this instrumental reason, the 
Mariner is a “self-authorizing agent, having created himself by a primal act of 
scepticism,” but proceeds from, and is licensed by, a powerful and mobilized discourse 
of sceptical, scientific inquiry (983).  The poem critiques this modernity through its 
presentation of a near-Kafkaesque modernity, in which the indeterminable nature of 
events and their significance becomes nightmarish.  Pfau writes, “the killing of the 
albatross launches the ship of modernity on its journey into what the likewise seafaring 
young Wordsworth recalls as ‘unknown modes of being’” (983).  The Mariner takes on 
his individual agency through his “act of self-origination,” but in so doing, he “must 
henceforth inhabit a condition of ethical limbo that this act prima facie created” (991, 
983). 
The indeterminacy of meaning born through the Mariner’s leap into an 
individuated subjective mode is reflected formally by The Rime’s structure.  The frame 
narrative converts the poem from a recounting of the Mariner’s experience at sea, to 
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the recounting of the recounting of the Mariner’s experience at sea.  This mediation 
builds the transmission and communication of the tale into the text itself, so that the 
meaning of the Mariner’s tale is coextensive with, and indistinguishable from, the scene 
in which it is told.  The same structure is deployed by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, 
which, in addition to citing The Rime directly, was influenced heavily by it.  Anne K. 
Mellor recounts how formative it was for Mary Shelley to hear Coleridge recite the 
poem: “on Sunday, August 24, 1806, when Coleridge and Charles and Mary Lamb came 
to tea and supper, [Shelley] heard Coleridge himself recite ‘The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner,’ an event she never forgot.  The image of the isolated, tormented old Mariner 
would haunt her own fiction, even as Coleridge’s verses reverberate through 
Frankenstein and Falkner” (11).  There are several parallels between The Rime and 
Frankenstein.  Both narrative frames articulate the desire to communicate and transfer 
experience from one failed, solipsistic individual to another; each having made a 
transgressive error through instrumental, scientific overreaching; both the Mariner and 
Victor are early explorers of modernity, intrigued by its possibilities but ignorant of its 
stakes; and both, through volitional acts, establish themselves as subjects in time, by 
setting forth a sequential and irreversible chain of events that becomes complex, 
indeterminable, unstoppable, and, ultimately, ruinous to each of their social groups.  
The Mariner and Victor have each taken on the Faustian, hubristic burden of modernity 
through their individual and irreversible acts, and the sole lesson they can each 
ultimately impart, both to the Wedding Guest and Walton, is to get back in lockstep 
“with a goodly company” (604).  Moreover, the frame narratives of each of these texts 
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reveal how the experience of modernity is a fait accompli.  The frame establishes 
formally a present and a past, as two unbridgeable realms that cannot be organically 
worked through and resolved—the frame presupposes the fact that the narrative that is 
to be recounted has already transpired.  The frames underline the fact that time is 
irreversible—that what is done cannot be undone.  All that is left is remorse and regret 
from Victor, and the Mariner’s simplistic lesson: “He prayeth best, who loveth best / All 
things both great and small” (614-615).  Arguably, Victor comes to understand, at last, 
the burden of modernity; the Mariner, however, remains caught in an endless, 
repetitive loop: instead of dying he wanders. 
The Mariner’s presence in the present of The Rime’s frame-narrative disrupts a 
site of traditional cultural activity, and asserts his own individualism.  By hailing and 
detaining the Wedding Guest, the Mariner impedes upon the traditional communal 
practice of the wedding.  His intervention, in this scene of social continuity, is contrasted 
sharply by the incredulous Wedding Guest, who is tied directly to this cultural 
ceremony.  The “next of kin” Wedding Guest embodies the call to traditional society, as 
he re-iterates insistently the occurrence of the event: “The guests are met, the feast is 
set: / May’st hear the merry din” (8).  Indeed, he feels this call almost painfully, as the 
Mariner continues to detain him: “the Wedding-Guest here beat his breast, / For he 
heard the loud bassoon” (31-32).  However, instead of observing traditional cultural 
practices, the Mariner disrupts them, by inserting his own individuality over and against 
the demands of the community.  The Mariner detains the Wedding Guest to recount his 
own narrative, and overwrites and subordinates the communal wedding with his own 
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individuated experience.  The Mariner’s first-person narration attests to this—he hijacks 
the narrative from the more public position of the narrator.  The Mariner relegates the 
narrator to a secondary auditor, and he converts the poem from a ballad narrative into a 
first-person lyric.   
The individuation of the Mariner is apparent from the first line of the poem: “It is 
an ancient Mariner, / And he stoppeth one of three” (1-2).  The declarative, present 
tense that announces the Mariner’s presence underscores the singularization of 
subjects and objects that characterizes the modernity the Mariner embodies.  The 
Mariner himself who “stoppeth one of three” doubles this singularization.  The Mariner 
engages in the process of selection, distinction, and classification, as he marks the 
Wedding Guest as a typology different from the others.  The singularity and 
individuation of the Mariner is continued in the assertion of his will: “He holds him with 
his glittering eye— / The wedding-guest stood still, / And listens like a three years’ child: 
/ The Mariner hath his will” (13-16).  The Mariner’s arresting quality emanates from the 
exertion of his will, which appears as a form of magic to the Wedding Guest, who is 
entrenched in a more communal social mode.  The Mariner’s enchantment lies in his 
status as a figure of modernity marked by interiority.  His will signifies his individuation 
over and against the desires of the community, which is figured by the infantilizing of 
the Wedding Guest with his outmoded worldview.  The vaguely exotic nature of the 
Mariner’s body further casts him as a figure of modernity.  The Mariner’s physicality is 
arresting and mysterious—“he holds him with his skinny hand” and “with his glittering 
eye”—and the Wedding Guest describes him as “long, and lank, and brown, / As is the 
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ribbed sea-sand” (9, 13, 226-227).  While the latter description signals his foreignness 
and heterogeneity vis-à-vis the Wedding Guest’s more homogenous community, the 
fragmentation of the Mariner’s body in the eyes of the Wedding Guest indicates that 
the Mariner lies beyond the purview of conventional wisdom.  The Mariner’s 
indecipherability fractures the Wedding Guest’s notion of personhood.  
The Mariner proceeds to recount his experience at sea, and, in so doing, he 
traces out effectively the origin story of his own modernity.  The voyage upon which he 
embarks is truly pivotal, in so far as its maritime expansion becomes the hinge between 
the more traditional social world, from which the crew departs and perishes, and the 
modernity undertaken by the surviving Mariner.  The journey commences from a world 
organized by traditional authority.  The Mariner states, “The ship was cheered, the 
harbour cleared, / Merrily did we drop / Below the Kirk, below the hill, / Below the 
lighthouse top” (21-24).  The ship embarks from a space that is ordered and organized 
by feudal and Christian power—where kirk and hill, religious and sovereign power 
respectively, stand above the departing ship, and sanction its voyage.  Pfau writes, the 
ship “leaves a stable and conventional society behind, exemplified most clearly by the 
Christian values” (984).  Despite the “cheered” parting, the “departure is followed by 
the disintegration of community on the ship” (21; Pfau 984).  Their very departure from 
this space signals the beginning of the end of this worldview.  Indeed, the obsolescence 
and abandonment of traditional society is figured ideationally and technologically 
through the homogenization of time and space that characterizes their sailing.  As soon 
as the Mariner’s “own countree” is cleared, the nascent modernity inherent in the 
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voyage becomes clear, as the ship’s mapping of time and space underlies their very 
voyage (467).  The Mariner states, “The sun came up upon the left, / Out of the sea 
came he! / And he shone bright, and on the right / Went down into the sea” (25-28).  
The Mariner’s notation of the movement of the sun—“Higher and higher every day, / 
Till over the mast at noon”—actively inscribes the ship as a temporal centre around 
which the movement of the sun can be marked and tallied (29-32).  The ocean is here 
denuded of particularity, and refigured as homogenous, mappable space, through which 
the ship marks and plots its course.  Indeed, marine exploration is part and parcel with 
the ethos of Enlightenment.  The development of the marine chronometer, by John 
Harrison in 1761, brought reliable, standardized timekeeping to marine travel, and 
made possible more exact determinations of longitude.  It also established Greenwich 
Mean Time and the Greenwich meridian as the gold standard of global temporal and 
spatial mapping.  Captain Cook had a chronometer on board his second voyage (a 
voyage that also sought the polar seas), which made Cook “the first commander to 
know very closely where he was for virtually all his time at sea” (Crathorne 239).  The 
connection between maritime exploration and temporal, spatial mapping is in The 
Rime’s discursive and historical context, but it is also in Coleridge’s own lived 
experience.  Cook’s astronomer “became Coleridge’s maths teacher,” and Cook had 
become famous in how he “had maintained discipline and subjected unknown coasts to 
the order of the naval chart” (Fulford 50, 51).  From school to his later readings in “the 
massively popular printed accounts, with their details of Antarctic storms, tropical heat, 
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strange effects of light, and—shooting albatrosses,” Coleridge encountered a thoroughly 
cartographical and instrumental view of marine travel (Fulford 50).    
Moreover, Coleridge encountered a marine travel that was increasingly 
indistinguishable from Britain’s slave trade.  Debbie Lee situates The Rime at the cross-
section between the rhetoric of the anti-slavery movement, and discourses of the 
nation and body politic at the end of the eighteenth-century.  Lee argues that the 
Mariner’s voyage is that of the slaver, and his experience of death and rot at sea 
emulate the symptoms of yellow fever—a disease that was increasingly regarded as a 
foul and fetid sign of the corruption of the slave trade.  “It was the geographical 
movement of this disease,” Lee writes, “that determined its interpretive implications . . . 
yellow fever itself became intimately tied to the physical and philosophical effects of 
slavery” (676).  The slave trade, Lee observes, is aptly figured by yellow fever on a 
national level, as the analogy emerged between the ruination of the physical body by 
yellow fever, and the ruination of the political body by the slave trade.  Lee writes, “by 
way of disease the slave trade destroyed the British national body by destroying 
individual bodies” (685).  Coleridge’s text, “heavy with images of disease and nuances of 
slavery,” thus assists in the symptomization of the slave trade as a corrupting and 
degenerative social illness, where “the medical” is moved “to the political level by 
designating slavery a European disease” (694, 687).   
The conception of slavery as a disease, via yellow fever, resulted in the figurative 
reconstitution of the British socio-political body.  Lee argues, “together, the medical 
study of yellow fever and the debate on the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery 
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kindled a series of specific concerns—especially among British writers—about what 
happened when ‘foreign’ matter, or ‘foreigners,’ became part of the physical or political 
body” (676).  The cross-section between disease, slavery, and nation, that Lee observes, 
situates The Rime within modern contexts of cultural heterogeneity, colonization, and 
the nation state.  Indeed, the violence and movement of people carried out by the slave 
trade is central in the breakdown of a pre-modern worldview.  Lee writes, “from its 
beginnings in the fifteenth century to its peak in the early nineteenth century, the slave 
trade represented the largest migration of people in human history”—a violent 
displacement that Lee reads Coleridge figure as “the ruination of the universe” (688, 
691).  The disease of slavery, for Coleridge, has national stakes in the construction of a 
social world characterized by difference.  Lee argues, “like yellow fever, which wiped out 
fleets and armies by dissolving individual bodies, a realignment of Africans would 
redefine British identity and thus individual selfhood by dissolving a certain self-
construction” (694).  The poem then, Lee states, “is a statement about how to relate to 
what is outside or other than the self,” and ultimately considers “ways in which the 
British could dissolve their personal and national borders, yet still maintain their 
identity” (694).  By way of its concerns with the implications of a newly geopolitical 
world, Lee places Coleridge’s text at the centre of late-eighteenth-century 
considerations of modernity. 
The Mariner’s voyage, then, maps onto and corresponds to the “Age of 
Discovery’s” ethos of science, trade, and colonization.  The Mariner’s claim, “We were 
the first that ever burst / Into that silent sea,” figures succinctly this shift, as both a 
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violent disruption, and an irreversible singularity (105-106).  The lines also reflect a 
lingering ignorance to the inherent violence of colonization: the triumphalism of 
discovery, of being first, fails to fully grasp the violent bursting upon which it depended.  
Cook recounted how “when landing at a place for the first time,” he would “approach 
the beach in one of the ship’s boats, holding a green branch in his hand to signify 
friendship.  He would then get out of the boat and walk ashore alone;” however, this 
peaceable approach was not always successful (Crathorne 239).  Cook wrote, after 
having killed four people unreceptive to his crew’s advances, “it is impossible for them 
to know our real design, we enter their ports and attempt to land in a peaceful manner.  
If it succeeds all is well, if not, we land nevertheless and maintain our footing by the 
security of our firearms.  In what other light can they first look upon us, but as invaders 
of their country” (239).  Cook’s method intricately links technology, discovery, violence, 
and colonization as one movement.  He also demonstrates the knowing ignorance of the 
Mariner, in so far as he acknowledges the justness of native resistance, and yet never 
questions the right or legitimacy of his own colonizing project.  William Empson argues 
that The Rime “evokes a major historical event, the maritime expansion of Western 
Europeans” (298).  The torment the Mariner comes to experience resides in the fact that 
these European colonizers “reek of guilt” (304).  Empson recalls how Columbus 
“lamented that the Caribbeans were so innocent, unsuspicious, and doomed” (304).  
“The terrible cry, ‘I didn’t know it was wrong when I did it,’” which Empson claims 
“belongs somehow naturally to the whole setup of the exploring ship,” is seeded in the 
larger project of modernity, in which science, technology, and commerce obfuscate the 
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violence of the colonization that underwrites the entire enterprise (305).  The European 
sailing ship, with its spatial and temporal mapping and spirit of colonization, aptly 
symbolizes the shift from the medieval world to the world of modernity.  “The Mariner 
was . . . medieval,” Empson writes, “and I think we are expected to retain a certain 
superiority to him;” and yet, he has received a “blinding revelation” of the vast 
transgression of colonization, even if he does not fully realize it (303).  
Warren Stevenson views the Mariner as a hinge between pre-modern and 
modern society.  He observes how The Rime associates the Mariner with the 
Renaissance and its worldview of discovery, by showing how the poem traces out the 
progression of the Mariner from a more medieval, homogeneous, and Christian world to 
the globalized, colonized, and rationalized society of modernity.  Stevenson writes,    
Since the Mariner’s two-hundred shipmates represent his own society, 
and that society was medieval and Christian, it follows that the Mariner 
as intellectual and moral rebel against that society represents the 
Renaissance with its new learning, particularly its new science, which was 
anathema to the old order.  Seen in this light, the poem recapitulates a 
major aspect of European history from the medieval to the modern 
period. (52)    
The Mariner is singled out from, and placed in distinction to, the otherwise medieval 
crew, and in this individuation, he becomes a prototype of the modern subject armed 
with instrumental and methodical science.  Stevenson writes, “the Mariner’s sin against 
the Holy Ghost, or Spirit of Love, is parallel to the displacement of Love by logic as the 
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raison d’etre of the cosmos, a displacement which began during the Renaissance with 
the discoveries not only of Columbus and Magellan but also those of Galileo and Kepler” 
(54).  Stevenson observes that the Mariner is “not simply an explorer; he is discoverer of 
the Pacific and, if we are to trust the poem’s inner dynamics, the world’s first 
circumnavigator” (52).  The Mariner’s naval excursion anticipates “all those subsequent 
voyages of exploration and discovery by means of which Western European society has 
sought to imprint its imperial and slave-owning image upon the new world” (54).  The 
Mariner’s narrative encodes the cultural shift from the pre-modern to modernity. 
It is into this context of a latent modernity that the Albatross flies.  The Albatross 
appears at a moment of stasis, as the ship is hemmed in by ice and snow.  The ship’s 
temporary immobility signifies a kind of epistemic and semantic break down, wherein 
the medievalism it transports is stranded, isolated, and flash-frozen.  The Mariner 
states: 
And through the drifts the snowy clifts 
Did send a dismal sheen: 
Nor shapes of men nor beasts we ken— 
The ice was all between. 
The ice was here, the ice was there, 
The ice was all around: 
It cracked and growled, and roared and howled, 
Like noises in a swound! (55-62) 
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The Mariner’s description reveals the lingering medievalism of the crew and himself, as 
evident in his diction (“ken” and “swound”), in his more overt use of the ballad trope of 
repetition, and in the animism and auguries of nature he refers to.  Indeed, the looser, 
more medieval continuity he presents here between nature and culture—where “men” 
and “beasts” are placed on the same footing—is what characterizes the ship’s 
encounter with the Albatross.  They greet the Albatross with a medieval, Christian 
hospitality and fellowship: “At length did cross an Albatross, / Thorough the fog it came; 
/ As if it had been a Christian soul, / We hailed it in God’s name” (63-66).  The bird is met 
by the crew as a fellow “Christian soul,” and as a sign of good fortune that is to be hailed 
in “God’s name.”  Indeed, the Albatross keeps medieval vespers with the crew—“In mist 
or cloud, on mast or shroud, / It perched for vespers nine” (75-76)—and dines with the 
crew as well: “It ate the food it ne’er had eat; / And round and round it flew” (67-68).  
The crew thus interacts with the Albatross in a decidedly medieval and communal 
manner.  The encounter with the Albatross also evinces their medieval valuation of 
superstition, fortune, and omenry.  The bird’s arrival is read by the crew as an omen of 
good fortune for the ship, which shifts from being fixed in ice to being propelled again 
by a “good south wind”: “The ice did split with a thunder-fit; / The helmsman steered us 
through!” (71, 69-70).  The encounter with the Albatross calls forth the crew’s 
medievalism, which is forged upon the hospitality and fellowship between beasts and 
men, and the animating magic of omens.  
Against the collectivity of the crew and its peaceable communion with the 
Albatross, “the Ancient Mariner inhospitably killeth the pious bird of good omen,” as 
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The Rime’s gloss notes.  His transgression against Christian fellowship and hospitality, 
however, is far greater than a faux pas.  The killing of the Albatross enacts the Mariner’s 
definitive leap into modernity.  The act performs the production and assertion of subject 
over object—the dominance and dominion of a Western instrumental science over a 
blank nature—and anticipates colonial violence.  Thomas Pfau writes, “the Mariner’s 
killing of the albatross, I contend, furnished us with a parable for the hubris that is 
modernity, specifically its founding, purely volitional act whereby the solitary individual 
turns the cosmos into an object for (inherently sceptical) experimentation” (975).  
Empson attests to this, by writing “all good explorers try out new sources of food; it is 
part of their scientific aspect, which gives them the dignity of Faust; and the darker 
Albatross mentioned in the anecdote of Shelvock, which is just small enough to be hung 
around a man’s neck, does, I am told, make a tolerable soup which would help keep off 
scurvy” (301).  Leslie Brisman states similarly, “we need only the sense that the shooting 
of the albatross is an act of will, and that this ‘enlightenment’ breaks the spell that 
bound nature and supernature in mysterious communion” (85).  The Mariner’s act, 
therefore, is less about motive than it is about mode: the Mariner kills the Albatross 
because he undertakes the modality of modernity, which authorizes both the 
instrumental reason of science and discovery and the extraction and violence of 
colonization.  Indeed, the Mariner’s depiction of the arctic seas, before the ship 
encounters the Albatross, demonstrates this latent modernity: “And now there came 
both mist and snow, / And it grew wondrous cold: / And ice, mast-high, came floating 
by, / As green as emerald” (51-54).  The repeated “And” of these lines shifts the 
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Mariner’s discourse into a collection of descriptive field notes, complete with 
measurements, and the prospect of extracting precious gems.  His killing of the 
Albatross makes manifest the modernity already latent in the voyage. 
 The Mariner’s volitional, experimental, colonizing act, however, cuts both ways.  
Not only does it reify the Albatross’ object-hood, it instantiates the Mariner’s subject-
hood.  Just as the Albatross becomes an objectified specimen, the Mariner becomes the 
executing and experimenting subject.  The first time the Mariner refers to himself as an 
“I” in The Rime is the moment at which he reveals to the Wedding Guest what he has 
done: “With my cross-bow / I shot the albatross” (81-82).  The act, and its subsequent 
recounting, establishes the Mariner as an individual subject with an internal 
consciousness.  “Why look’st thou so?” the Wedding Guest inquires, and he has to ask 
precisely because the Mariner harbours an internal subjectivity, as an agent of 
modernity (81).  This is underlined by the fact that this transition occurs to the Mariner 
alone.  The crew continue to function as an homogeneous social group, and retain their 
more medieval belief in omens.  “For all averred, I had killed the bird / That made the 
breeze to blow,” the Mariner states; but immediately afterword he reports, “Then all 
averred, I had killed the bird / That brought the fog and mist / ‘Twas right, said they, 
such birds to slay” (93-94, 99-101).  The crew’s worldview is applied and adapted on an 
ad hoc basis, and lacks a comprehensive theory or method to underpin its assertions.  
The crew’s retention of a traditional ethos is underlined by their eventual symbolic 
excommunication of the Mariner.  The Mariner states: “Ah! well a-day! what evil looks / 
Had I from old and young! / Instead of the cross, the Albatross / About my neck was 
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hung” (139-142).  The crew casts him out by transposing the cross for the sign of his 
transgression, in an almost-mock sacrificial gesture.  Even their Christianity is more 
literal and medieval.  The fact that the crew soon after perish and become ghosts 
underscores their own incompatibility with the modernity the Mariner conjures forth.  
As a prototype of modern subjectivity, the Mariner finds himself freighted with 
the solitude of individualism.  Geoffrey Hartman argues that The Rime demonstrates the 
self-consciousness that accompanies modernity.  Hartman writes, “Coleridge’s poem 
traces the ‘dim and perilous way’ of a soul that has broken with nature and feels the 
burdenous guilt of selfhood” (45).  In his reading of The Rime, Hartman claims that the 
process of individuation is inaugurated by a decisive act—such as that of the Mariner’s.  
“It is a founding gesture, or caesura dividing stages of being,” Hartman continues, “it 
may anticipate the modern ‘acte gratuite’ or reflect the wilfulness in Original Sin, but 
only because both are epochal and determining acts of individuation” (45).  The 
assertion and consciousness of the self, Hartman maintains, runs counter to a more 
communal, integrated, and natural way of life.  Hartman states, “consciousness appears 
as a breach or betrayal of nature” (46).  Hartman argues that this assertion of one’s 
autonomy is the source of the weight of modernity.  “The punishment” writes Hartman, 
“is simply life itself under the condition of consciousness” (45).  Acts of imagination and 
poetic creation foster the means for re-integration, but in the Mariner Hartman sees a 
case of arrested development.  The Mariner, who continues to wander after his return 
from sea, is the perennially self-conscious figure of modernity: he is “unable to die, or 
find release from the experience except in the punctual agony of storytelling” (47).  
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The self-consciousness and the alienation of the Mariner, however, are also an 
effect of modernity’s schematization and ordering of time.  Bruno Latour argues that 
modernity is forged upon a sequential and irreversible temporality.  Latour shows that 
modernity works through acts of “purification” that are organized and arranged around 
the central divide between nature and culture (10).  Purification, Latour writes, “creates 
two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of 
nonhumans on the other;” a “partition” that divides a “natural world that has always 
been there,” from “a society with predictable and stable interests and stakes” (10-11, 
11).  The purification of modernity, however, is constituted by the temporal distinction 
it draws between past and present.  “Modernity,” Latour writes, “comes in as many 
versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or 
another to the passage of time” (10).  Modernity establishes and defines itself by the 
temporal difference it creates between its own forward motion and its configuration of 
an outmoded, frozen past.  Latour claims, “the adjective ‘modern’ designates a new 
regime, and acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time” (10).  To become modern, 
then, is to place oneself within a larger timeline that is inherently progressive.  
Modernity situates itself within a teleological and chronological trajectory, and sees 
itself as emerging from, and standing in distinction to, a limited and outmoded past.  
Latour states, “when the word ‘modern’ . . . appears, we are defining, by contrast, an 
archaic and stable past” (10).  Modernity figures itself in terms of “time’s irreversible 
arrow” (10).  The flight of the Mariner’s arrow dramatizes his own movement into a 
spatial, external, sequential and irreversible temporality.  
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 Thomas Pfau argues that the Mariner’s embodiment of modernity’s methodical, 
experimental scepticism refigures him as a perceiving subject cast upon a plane of 
endlessly unfolding external stimuli.  Pfau writes, “the Mariner’s act of 
scepticism/killing, are now sacrificed to a radically new, speculative type of curiosity no 
longer governed by ingrained norms but permanently and anxiously cathected onto 
further outcomes” (975).  The Mariner takes on a mode of being in which the certainty 
of meaning is forever deferred, by virtue of the fact that meaning must continuously 
and provisionally be falsified through an endless flow of external phenomena.  Pfau 
continues, 
In its own struggle with a wholly abstract (mathematical) conception of 
space and time, the modern self (particularly in the work of Galileo, 
Descartes, Newton, and Kant) once again encounters “infinity,” though 
now not as plentitude but as sublime and terrifying emptiness.  It can 
hardly surprise that eighteenth-century philosophy and science struggle 
so often to compensate for the unnerving implication of empty, infinite 
space and time by inferring from it, in a curious bit of post hoc ergo 
prompter hoc, reasoning, “the infinite extent of divine presence.”  What 
such attempt at deducing a divine presence from a material absence (i.e., 
of limits to space and time) had curiously forgotten was the fact that the 
alarming “infinity” of historical time and cosmological space had arisen 
from the non-appearance of the redeeming god to begin with. (993) 
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Having established a rational and uniform time and space, modernity is subsequently 
haunted by the void created in that grand act of levelling and homogenization.  Indeed, 
Enlightenment figurations of the Clockwork Universe attest to this, as they place the 
divine at the origin—the clockmaker—of a mechanical universe that runs otherwise 
independently and automatically.  The terror and angst that arises from the modern 
condition, mapped out by Pfau, is performed by the Mariner writ large—he not only 
experiences the burden of consciousness, but he experiences this burden in time.  One 
of the most defining qualities of The Rime is the piling on of events that continue to 
happen to the Mariner.  The Albatross, the ghost ship, the death of the crew, the sea 
snakes, the polar spirits, the resurrection of the crew, the sinking of the ship—moment 
follows moment, as the sun and moon continue to rise and set, until the Mariner is 
eventually set adrift like a corpse.  Pfau states, “as is evident from its strictly sequential 
presentation, The Rime’s nautical trope proffers a quintessentially modern paradigm of 
experience whose import the Mariner can distil and legitimate only by appealing to 
criteria that have yet to be derived from whatever counts as experience” (981). 
The irreversibility of the Mariner’s arrow enacts the temporality of clock time, as 
a spatial and chronological sequence.  Time, for the Mariner, has become an external 
and sequential horizon of being, which changes the Mariner into a mere passive witness 
to his own experience.  Time is no longer embodied or had by the Mariner, but endured 
as a running sequence.  The poem stages this temporal alienation through the ship’s 
being adrift at sea: “Down dropt the breeze, the sails dropt down / ’Twas sad as sad 
could be” (107).  The inert ship, moreover, drifts upon a seascape that is characterized 
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by a stifling artificiality.  Indeed, the Mariner figures the sun not as a source of life or of 
temporal fruition, but as an artificial and secondary sign of the Mariner’s own temporal 
alienation.  The Mariner states, “All in a hot and copper sky, / The bloody Sun, at noon, / 
Right up above the mast did stand, / No bigger than the moon” (111-114).  Far from 
being the source of growth and development, the sun is here a removed and lifeless 
object, but is nonetheless oppressive and stifling.  Within this fixed artifice the ship 
drifts, and the crew now find themselves transfixed in time as nothing other than an 
abstract and detached tally.  “Day after day, day after day, / We stuck, nor breath nor 
motion; / As idle as a painted ship / Upon a painted ocean,” observes the Mariner (115-
118). The repeated “day after day” presents time as sheer repetition, as it is reduced to 
a simple and meaningless chronology.  The artificiality of the sun and sky is extended to 
the ship and ocean, as the world has become synthetic, through the homogenization 
and quantification of time and space.  The Mariner is alienated from his own temporal 
experience as a result.  The Mariner says twice, and in close succession, “There passed a 
weary time” (143), “A weary time! a weary time!” (145).  Time is wearying because it 
has become something he needs must endure, rather than that which he actively 
embodies and produces. 
 The “spectre-bark” makes manifest the Mariner’s status as a subject of 
modernity suspended in sequential time (202).  The ghostly ship appears emphatically in 
time.  Its very approach is represented as a successive unfolding of the present, as the 
Mariner, moment by moment, discerns what it is.  The Mariner states, “At first it 
seemed a little speck, / And then it seemed a mist; / It moved and moved, and took at 
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last / A certain shape, I wist” (149-152).  This is repeated in the Mariner’s attempt to 
determine who is on board, “And is that Woman all her crew? / Is that a Death? and are 
there two? / Is Death that woman’s mate?” (187-189).  The shifting interplay between 
the perceiving subject and the approaching object shows time to be an unfolding 
sequence, which forever sends subjects scrambling after meaning with the arrival of 
each successive moment.  Also, the arrival of the ghostly ship is indexed by markers of 
time.  The Mariner describes the ghostly ship’s approach: 
The western wave was all a-flame. 
The day was well nigh done! 
Almost upon the western wave 
Rested the broad bright Sun; 
When that strange shape drove suddenly 
Betwixt us and the Sun. (171-176) 
The “strange shape” takes the place of the setting sun, and figures modernity’s 
mediation of time in so doing.  As the ghostly ship glides between the sun and the crew 
it effectively impedes and intervenes upon a more naturalized mode of temporalizing.  
This substitution, moreover, is figured as a disciplinary encroachment upon a more 
naturalized temporality.  The Mariner states, “And strait the Sun was flecked with bars / 
. . .  / As if through a dungeon-grate he peered” (177, 179).  The sun is mediated in a 
disciplinary manner by the interposition of the ghostly ship.  The overtly symbolic 
stature of the ghostly ship—its ruinous framework, its movement in spite of its lack of 
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wind, and its crew—underlines the artificiality of this mediating and successive time of 
modernity.    
The ghostly ship’s mates “Death” and “The Night-mare Life-in-Death” represent 
respectively the temporalities of the medieval world and of modernity (193).  The 
skeletal Death represents time in its more classical figuration, as the remorseless scythe.  
However, Life-in-Death figures the temporality of modern subjectivity, where the 
organic cessation of life is supplanted by an artificial interminability.  Life-in-Death is the 
modern subject characterized by artificially: “Her lips were red, her looks were free, / 
Her locks were yellow as gold: / Her skin was as white as leprosy, / The Night-mare Life-
in-death was she, / Who thicks man’s blood with cold” (190-194).  Life-in-Death, unlike 
Death, obfuscates and masks mortality through the artifice of her dress.  Life-in-Death’s 
defeat of Death, in their “casting dice,” performs the victory of the mode of modernity 
over that of the medieval, where the reckoning and minding of chance wins out over a 
traditional world bound by an orderly Christian cosmology (196).  Life-in-Death’s 
winning of the Mariner’s fate recruits him symbolically into the interminability of 
modern subjectivity.  This is highlighted by the fact that as soon as the ghostly ship sails 
off there is an abrupt shift in time, which again stresses the artifice and automation of 
modernity.  As soon as the Mariner learns his fate the time of day shifts instantly, as if 
by mechanization: “The Sun’s rim dips; the stars rush out: / At one stride comes the 
dark” (199-200).  The immediacy of this time change, which happens instantaneously as 
one present replaces another, registers a temporality constituted by absolute and 
successive change. 
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In taking on the successive temporality of modernity, the Mariner experiences 
alienation and isolation.  The rest of the crew, who espouse a more medieval worldview, 
perish on board the ship; but the Mariner finds himself suspended within an endless 
succession of time.  The Mariner presents this information through the very language of 
quantified time: “seven days, seven nights, I saw that curse, / And yet I could not die” 
(261-262).  Devoid of a more organic temporality—the same that ends the lives of the 
crew—he is left alone to count the days.  The Mariner marks his solitude through the 
void of traditional, Christian consolation.  The Mariner states, “Alone, alone, all, all 
alone, / Alone on a wide wide sea! / And never a saint took pity on / My soul in agony” 
(232-235).  As a subject of modernity, the Mariner can no longer seek solace in the 
passions of the Saints or in the external, Christian community in which they circulate.  
Indeed, with the breaking of this modality the Mariner loses the ability to link his 
feelings and concerns to a divine cosmology through the act of prayer: “I looked to 
heaven, and tried to pray; / But or ever a prayer had gusht, / A wicked whisper came, 
and made / My heart as dry as dust” (244-247).  The wicked whisper is the Mariner’s 
own interiority, where self-consciousness has supplanted communal mindedness.  
Modern subjectivity is individuating and atomizing, which the Mariner’s isolation at sea 
performs.    
To be sure, the Mariner’s becoming modern is indexed by the development of 
his interiority.  Pfau writes, “what happens next is the advent of interiority, of the 
modern psyche as ‘unhappy consciousness’ (Hegel), as a ‘prison-house’ (Wordsworth), 
or some other ‘punctual self’ (Charles Taylor) whose isolated nightmare existence is the 
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stuff of narrative from Coleridge through Kafka” (989).  The moment at which the 
Mariner embodies his own individuation by exercising his interiority is the moment at 
which he begins to make his way home.  The Mariner’s encounter with the sea snakes 
demonstrates his undertaking of the self-consciousness of modernity.  The Mariner 
states,   
O happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I blessed them unaware. (282-287) 
The seeming spontaneity of the Mariner’s blessing is, in actuality, the automation of the 
internal consciousness of subjectivity.  A true subject of modernity, he feels and thinks 
within.  Rather than a moment of conversion or salvation, the Mariner’s blessing is a 
moment of iteration, where the Mariner begins to live as a subject of modernity.  It is 
not that the curse is lifted, or that “the spell begins to break,” as the gloss reads it, but, 
rather, his own normalization and internalization of the modernity he has always 
already taken on.  With this same gesture the Mariner sheds the sign of his 
transgression—the Albatross—because it is now superfluous.  “The Albatross fell off, 
and sank / Like lead into the sea,” because as a modern subject the Mariner now wears 
that act internally as a weight upon his conscience, and as a part of his individual history 
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(288-291).  The Mariner’s development of the consciousness of modernity enacts the 
internalization of his transgression.  
The Mariner’s voyage home is framed as a form of time travel.  He returns within 
an abstracted and mechanized timeframe that is altogether separate from the natural 
world.  The Mariner again marks the sun’s movement by stating, “The sun, right up 
above the mast, / Had fix’d her to the ocean: / But in a minute she ’gan stir, / With a 
short uneasy motion— / Backwards and forwards half her length / With a short uneasy 
motion” (383-388).  The ship operates on a separate and distinct plane, free from the 
particularities of the physical space of nature.  This plane is the abstracted and uniform 
space and time of modernity.  Indeed, the Mariner uses the clock’s language—“in a 
minute”—to designate the commencement of his journey.  As the ship “drive[s] on so 
fast,” one of the observing voices informs the other that the ship’s speed derives from 
the fact that “the air is cut away before, / And closes from behind” (424-425).  The ship 
moves through the spatial-temporal coordinates of modernity, at a speed “faster than 
human life can endure,” as the gloss observes, because the Mariner is free from the 
constraints of localized space through this virtual homogenization.  Stevenson points out 
that “the mysterious motion of the ship, while intended to be supernatural in origin, 
also has technological overtones,” and bears a distinctly “aeronautical motion” (55).  
The strange technology of the ship’s return home reveals how “the Mariner’s voyage is 
not only a voyage through space but a voyage through time as well.  For better or 
worse, he emerges as the first modern man” (55).  The Mariner becomes a time traveler 
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because time itself is reconfigured through the lens of modernity as a pure, sequential, 
and spatial entity divorced from natural phenomena. 
 William Empson argues that “modern critics” are “evading the real point of the 
poem when they so eagerly invent proofs” that the Mariner deserves his fate (307).  
And yet, the poem seems to anticipate and solicit this critical supplementation.  
However, the impulse to explicate and adjudicate the Mariner’s “crime” is an effect of 
the very modernity the poem maps out.  The Rime presents a world in which stable and 
absolute truth, as underwritten by a divine authority, has been abandoned.  Moreover, 
the text shows how traditional authority has been supplanted by a mode of scientific 
scepticism wherein the inquiring subject becomes the only means of verification.  
Accordingly, interpretative and evaluative acts are continuously required to unpack a 
world that conceals itself from human efforts.  The critical supplementation takes its cue 
from the Mariner himself, who, as a sceptical subject of modernity, is likewise glossing 
for meaning.  Pfau writes, “a condensation of the Cartesian sceptic and the Hobbesian 
solitary individual whose volitional acts of experimentation and objectification produce 
an unhinged, radically contingent cosmos, the Mariner can only hope to grasp at and 
contain the meaning of his self-creating deed through the supplemental practices of 
symbolic narration, which in the will require further acts of textual exegesis” (987).  By 
mapping out the gaps, fissures, and lacunae that constitute modernity, the poem builds 
critical inquiry into the text itself, and performs the provisional nature of truth and 
meaning in the process.  Jerome McGann and Frances Ferguson working from distinct 
critical perspectives each understand the poem along these lines.  While the notion that 
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the poem envisions and accounts for its own interpretability has ideological implications 
for McGann and deconstructive implications for Ferguson, they both view the text as a 
performance of the act of interpretation. 
Jerome McGann claims that the actual focus of Coleridge’s poem is the act of 
interpretation itself.  McGann argues the poem’s “symbolic paraphernalia (albatross, 
mariner, spectre-bark, water snakes, rain, sun, moon, etc.)” appear in the poem as 
“objects of our analysis, but they are only in the poem as symbols . . . as objects-
bearing-meaning” (58).  Interpretation, and more specifically its own interpretation, is 
woven into the fabric of the text.  Accordingly, the oft-maligned 1817 gloss, McGann 
argues, is entirely in keeping with, and is even envisioned by, the original 1798 edition, 
because the act of interpretive glossing is what the poem has always been about.  
McGann writes, 
The "Rime" imitates or re-presents a process of textual evolution, and the 
symbolic meaning of that process—which is the poem's dominant 
symbolic event—is that the process has a symbolic value and meaning, 
that is, a religious, a Christian, and ultimately a redemptive meaning.  In 
this we can see very clearly the living operation of processive historical 
events.  At the outset of the nineteenth century and in reaction to the 
revolutionary intellectual developments of the Enlightenment, Christian 
ideas find a new birth of freedom, not in the fact of Christ's resurrection, 
which is the traditional Pauline view, but in the symbol of the 
resurrection, in its meaning. (60)  
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The gloss appended to the 1817 text simply continues the work that the poem has 
always done: the formalization of “an evidently mediated” or “redacted literary text” 
(57).  McGann argues that the poem stages “Coleridge’s special religious/symbolic 
theory of interpretation founded upon his own understanding of the Higher Critical 
analytic” (50).  The “meaning” of Coleridge’s text then is less in the decoding of the 
events that transpire within the narrative, but rather the process and significance of 
interpretation itself.  The poem’s interest in hermeneutics is visible, McGann shows, by 
the palimpsest of textual “perspective[s]” and interpretive traditions it represents (50).  
McGann writes, “Coleridge means us to understand that the ballad narrative dates from 
the sixteenth-century, that the gloss is a late seventeenth-century addition, and, of 
course, that Coleridge, at the turn of the nineteenth century, has provided yet another . 
. . perspective” (50).  Coleridge envisions interpretation in the very structure of his 
poem.  McGann claims, “Coleridge certainly intended his more perspicuous readers—
that is, those read in the theory and practice of the new historical criticism—to see that 
the ‘Rime’ was an imaginative presentation of a work comprising textual layers” (50-51).  
The text’s meaning then lies in its performance of interpretive traditions, “as diverse as 
pagan superstitions, Catholic theology, Aristotelian science, and contemporary 
philological theory” (51). 
Frances Ferguson also asserts that the poem takes interpretation, and, more 
specifically, the act of reading, as its central preoccupation.  Ferguson observes how 
“the criticism of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner reflects a craving for causes” in its 
grappling with the multiple and often irreconcilable components of the text (57).  As a 
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result, the criticism tends to depend “upon sorting that experience into a more linear 
and complete pattern than the poem ever agrees to” (57, 59).  This is in part the result 
of the 1817 gloss, Ferguson argues, which casts a “strange kind of clarity and unity” on 
the 1798 version—a unity from which subsequent criticism has taken its cue (63).  The 
gloss, Ferguson argues, “in assuming that things must be significant and interpretable, 
finds significance and interpretability,” and in so doing it underscores how reading the 
poem necessarily “editorializes” it and establishes a “cause-and-effect pattern that the 
main text never quite offers” (63).  Ferguson locates this impulse to order in Coleridge’s 
belief that “what you know and what you read are part of a moral dilemma” (72).  For 
Coleridge, Ferguson claims, there lies an inherent transgression in “insufficient 
knowledge or reading,” which stands as “the cause of moral inadequacy” (72).  Hence, 
“nothing less than all knowledge—everything—will suffice” (72).  The poem is about the 
staging of the process of interpreting and understanding from a necessarily blinkered 
position.  Ferguson states, “for Coleridge [the] original sin was interpretation from a 
limited perspective that had disproportionate consequences” (72).  The poem thus 
models the limits of hermeneutics, where “a reader can only read the texts that say 
what he already knows” (72). 
Mark L. Barr shows how modernity is staged in Coleridge’s text, by considering 
how the gloss effectively emulates and performs the literary and juridical containment 
of radical political dissent.  Barr reflects on the unease displayed by authorities during 
and after the French Revolution surrounding “the radical potential of language to 
promulgate ideas subversive to the state” (864).  These authorities working in “both the 
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legal and literary realms,” understood how “the influence of ‘publications’ lay at the 
heart of the revolution,” and that “such revolutionary sentiment was an explicit threat 
not merely to the laws but the fabric and structure of English society” (866, 864).  Barr 
identifies a literary and legal concern with the radical potentialities of Jacobin 
publications to undermine traditional authorities.  Coleridge, Barr argues, reflects the 
same concerns with the appending of an explanatory and ultimately curtailing gloss to 
his 1817 iteration of the poem.  Barr writes, “this fear of mass circulation and the 
Jacobinical effects of unregulated reading Coleridge imports into his 1817 revision of the 
Rime, in particular its marginal gloss” (873).  The gloss, Barr argues, reigns in and 
delimits the more radical possibilities found in the text.  Barr writes, “the Mariner 
produces some kind of revolution in how the Wedding Guest sees himself and the 
reality around him” (874).  Indeed, the near-atheistic Mariner poses, as Barr notes, a 
revolutionary threat to the communal and traditional society he wanders into.  The gloss 
then, Barr argues, functions as a distancing and deflating layer of officiating rhetoric to 
neutralize the potentially radical politics of the Mariner.  Barr states, “For Coleridge’s 
reader, the gloss provides a historically-situated interpretation that seeks to limit 
meaning making from the text of a (somewhat bizarre) case, placing the Rime gloss 
within a contemporary legal institutional movement towards the modern notion of 
precedent” (876).  The gloss co-opts and reroutes the potentially rebellious language of 
the text and in so doing “becomes an embodiment,” Barr argues, “of the forms of 
justice” (882).  Despite this, Barr shows that the very performance of authoritative, legal 
containment by the gloss in fact falls victim to the inevitable slippage that occurs 
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between the authoritative control of meaning and the reality it strives to contain.  
Accordingly, “the gloss, therefore, enacts the containment of form and precedent on 
literary and legal reading, and, in its inadequacy, mimics the inevitable failure of any 
such containment in either the legal or literary spheres” (883).  In that slippage, the 
poem performs the fracturing of traditional authority elicited by modernity.  The Rime 
mimes and reflects the pull between a concerted resistance to state power and the 
complex of legal, juridical, and aesthetic theory mobilized to officiate, regulate, and 
curtail that dissidence.  
 The dissonance between the gloss and the movement of the text itself is readily 
apparent in the final statement of the gloss; a summation that amounts to the moral of 
the Mariner’s story: “And to teach, by his own example, love and reverence to all things 
that God made and loveth” (610).  On this moral Empson writes, “I would do wrong to 
belittle the moral ‘Don’t pull poor pussy’s tail,’ which needs to be taught to children; but 
Coleridge came to feel, like many of his readers, that it forms an inadequate conclusion 
to so much lightning and despair” (310).  One cannot help but register a disconnect 
between the clichéd, banal moral—a dusting off of the golden rule—and the torment 
the Mariner has experienced; not to mention the fact that the Mariner seems to lack the 
grace and understanding such a moral presupposes.  But, again, the unsatisfactory and 
overwrought status of the moral reifies the modernity the text takes on, in which clear 
and tidy moral statements are no longer tenable or possible.  Indeed, the Mariner’s 
desire for the truth and certainty of a more traditional society, which he conveys at the 
end of his narrative, is underwritten, ironically, by his status as a modern subject.  The 
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Mariner advocates an antiquated and local way of life over and against the global 
modernity he has inadvertently wandered into: “to walk together to the kirk, / And all 
together pray, / While each to his great Father bends, / Old men, and babes, and loving 
friends, / And youth and maidens gay!” (605-609).  Despite this, it is the concept of 
modernity that establishes and installs the very idea that a traditional, paradisiac society 
ever existed in the first place.  The Mariner’s nostalgia is produced and engendered by 
modernity as a mode, as that which envisions its own originating rupture—time’s 
irreversible arrow—after which nothing is ever the same.  Indeed, the historicism and 
antiquarianism that permeates the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century—the 
resurgence of the medieval, the Gothic, and the ballad—of which The Rime is a product, 
is the result of a modernity that powers and constitutes itself through its own 
conception of a past, out of which it has emerged and moved away from.  The Mariner’s 
parting words are an ethnography of a pre-modern and pre-Protestant Western Europe; 
but the value he finds in that imagined space can only be summoned and desired 
through its very negation.  The Mariner is part and parcel of a scientific, methodical 
mode of inquiry that posits an imagined past as an origin for its own irreversible, 
progressive temporality.  The Mariner thus posits a pre-modern selflessness, “He 
prayeth well, who loveth well / Both man and bird and beast,” over and against the 
solipsism of modernity, but this iteration of the ubi sunt motif is always already a 
product of modernity (612-613).   
After his voyage the Mariner can no longer claim membership in any local, 
cultural community, but instead wanders endlessly.  As Stevenson observes, “the 
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repentant Mariner may after all be seen as the first lonely inhabitant of the global 
village” (56).  Upon his return, the Mariner is no longer recognizable.  The pilot’s boy 
starts at seeing the strange Mariner climb aboard, and manically claims, “The Devil 
knows how to row” (569).  The Hermit likewise greets the Mariner with suspicion, and 
fails to recognize not only his person, but what form of person he is.  The “Hermit 
crossed his brow / ‘Say quick,’ quoth he, ‘I bid thee say— / What manner of man art 
thou?’” (575-577).  The Mariner’s voyage and the modernity it elicits cancels his 
membership in traditional society, and he is no longer recognizable there.  Indeed, the 
Mariner is alone in his dispossession.  His shipmates, in spite of their deaths, 
nonetheless experience a form of spiritual homecoming upon the ship’s return: “This 
seraph-band, each waved his hand: / It was a heavenly sight! / They stood as signals to 
the land, / Each one a lovely light” (492-495).  The ghostly crew manages to reaffirm 
their communal ties, but the Mariner does not.  Instead, the Mariner’s passage from 
ship to shore, at his moment of homecoming, is represented as a death.  He describes 
himself “Like one that hath been seven days drowned / My body lay afloat” (552-553).  
Rather than a communal rescue or retrieval, the Mariner’s landing is figured as the 
collection of a drowned stranger, which stresses his alienation from his native land.  The 
Mariner returns as a newly mobilized member of the wandering citizenry of modernity. 
 His wander is powered by his compulsion to repeat his “ghastly tale” (584).  This 
repetition is less an act of atonement or redemption, than it is the reification of the 
modernity he embodies.  Pfau writes, “cut adrift from all communal and object 
relations, the Mariner’s emblematic impersonation of the modern condition is above all 
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defined and circumscribed by his ‘strange power of speech,’” and by the “Sisyphean 
labour of constantly having to secure ‘uptake’ or ‘acknowledgement’ for strictly virtual, 
textually mediated notions that are no longer referentially anchored in any objective 
reality or nature” (984).  The Mariner’s endless wander and repeated retellings iterate 
his position as a subject and function of modernity.  The poem figures this by stressing 
the compulsive, mechanistic status of the wandering Mariner.  He tells the Wedding 
Guest, “I pass, like night, from land to land; / I have strange power of speech; / That 
moment that his face I see, / I know the man that must hear me: / To him my tale I 
teach” (586-590).  The teaching of his tale is figured as compulsory and automated.  Like 
a wound clock the Mariner sounds on cue: “Forthwith this frame of mine was wrenched 
/ With a woeful agony, / Which forced me to begin my tale; / And then it left me free” 
(578-581).  The temporal markers that permeate his characterization of his wandering 
narration are telling, because they underline how his wander is underwritten by a 
sequential and ceaseless temporality.  The Mariner “pass[es], like night,” remains 
beholden to the “moment,” and his tale is elicited and recounted “at an uncertain hour” 
(582).  His very repetition of the past continuously reinforces time as a sequence 
consisting of past, present, and future, and his own temporal alienation is registered in 
the monotony and homogeneity of his condition.  
The Mariner’s ultimate departure from the poem attests to the irreversibility of 
modernity his voyage has engendered.  The Mariner’s departure at the end of the poem 
tears open a space into which the temporality of clock time floods.  The narrator states, 
“The Mariner, whose eye is bright / Whose beard with age is hoar, / Is gone: and now 
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the Wedding-Guest / Turned from the bridegroom’s door” (618-621).  The caesura that 
follows the description of the Mariner’s leaving—“is gone:”—installs a sequential 
temporality, by demarcating and separating one moment from the next.  His departure 
is marked by a clear punctuation, which is followed by the invocation of a succeeding 
moment: “Is gone: and now” (620).  The “and now” inflects the discourse of the poem 
with the Mariner’s own irreversible modernity, and demonstrates how that modernity 
now indelibly marks the world.  The Mariner has departed, but the successive 
temporality of modernity endures.  The persistence of modernity is continued in the 
narrator’s depiction of the parting Wedding Guest.  The final lines of the poem describe 
the Wedding Guest’s departure: “He went like one that hath been stunned, / And is of 
sense forlorn: / A sadder and a wiser man, / He rose the morrow morn” (622-625).  The 
final image of the Wedding Guest shows how he is likewise marked and affected by 
modernity.  The narrator’s use of the future past tense—“He rose the morrow morn”—
casts the Wedding Guest within a sequential temporality.  Like the Mariner, The 
Wedding Guest is caught within time as the succession of moments.  Moreover, his 
position within the irreversible, successive time of modernity is shown to be likewise an 
experience of alienation and dispossession.  The Wedding Guest now has a tomorrow, 
and a yesterday, but the text figures his undertaking of clock time as a loss.  It is for this 
reason that the Wedding Guest is “of sense forlorn.”  The adjectival “forlorn” carries 
with it the traces of the early modern noun a “forlorn hope,” which, “in early use,” 
referred to “a picked body of men, detached to the front to begin the attack; a body of 
skirmishers;” and finds its first appearance in English in a military treatise form 1579 
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(OED 1.a.).  The English “forlorn hope” is Dutch in origin (deriving from “verloren hoop” 
or “lost troop”), and the Dutch translation more transparently holds the sense of loss 
and death signified by the word “forlorn.”  The Rime’s use of the word “forlorn” carries 
with it the military, colonial procedures of early modernity.  Indeed, its derivation from 
the Dutch, whose maritime, colonial power preceded that of Britain’s, traces the 
modernity it carries, right back to the Mariner’s own experience on a colonial vessel.  
The word “forlorn” reifies modernity itself—the forlorn were those sacrificed and lost to 
the establishment of the trade, expansion, colonization, and war of early modernity.  
The forlorn were the first to die for the project of modernity, the implementation of 
which The Rime of the Ancient Mariner dramatizes and yet remains deeply troubled by.   
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Romanticism and the Temporality of Wander 
 
Chapter Five: 
 
The Fall of Wander: Melmoth the Wanderer and the Torment of Time 
 
 
 The titular wanderer of Charles Robert Maturin’s 1820 Gothic novel Melmoth the 
Wanderer embodies a “bitter and burning irony” (492).  Having brokered an infernal 
deal to extend his life for 150 years, the Wanderer is “permitted to wander” with the 
“power to tempt men under the pressure of extreme calamity;” and yet, he spends his 
prolonged life trying and failing to extricate himself from this fate by tempting others to 
exchange “destinies” (475, 601).  The Wanderer is an over-reacher and a tempter at 
once; he is both “Faust and Mephistopheles,” protagonist and antagonist, victim and 
villain, object and subject (Sage xvi).  Indeed, Kathleen Fowler’s designation of the 
Wanderer as a “splendid Gothic hero-villain” “descended from Faust, Mephistopheles, 
Milton’s Satan, Cain, and the Wandering Jew” underlines this division—the Wanderer is 
just as much the tortured as he is the torturer (522-523).  The Wanderer’s irony is 
rooted in his relationship to temporality.  His longevity refigures his existence as sheer 
time, and reduces his life to the simple measure of hours, days, and years.  The 
Wanderer has time, but only in so far as he surrenders that time to its successive 
quantification.  By undertaking a timebound subjectivity, the Wanderer becomes an 
object of the clock, and is divested of his own organic temporality in the process.  The 
irony of the Wanderer signifies the ironic condition of living within the measured time of 
modernity, where one is given time as an authorized subject, but alienated from one’s 
own authentic temporal experience by virtue of its schematization.  Melmoth the 
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Wanderer is thus a cautionary tale.  The novel offers the figure of the Wanderer, and the 
more general instantiations of listless wander undertaken by those he tempts, to warn 
against a temporality it finds to be thoroughly dispossessing. 
 The Wanderer’s irony, along with the temporal alienation it registers, is exhibited 
in the very form of Melmoth the Wanderer.  The novel upends the traditional 
conventions of prose narrative, which generally outline central protagonists developing 
in time, in both the Wanderer’s temporal stasis—“time seems to have forborne to touch 
him from terror,” as an English Reverend notes—and by virtue of the fact that he 
remains a peripheral presence in his own narrative (558).  “Contrary to what one might 
expect,” Charlotte Sussman writes, “the Wanderer is hardly the central character in the 
novel named for him, but rather the pole around which a series of vignettes of suffering 
is organized” (142).  Melmoth the Wanderer deploys the Gothic convention of the frame 
narrative and the found manuscript, but it takes these tropes to baffling and 
disorienting heights.  Fractured and fragmented, the novel is an amalgam of narratives 
relayed through multiple speakers, which, for the most part, lack resolution, or are in 
some other way incomplete.  The novel adopts, as Sharon Ragaz terms it, a 
“labyrinthine, infinitely regressive [and] Chinese-box structure” in its presentation of 
these vignettes (359).  Melmoth the Wanderer consists of the narration of John 
Melmoth the younger, on his return to the family seat; of the found, decaying, and 
fragmented narrative of Stanton, as read by John Melmoth; and of the first-person 
account of the shipwrecked Moncada, as conveyed to John Melmoth; however, 
Moncada’s narrative contains the lengthy narrative of the Tale of the Indians, which 
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Moncada recalls having transcribed in the secreted apartment of Adonijah; and that 
narrative itself contains The Tale of Guzman’s Family and The Lover’s Tale, both of which 
have their own distinct narrators.  At what amounts to its most dizzying moment, the 
novel has at least five layers of mediation: The Tale of Guzman’s Family is told by an 
unnamed writer, which is contained within the Tale of the Indians, which is recorded by 
Adonijah, which is transcribed by Moncada, which is then recounted by Moncada to 
John Melmoth in the novel’s present.  Within this disorienting narrative structure, the 
Wanderer remains elusive, uncontainable, and almost apocryphal, despite being the 
novel’s namesake.  The novel, then, subverts the general conceit of prose narrative of 
conveying the progression and growth of a central character.  Rather than featuring the 
development of its assumed protagonist, Melmoth the Wanderer, as Fred Botting 
observes, presents an “ironic reversal of romance ideals and their homogenizing effects” 
(70). 
 The Wanderer’s own irony is demonstrated most palpably in the various historical 
accounts he delivers to his would-be victims.  Throughout the novel the Wanderer 
baffles his interlocutors with vivid, first-hand accounts of history; however, he presents 
these accounts through an ironic language that underlines and reaffirms his own 
distance from that time, in spite of his actual presence.  Moncada recalls how the 
Wanderer “dealt much in anecdotical history,” and states that “he constantly eluded to 
events and personages beyond his possible memory, —then he checked himself—then 
he appeared to go on, with a kind of derisive sneer at his own absence” (254).  The 
“derisive sneer” of “absence” hints at the Wanderer’s absence from his own temporal 
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experience.  Indeed, the Wanderer’s historical accounts remain observational and 
descriptive—a running commentary that hovers above lived and embodied historical 
understanding.  His reporting of the past reads more like an ongoing, discontinuous 
taking of minutes, than it does an historical narrative, as he abruptly shifts from one 
event to another, each devoid of contextual, historical insight.  In one breath, the 
Wanderer “spoke of the Restoration in England,” and then “of the superb fetes given by 
Louis Quatorze,” and “then he reverted to the death of the Duchesse d’Orleans,” and 
then “passed to England” and “spoke of the wretched and well-rebuked pride of the 
wife of James II” (254, 255).  The Wanderer’s account of the past amounts to a 
continuous description that flits from one scene to the next; replete with detail, but 
lacking in understanding.  Moncada recalls how the Wanderer’s discourse was 
characterized by a “minuteness and circumstantiality,” and that his descriptions 
contained a “minute fidelity somewhat alarming” (255, 256).  The “minuteness” of his 
descriptions is indicative of an automated, total recall of the past—one that is emptied 
out of authentic historical understanding.  The past in the Wanderer’s language is a 
summation of details, and nothing more.  The Wanderer ironically remains outside of 
the very past for which he was present. 
The Wanderer further reveals his temporal alienation in the heavily ironized 
account of European history he provides to Immalee.  In presenting Immalee with the 
violent, “cruel and wicked absurdities” of European society, the Wanderer participates 
in what Fred Botting identifies as the critical function of the Romantic-Gothic figure; but 
the “acrid and searing irony” with which he presents his account of history underlines 
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his distance from that time (339, 343).  He criticizes the law in defining it as an 
“amusement of these people, so ingenious in multiplying the sufferings of their destiny” 
(340), and he similarly censures war by calling it a “legalized massacre” composed of the 
“collecting the greatest number of human beings that can be bribed to the task, to cut 
the throat of a less, equal, or greater number of beings, bribed in the same manner for 
the same purpose” (338).  The Wanderer’s de-familiarizing irony stresses his own 
separation from the European history of which he is a product.  The ironical nature of 
the Wanderer’s time-bound subjectivity ensures that he remains distanced and 
alienated from the time he observes. 
Baudelaire, one of Melmoth the Wanderer’s early champions, claims the “great 
satanic creation of the Reverend Maturin” derives its power from this irony (139).  The 
Wanderer, Baudelaire writes, exhibits a “contradictory double nature, which is infinitely 
great in relation to man, and infinitely vile and base in relation to Absolute Truth and 
Justice” (139).  As “the outcast of society, wandering somewhere between the last 
boundaries of the territory of mankind and the frontiers of the higher life,” the 
Wanderer “always believes himself to be on the point of freedom from his infernal pact, 
and longs without ceasing to barter that superhuman power, which is his disaster, for 
the pure conscience of a simpleton, which is his envy” (142-3).  Baudelaire finds the 
Wanderer’s irony—his status as a “living contradiction”—to be most pronounced in his 
laughter, which Baudelaire claims to be a uniquely post-lapsarian phenomenon (142).  
Laughter, he writes, originates in “the idea of one’s own superiority,” which the 
Wanderer sneeringly and consistently affirms (137).  Baudelaire argues that this sense of 
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self-superiority is thoroughly “Satanic,” and he asserts that the “Romantic school, or, to 
put it better, the Satanic school,” of which the Wanderer is a significant founding 
member, demonstrates “a proper understanding” of laughter’s primordial law” (137, 
139).  The laughter of irony is Satanic, Baudelaire argues, because it originates and 
registers the theological ejection from the garden, wherein one is subject and object at 
once.  “Human laughter,” Baudelaire writes, “is intimately linked with the accident of an 
ancient Fall, of a debasement both physical and moral” (135).  
 In “The Rhetoric of Temporality” Paul De Man develops the connection 
Baudelaire draws between the fall and irony, in order to indicate the temporal insight 
that resides in the fact that neither laughter nor tears “make their appearance in the 
paradise of delights” (Baudelaire 135).  De Man responds to Baudelaire’s formulation of 
irony by showing the temporal implications of irony’s doubled structure.  The superiority 
that arises from watching the fall of another reflects an internal difference located in 
the watcher.  “Superiority and inferiority,” de Man writes, “become merely spatial 
metaphors to indicate a discontinuity and a plurality of levels within a subject that 
comes to know itself by an increasing differentiation from what it is not” (213).  De Man 
reads the fall as the movement into self-division that divides an empirical self from a self 
that is constituted by language.  De Man writes, 
In Baudelaire’s description the division of the subject into a multiple 
consciousness takes place in immediate connection with a fall.  The 
element of falling introduces the specifically comical and ultimately 
ironical ingredient.  At the moment that the artistic or philosophical, that 
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is, the language-determined, man laughs at himself falling, he is laughing 
at a mistaken, mystified assumption he was making about himself . . . As 
a being that stands upright . . . man comes to believe that he dominates 
nature, just as he can, at times, dominate others or watch others 
dominate him.  This is, of course, a major mystification.  The Fall, in the 
literal as well as the theological sense, reminds him of the purely 
instrumental, reified character of his relationship to nature. (213-214) 
The literal fall echoes the theological fall, and reveals a division in consciousness, where 
“language thus conceived divides the subject into an empirical self, immersed in the 
world, and a self that becomes like a sign in its attempt at differentiation and self-
definition” (213).  The fall discloses the ironic condition that sits at the very centre of 
subjectivity. 
De Man goes on to show that irony’s revelation of different selves within the 
same consciousness is a temporal development.  Like allegory, irony reveals a “temporal 
void” by “always implying an unreachable anteriority” (222).  This temporal void is 
established in the realization of the erroneousness of a past self, at the expense of a 
future self that might itself be erroneous.  De Man writes, “irony divides the flow of 
temporal experience into a past that is pure mystification and a future that remains 
harassed forever by a relapse within the inauthentic” (222).  The effect of irony is to 
reveal a temporal predicament it can itself never surmount.  Irony “can know this 
inauthenticity but can never overcome it” (222).  And yet, this knowing, de Man 
continues, is nonetheless insightful.  Irony, de Man shows, “comes closer to the pattern 
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of factual experience and recaptures some of the factitiousness of human existence as a 
succession of isolated moments lived by a divided self” (226).  Irony may disclose the 
inauthentic, in so far as it demystifies a past self and destabilizes a future self, but that 
inauthenticity authentically defines consciousness as the successive establishment of 
multiple selves.  Through negation, irony diagnoses the temporality of subjectivity.  
Irony and allegory, de Man states, are “determined by an authentic experience of 
temporality which, seen from the point of view of the self engaged in the world, is a 
negative one” (226).   
I argue the Wanderer’s “fall” is a fall into the temporality and, hence, the 
subjectivity of modernity—a fall that gives rise to an irony that authentically diagnoses 
his own inauthenticity.  The Wanderer is cast within an external, sequential timeframe 
that externalizes him from his own authentic temporality, and yet his undertaking of 
that temporality imbues him with an ironic language with which he can register and 
gauge his own temporal dispossession.  His irony, then, can only ever refer to and 
diagnose his temporal dispossession—it can never actively redress it, nor escape it.  
“Mingling with, yet distinct from all his species,” the Wanderer wanders, “like a wearied 
and uninterested spectator rambling through the various seats of some vast theatre, 
where he knows none of the audience” (397). 
 Sussman observes that Melmoth the Wanderer is one of many Romantic era 
narratives that explore subjects with prolonged lifespans.  Placing Maturin’s novel 
alongside other Romantic texts like, “John Galt’s 1820 novel The Wandering Jew, 
William Godwin’s St. Leon, and Mary Shelley’s “The Mortal Immortal,” Sussman shows 
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that “Romantic-era literature abounds with characters who are immortal or who have 
lived beyond their allotted years” (140).  Sussman finds that the “relationship” between 
epistemology and temporality “has become more complex in the Romantic-era novel 
than it had been understood to be in the eighteenth century” (144).  “Moral 
epistemology in the novel,” Sussman argues, “is conventionally connected to the 
experience of sympathetic witnessing” (141).  However, these long-living Romantic 
figures “alter the terms of that imaginary exchange, suggesting that sympathy has its 
own temporality, perhaps one tied to the human body” (141).  “The prolongation of 
life,” Sussman writes, “seems to withdraw one from sympathy altogether, so that the 
instant has no moral effect” (145).  Accordingly, Sussman observes that the Romantic-
era novel strives to account for configurations of time that exceed biological existence.  
These novels’ “exploration of long-living individuals is tied up with an interest in the 
supra-individual scope of historical time—of epochs that cannot be defined by the 
temporal span of single bodies” (145). 
Melmoth the Wanderer presents just such an epoch, as the Wanderer’s 
prolonged life stretches alongside the historical turn of modernity.  The dates of his 
lifespan are never specified explicitly in the novel, but the portrait John Melmoth finds 
of his ancestor depicts “a man of middle age” with “the words of the border of the 
painting” reading “Jno. Melmoth, anno 1646” (20).  The portrait dates the Wanderer’s 
birth as sometime in the early years of the seventeenth-century, and thus, with the 
addition of his own life to middle age, plus his extended 150 years, roughly aligns his 
time of death with the novel’s present of 1816.  The Wanderer’s lifespan, running as it 
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does from the early-seventeenth to the early-nineteenth-century, covers the apex years 
of early-modernity.  The major historical changes that engender this epoch include, the 
English Civil War, the beheading of Charles the First, the rise of Protestantism, the rise 
of European colonization—all of which are explicitly referenced in the novel—as well as 
the onset of the Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, the French Revolution, and 
the early phases of the Industrial Revolution.  Jack Null notes the historical and cultural 
significance of the Wanderer’s timeline by stating, “if Melmoth made the pact 150 years 
earlier, he negotiated it in 1666-7,” and so “perhaps Maturin intended the pact to 
coincide with other cataclysmic events of this annus mirabilis” (137).  Null also observes 
how the novel focuses upon two particularly fractious “timespans:” the first, “1660-86, 
which may include the pact and certainly includes the tales of Stanton, Walberg, the 
Mortimers, Immalee-Isidora,” and the second, “1799-1816, which includes the 
adventures of Moncada and the final appearances and end of Melmoth” (144).  Both of 
these periods are particularly turbulent in the narrative of modernity—the first covering 
the English political turmoil of the seventeenth-century, and the second the 
Revolutionary, political, and social debates of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-
century.  Furthermore, these two periods bookend, roughly, the trajectory of early 
modernity, and both witness modernity’s more violent flashpoints.  Null writes, “in 
these periods, Maturin finds similar conditions of political turbulence, bigotry, and the 
uncertainty of events on a grand scale;” they each represent “a turning-away from the 
doctrine of universal love in favour of schisms that threaten to splinter” (144).   
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Ashley Marshall attests to how the Wanderer’s life coincides with the onset of 
modernity, by observing how his existence maps onto the major historical-cultural shifts 
that take place in Western European thought over the course of the Enlightenment.  
Marshall states, “Melmoth’s exchange of his soul for paranormal longevity coincides 
with the cultural transition from metaphysical to empirical understanding” (135).  
“Melmoth,” Marshall writes, “always fills the space from which God has been expelled 
by an empirically oriented society, preoccupied with things visible and countable” (137).  
Indeed, the Reverend of The Lover’s Tale describes seeing the Wanderer’s “room filled 
with an astrological apparatus, books and implements of science [the Reverend] did not 
understand” (557).  The Wanderer’s strange science displaces and replaces traditional 
religious and classical modes of authority with a new empirical science.  Furthermore, 
the time over which the Wanderer’s life is extended is the time in which time itself, 
along with space, becomes the means through which the world is contended with and 
understood.  The Wanderer’s extended life oversees and signifies the emergence of an 
instrumental rationalism, wherein subjects and objects are constituted and organized by 
empirical observation and method.  The Wanderer’s alienated wander, then, dramatizes 
the condition of modern subjectivity that his extended life has witnessed—a condition 
underwritten by and predicated upon the abstraction and quantification of time and 
space. 
The modernity of the Wanderer, moreover, is indivisible from his status as an 
agent of colonization, as Laura Doyle shows.  Developing what she terms the 
“geostructure of the Gothic,” Doyle argues that the Gothic arises from the point at 
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which colonialism and modernity intersect and constitute one another so as to make 
their distinction impossible (515).  “The Gothic,” Doyle writes, “is best read not strictly 
as a representation of the ‘dark side’ of the enlightenment republic but rather as a 
symbolic form generated by the slash that both divides and joins” colonialism to 
modernity (516).  This formulation is articulated through a newly emergent “anxious 
global consciousness via wanderers/Jews who bring troubles and rumblings of colonies 
to capitals” (516).  Doyle shows how both England and Spain depended upon Gothicized 
national narratives in order to underwrite their respective colonial endeavours.  
At the turn into the seventeenth century, England entered a shifting 
colonial/modern world as recently unified nations in the west sought to 
compete with established empires in the East.  Ideologically England did 
so (as had Spain) in significant part by fashioning itself as a Gothic nation 
in the republican, racial, and violent (or conquering) senses.  In England’s 
case this discourse found well developed expression as a myth of Anglo-
Saxonism claiming that the English descended from the fierce Gothic (or 
Germanic) Saxons, a populace of strong, “free born” men who had 
displaced the Rome-weakened Britons and brought with them from the 
woods of Germany a tradition of participatory government and zealous 
protection of land and rights. (522-523) 
The Gothic authorizes and empowers colonial modernity through a discourse it elevates 
to a mythology.  Indeed, Doyle shows how discourses of Gothic freedom were 
instrumental in the political engagements that led to the beheading of Charles the First 
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(523).  The Wanderer, Doyle maintains, is a colonial/modern subject, whose 
“unspeakable knowledge” is none other than his “witnessing of the radical injustice and 
unevenness of the world’s imperial order” (535).  Melmoth the Wanderer, Doyle argues, 
“explicitly surveys the conditions, causes and violent effects of colonial modernity” 
(529). 
Terry Eagleton also outlines the novel’s colonial underpinnings.  Eagleton claims 
that the “satanic pact” of the Wanderer mirrors the act of Anglo-Irish colonization, and 
the Wanderer’s suspension in time reflects the temporal and historical stasis this act of 
colonization has elicited (190).  Eagleton reads the Wanderer’s infernal deal as a 
“metaphor of the original crime of forcible settlement and expulsion, which belongs to 
the period in which Melmoth’s bargain with the devil takes place” (190).  As “the 
brother of a Cromwellian planter,” the Wanderer “has survived over the centuries, and 
what other human subject has a continuous existence over time than a social group or 
class?” (190).  The “Protestant-Gothic,” character of the novel, Eagleton writes, “might 
be dubbed the political unconscious of Anglo-Irish society, the place where its fears and 
fantasies most definitively emerge,” and is showcased by a “decaying gentry in their 
crumbling houses, isolated and sincerely eccentric, haunted by the sins of the past” 
(188).  Eagleton argues that the novel demonstrates how colonization has halted 
historical development.  Time, Eagleton writes, “has been suspended since the first 
trespass, freezing Melmoth in an eternal present” (190).  “Maturin’s astonishing novel,” 
then, becomes “an allegory of this strange condition in which exploiters and victims are 
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both strangers and comrades, and indeed, in the person of Melmoth himself, inhabit the 
same personality” (190). 
The estrangement and alienation that characterize the modernity of the 
Wanderer are hallmarks of what Fred Botting identifies as the Romantic-Gothic.  Botting 
writes, “in the period dominated by Romanticism, Gothic writing began to move inside, 
disturbing conventional social limits and notions of interiority and individuality” (59).  
Botting observes how “the gloom and darkness of sublime landscapes” of the Romantic-
Gothic become “external markers of inner mental and emotional states” (59).  The 
Wanderer most assuredly maintains an “independence of thought” that casts him 
outside the “acquired habitudes of society” (483).  Melmoth the Wanderer, often cited 
as the end of the High Gothic mode, revisions the Walpole-Radcliffe-Lewis Gothic by 
rerouting its conventions into the more immediate consciousness of contemporary 
Britain.  Indeed, as Joseph Lew point out, “Maturin’s opening narration breaks” with the 
Gothic’s convention of presenting a found manuscript that relays a medieval narrative in 
a southern and Catholic locale (176).  Instead, the novel is set “in a past so recent (to 
1820) as to be almost present,” and “places it in England’s back yard, Ireland” (176-177).  
Maturin’s updating and domestication of the Gothic more directly figures current 
cultural and historical concerns.  Lew argues that, in the novel, “the Inquisition, 
allegorically suggests the repression of civil liberties during the struggles against 
Revolutionary France, finding echoes in the Suppression of Habeas Corpus, the Sedition 
Acts, and Pitt’s spy-system” (186).  Botting sees this more immediate sounding of the 
present as endemic to the Romantic-Gothic.  “In political terms,” Botting writes, “the 
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failure of the French Revolution to realize hopes for human progress and equality 
contributed to the inward and darkening turn of Romantic speculations” (60).  
“Romantic-Gothic heroes” feel “the effects of this disillusion,” and are, as a result, 
“alienated from society and themselves” (69).  The Romantic-Gothic presents figures 
caught in limiting and corrupting social modes, where “evil has a banal, human 
existence, produced from accidents and circumstance that escalate beyond human 
control;” and the effects of which engender “alienation, desperation and mental 
deterioration” (70). 
Maturin’s Wanderer is an iteration of the trope of the Wandering Jew.  The 
figure of the Wandering Jew has circulated Western Europe since the medieval period, 
but it became a full-blown stock literary convention by the end of the eighteenth- 
century (Anderson, 78).  The hinge point between the more apocryphal medieval 
accounts of the Wandering Jew, and the “building up of the Wandering Jew into a 
universal European romantic creature,” as facilitated by “the careful nurturing of the 
English Gothicists and Byronic Romanticists,” was the publication of a German chapbook 
at the start of the seventeenth-century (Anderson 95).  R. Edelmann observes that the 
publication of this “small pamphlet,” entitled Kurtze Beschreibung und Erzehlung con 
einem Juden mit Namen Ahasuerus” in 1602, marked “a turning point in the old 
traditions that had been known throughout the Middle Ages” (5, 3).  The narrative of 
the Wandering Jew changed drastically, after the publication of this pamphlet, both in 
significance and prominence (Edelmann).  G.K. Anderson writes, the publication of the 
“Ahasuerus-Book” became responsible for “the anti-Semitism (which is not at all a 
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feature of the medieval treatment of the protagonist) and the varied symbolisms of the 
Jew as a representative of sin, omniscience, political liberty, social unconventionality, 
and Jewish nationalism,” all of which come to “characterize the art-form of the legend 
of the Wandering Jew in later years” (78).  “In the pamphlet,” Edelmann writes, 
the pseudonymous author relates that Paul von Eitzen had told him that, 
when he was a student and happened to be on holiday with his parents in 
Hamburg in 1542, on the first Sunday he attended the service in the 
church.  During the sermon he perceived a man of very strange 
appearance.  This man proved to be born in Jerusalem, was called 
Ahasuerus and was a shoemaker by profession.  He was a contemporary 
of Jesus and had been present when Jesus was taken to be executed.  On 
his way to Golgotha Jesus had leaned against his house, but he had 
driven him away, whereupon Jesus said to him: “I will stay and rest, but 
you shall go.”  Since then Ahasuerus had had to give up his home and his 
family and roam the world. (6) 
Edelmann argues that the German pamphlet shifted the focus of the narrative away 
from the figure’s immortality, and onto his status as a penitent, guilty, and Sisyphean 
wanderer.  “The Jew is punished with eternal wandering (‘I will stay and rest, but you 
shall go’),” writes Edelmann, “his continued life serves, as is expressly stated in the 
pamphlet, as a testimony of Jesus’ sufferings and death and as a warning for the godless 
people and the unbelievers,” “his fate is a punishment” (7).  Edelmann sees the 
pamphlet’s presentation of the narrative of the Wandering Jew as constitutive of, and 
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responsive to, a growing anti-Semitism.  The pamphlet ties the encounter with the 
Wandering Jew to Martin Luther through its reference to Paul von Eitzen, who “had 
studied with Luther during the period when he was at the peak of his anti-Semitic stage” 
(it was in 1543 that “Luther’s poisonous book, Concerning the Jews and their lives, 
appeared”) (7).  The pamphlet asserted as gospel the notion that “the Jew had been 
doomed, allegedly by Jesus himself, to be deprived of a permanent dwelling, and whom 
it therefore was a good Christian deed to chase away” (8).  And, Edelmann continues, 
“one year after the appearance of the pamphlet, citizens of Hamburg, backed by the 
clergy, demanded that the Senate of the city banish the Jews living there” (8).  In 
addition to harnessing the myth for decidedly anti-Semitic purposes, the German 
pamphlet also made “the legend about the Wandering Jew common property for the 
broad masses all over Europe” becoming, “like the Faustus legend and others,” “one of 
the most oft-treated motives of European art and literature” (8).   
The Ahasuerus-Book converted the Wandering Jew into a figure of modernity.  In 
its anti-Semitism, its galvanizing of social and political desires, its ties to Martin Luther 
and the Faust-book (likewise published as a German chapbook around the turn of the 
seventeenth-century), the Ahasuerus-Book modernized the myth of the Wandering Jew.  
Like the Faust-book, the pamphlet of the Wandering Jew becomes a proto-mass media 
object, and, also like the Faust-book, it presents a solitary and solipsistic figure whose 
own willful act of over-reaching—in his insult to Christ—leads to perpetual torment.  
The Wandering Jew of the pamphlet performs the spiritual and communal exile of a 
modernity engaged in producing and disseminating a new, individualistic subjective 
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mode.  Reborn in the early-seventeenth-century, the Wandering Jew becomes a 
harbinger of modernity.  Maturin imbues his Wanderer with this nascent modernity, by 
harnessing the narrative of the Wandering Jew and, moreover, by placing his 
Wanderer’s moment of transgression also in the seventeenth-century.  
The Wandering Jew that is featured throughout Romanticism—explicitly in 
Shelley, Wordsworth, and Mathew Lewis, and implicitly in Coleridge and Byron—is 
precisely this modern figure of itinerant alienation and ennui.  Jay Salisbury argues that 
Romanticism draws upon the trope of the Wandering Jew as a means of reflecting its 
own suspension between two distinct epistemic modes.  Salisbury argues that the 
Wandering Jew, and his inheritors, “is anything born of the dreadful moment between 
two epistemological systems and before the wandering assumes a direction through 
structures of meaning productive of what Foucault calls jeux de verité” (46).  The 
Romantic wanderer reifies epistemic and modal uncertainty, in which signification is 
untethered and consensus is in flux.  Salisbury writes, the wanderer “haunts 
Romanticism as it attempts to move away from and foreclose this moment . . . its 
uncanny presence always threatens the collapse of the certain subject,” and “ungrounds 
its structures of meaning and reveals the desperate nature of its games of truth” (46).  
Salisbury observes that in “Matthew Lewis’s The Monk and Charles Maturin’s Melmoth 
the Wanderer, this figure appears at moments when belief is suspended or has 
collapsed into despair,” and challenges and complicates moments at which 
“Romanticism risks becoming entangled in the same systems of values it seeks to 
repudiate and transcend” (46).  However, Salisbury mistakes the effect for the cause.  
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The Wandering Jew is a sign of indeterminacy, but not as an essential disruption of 
epistemic certainty.  Instead, the Wandering Jew harkens a new modality, and 
specifically a new modernity, of which he is a prototype.  The Wandering Jew reifies 
modernity, the stakes and significance of which remain uncertain and unknowable to 
the figures he encounters.   
 Within the tradition of the Wandering Jew, Maturin’s Wanderer is most 
immediately responsive to the iteration found in The Monk.  Heavily influenced by 
Lewis’ landmark Gothic novel, especially in its anti-papist sentiments, Melmoth the 
Wanderer makes an explicit reference to the scene in The Monk into which the 
Wandering Jew enters.  The citation appears in the opening pages of Melmoth the 
Wanderer, where on returning to the family estate to attend his uncle’s deathbed, the 
young John Melmoth remembers “his school-boy years, when at Christmas and Easter, 
the ragged pony, the jest of the school, was dispatched to bring the reluctant visitor to 
the Lodge, —where his pastime was to sit vis-à-vis to his uncle, without speaking or 
moving, till the pair resembled Don Raymond and the ghost of Beatrice in the Monk” 
(10).  The reference positions Melmoth the Wanderer as an inheritor of Lewis’ strain of 
Gothicism, but it also finds and develops a through-line established by The Monk 
between the Wandering Jew and clock time.  Don Raymond’s nightly haunting by the 
ghostly Bleeding Nun is presented through the language of clock time.  Every night when 
the clock strikes one the Bleeding Nun visits Raymond, and remains “for the whole long 
hour” until “the Clock struck two” (160).  “Every night,” Raymond recounts, “was this 
repeated” (163).  And, as Raymond learns from the Wandering Jew, “though to [him] 
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only visible for one hour in the twenty-four, neither day or night does she ever quit [his 
side]” (169).  Seemingly from nowhere—“some supposed him to be an Arabian 
Astrologer, others to be a Travelling Mountebank, and many declared that He was 
Doctor Faustus, whom the Devil had sent back to Germany”—the Wandering Jew steps 
into this mechanized and repetitious performance of clock time to assist Raymond in 
exorcising this ghost (163, 167).  The Wandering Jew alone possesses “the power of 
releasing” Raymond from his “nightly Visitor,” and he alone can discern her presence 
(168).  In his exorcism, the Wandering Jew bears witness to the Bleeding Nun’s narrative 
to allow Raymond to learn that he is, in fact, related to her; and the Wandering Jew 
shows Raymond what he must do to right the Bleeding Nun’s historical wronging: he 
must exhume the Bleeding Nun’s “mouldering bones” and bury them “in the family 
vault of his Andalusian Castle” (172).  Accordingly, the Wandering Jew’s insight breaks 
the temporal monotony of the clock-bound haunting Raymond experiences, and 
reconnects Raymond to his own authentic, historical temporality.  The Wandering Jew 
sees time beyond measure—time as an intensity, or as a permutation—and he frees 
Raymond from the clock’s homogenous leveling and sequencing of time.  After this 
freeing, the “celebrated Character of the Wandering Jew,” with the “burning Cross 
impressed upon his fore-head,” disappears from the novel as suddenly as he came, “his 
not being permitted to pass more than fourteen days on the same spot;” however, he 
goes only after he has attenuated Raymond’s experience of the repetitive, monotony of 
clock time (177). 
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Maturin’s Gothic Wanderer follows that of Lewis, but it is a repetition with a 
difference.  While Lewis’ Wandering Jew is a marginal and tangential figure who works 
to reconnect and reintegrate Raymond to his own temporality, and to the larger 
narrative, Maturin’s Wanderer is a central figure of disintegration, whose attempts to 
find candidates with whom to exchange destinies performs the inverse of Lewis’ 
Wandering Jew.  The Wanderer seeks to reestablish his own organic temporality, by 
transferring his contracted, sentenced duration of years to another.  Unlike Lewis’ 
Wandering Jew, the Wanderer is not a penitent immortal; rather, he has extended his 
life for the prescribed period of 150 years.  In this extension, the Wanderer has 
transposed an organic and contingent life for the quantified temporality of modernity.  
Divorced from organic corporeal limitations, the Wanderer is an uprooted and free-
floating subject of Newtonian mechanics.  His infernal deal, then, is less the stuff of 
infernal supernaturalism, than it is a figure for a rational, instrumental, and 
homogenizing modernity.  The origins of the Wanderer’s power are never represented 
in the novel, but come directly from the mouth of the Wanderer himself: “it has been 
reported of me, that I obtained from the enemy of souls a range of existence beyond 
the period allotted to mortality—a power to pass over space without disturbance or 
delay, and visit remote regions with the swiftness of thought” (601).  The veracity of this 
account aside, the Wanderer’s powers are authorized and underwritten by a quantified 
measure of time and space—he can move freely within them, because he iterates a 
modernity that has reconfigured time and space as mathematized coordinates.  The 
Wanderer is not immortal or beyond time; rather, he is entirely timebound (50).  As a 
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subject of modernity, the Wanderer reflects the experience of time as time and space as 
space.  Far from being timeless, he is cast within a timeframe that functions like a 
sentence. 
 The Wanderer’s seeming immunity to the progression of time, then, is not an 
indication of his immortality, but a demonstration of his transfixed-ness within 
sequential and homogenous time.  As a running, tallying sequence of past, present, and 
future, clock time in itself does not elicit actual temporal change; it demarcates a virtual 
and changeless horizon of time qua time.  Clock time is the constant, regulated, 
homogenous horizon that monitors and records the interpretation of time as a spatial 
and irreversible celestial movement.  The Wanderer’s alignment with clock time places 
him within this changeless sphere of change, where time and space are equivalent 
coordinates, devoid of any locality or particularity, and independent of actual “space 
and time” (75).  Biddy Brannigan, the Irish sage who provides the first narrative account 
of the Wanderer, affirms his more virtual characteristics.  She notes how the Wanderer 
“was never heard to speak, seen to partake of food, or known to enter any dwelling but 
that of his family” (30).  Throughout the text he remains parallel to, but distanced from, 
organic life—only before his death does he request a glass of water as his final taste “of 
earth’s produce” (600).  The Wanderer’s ability to enter and exit prisons at will—to 
“defy the power in whose grasp he appeared to be enclosed”—and his capacity to be in 
two places at once—“to be active in his purposes of mischief in the remotest parts of 
Europe at the moment he was supposed to be expiating them in others”—reflects the 
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detached, artificial, and homogeneous time and space he inhabits and manipulates 
(362).  
Throughout Melmoth the Wanderer, the Wanderer is associated with clocks.  
The English Reverend’s account of the Wanderer’s temporary death, in The Lovers’ Tale, 
is presented like clockwork.  The Reverend had witnessed the Wanderer dying in 
Germany only to see him alive, years later, in Yorkshire; and he describes the 
Wanderer’s death in language that resembles the winding down of a clock.  The 
Wanderer had said to the Reverend, “tarry but an hour, and you yourself will behold me 
dead!” (558); and soon after the Reverend observes: 
As the hand of the clock approached the hour of twelve his countenance 
changed—his eyes became dim—his speech inarticulate—his jaw 
dropped—his respiration ceased.  I applied a glass to his lips—but there 
was not a breath to stain it.  I felt his wrist—but there was no pulse.  I 
placed my hand on his heart—there was not the slightest vibration.  In a 
few minutes his body was perfectly cold.  I did not quit the room till 
nearly an hour after—the body gave no signs of returning animation. 
(558) 
The death of the Wanderer is couched in the language of clock time.  It occurs on the 
hour, and the cessation of his organic functions is framed as the slowing down and 
stoppage of a mechanical timepiece.  The clock-bound nature of the Wanderer is reified 
by the Reverend’s observation of the Wanderer’s death in time.  The very life processes 
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of the Wanderer are reduced to an occurrence within a quantified sequence of minutes 
and hours. 
The novel further develops an association between the Wanderer and the 
modality of clock time in Moncada’s tale.  As Moncada recounts breaking free from the 
burning prison of the Inquisition, he recalls seeing the Wanderer illuminated by fire, 
perched aloft the church’s great clock: 
I could see the spire blazing, from the reflected lustre, like a meteor.  The 
hands of the clock were as visible as if a torch was held before them; and 
this calm and silent progress of time, amid the tumultuous confusion of 
midnight horrors, —this scene of the physical and mental world in an 
agony of fruitless and incessant motion, might have suggested a 
profound and singular image, had not my whole attention been riveted to 
a human figure placed on a pinnacle of the spire, and surveying the scene 
in perfect tranquility.  It was a figure not to be mistaken. (269-270)   
The Wanderer’s contiguity to the clock aligns him with its temporal mode.  The passive 
recording of both the clock, with its “silent progress of time,” and the Wanderer, with 
his “perfect tranquility,” amidst the chaotic scene below, place the two in conjunction 
with one another, and, moreover, underline how this sequential time passively monitors 
and surveys from above, a temporality it remains disconnected from.  The Wanderer 
and the clock are detached witnesses hovering over, but entirely divorced from, 
temporalities they can only ever measure and gauge.   
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The image of the Wanderer alongside a great clock is presented again at the 
novel’s conclusion.  After returning to his family seat and confronting John Melmoth and 
Moncada, the Wanderer requests isolation for his final repose, wherein novel offers a 
glimpse of his unconsciousness, in The Wanderer’s Dream.  The dream recounts, what 
appears to be, the final expiration of the Wanderer’s extended life at the hands of a 
satanic figure. 
He stood, in his dream, tottering on a crag midway down the precipice—
he looked upward, but the upper air (for there was no heaven) showed 
only blackness, unshadowed and impenetrable—but, blacker than that 
blackness, he could distinguish a gigantic outstretched arm, that held him 
as in sport on the ridge of that infernal precipice, while another, that 
seemed in its motions to hold fearful and invisible conjunction with the 
arm that grasped him, as if both belonged to some being too vast and 
horrible even for the imagery of a dream to shape, pointed upwards to a 
dial-plate fixed on the top of that precipice, and which the flashes of that 
ocean of fire made fearfully conspicuous.  He saw the mysterious single 
hand revolve—he saw it reach the appointed period of 150 years—(for in 
this mystic plate centuries were marked, not hours)—he shrieked in his 
dream, and, with that strong impulse often felt in sleep, burst from the 
arm that held him, to arrest the motion of the hand. (602-603)   
The Wanderer’s life is represented as a timed sentence, one that is kept and powered 
by a giant, demonic clock.  The mechanical arbitrariness of the number that determines 
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his death shows the Wanderer’s fundamental estrangement from his own organic 
temporality.  Clock time is presented here as an external and demonic cooption of 
temporality; one that severs the Wanderer from his own time, where his only recourse 
is to struggle in vain to “arrest [its] motion.”  The Wanderer’s Dream makes manifest the 
latent experience of the subjectivity of modernity.  The dream’s paralleling and 
equivalency of the giant hands of the clock with the giant arms of the being that holds 
the Wanderer uses the Satanic “fall” to figure a temporal “fall.”  Undertaking the mantle 
of modernity, the novel shows, is akin to a Satanic fall, where obedience and collectivity 
are eschewed for an Enlightenment individualism and instrumentalism, a la Blake’s 
painting of Newton. 
The Wanderer is a sign of modernity and of its temporality, but he is not alone in 
heralding its rise.  The Wanderer’s alienation from his own temporality—his status as a 
“disinherited child of nature”—also figures a more general encroachment of clock time 
staged throughout the novel (355).  The Wanderer’s own extended life, and the 
suffering of those he encounters, are indicative of time as a social and disciplinary 
structure, as it was increasingly experienced in the early-nineteenth-century.  In the 
novel, time as an unfolding sequence effects consciousness to the point of madness, 
and produces a solipsistic individualism disconnected from more organic and cultural 
life.  Melmoth the Wanderer is populated and punctuated by ticking and tolling clocks 
that underscore the ways in which clock time comes to impede upon and structure lives.  
As John Melmoth the younger travels as the “solitary passenger” in “the mail” to the 
family estate, at the outset of the novel, he “consulted his watch” to “repel” his “many 
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painful thoughts . . . from the past, and more from the future” (9).  Later, John Melmoth 
sits down to read Stanton’s “discoloured, obliterated and mutilated” manuscript, and is 
roused by “the sound of the clock striking twelve . . . it was the only sound he had heard 
for some hours,” and had “at such an hour an effect indescribably awful” (32, 31). 
Similarly, Stanton, in his narrative, reports hearing a “clock [strike] audibly” with “no 
voice of mirth or of occupation to drown its sound; time told his awful lesson to silence 
alone” (36).  In the same house, Stanton hears the cries of an “unhappy maniac,” who 
“at midnight always exclaims, in a voice frightfully piercing, and hardly human, ‘They are 
coming! they are coming!’ and relapses into a profound silence” (40).  Stanton also 
encounters, in the insane asylum in which he is later confined, a “maniac who had lost 
her husband, children, subsistence, and finally her reason, in the dreadful fire of 
London” (58).  Whenever the woman hears “the cry of fire” it causes her to relive the 
experience with “terrible punctuality” (58).  Her trauma recurs like clockwork. 
The structuring nature of clock time is detailed in Moncada’s narrative as well.  
Moncada recounts the clock-bound and “monotonous existence” of life in a monastery, 
which at one point is given over to a debate surrounding “the proper hour of matins, 
which the Superior wants to have restored to the original hour” consisting of a 
difference of a “Full five minutes” (111, 113).  While at the convent, Moncada sees a 
monk “with an habitual motion, (it could not have been more), make the sign of the 
cross, as a clock in some distant passage struck” (246), and later, upon attending an old 
monk on his deathbed, Moncada recalls the monk’s dying remarks: “I am a clock that 
has struck the same minutes and hours for sixty years.  Is it not time for the machine to 
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long for its winding up?” (123).  Clock time in the novel is an increasingly pervasive force 
that is not only omnipresent, but disciplinary as well, as it organizes bodies in time. 
The Wanderer, then, is only the most glaring sign of an ascendant clock time that 
is present everywhere else, which the novel demonstrates to be a looming danger.  The 
figures the Wanderer encounters and tempts are each threatened by the same 
mechanized and monotonous subjectivity that the Wanderer embodies.  The Wanderer 
“[visits] those who teeter at the border between wealth and poverty, sanity and 
insanity, or innocence and corruption,” as Laura Doyle observes; however, they are also 
figures who teeter on the brink of embodying a new temporality (532).  In this light, the 
Wanderer is less an infernal figure of menace than he is a transparent iteration of this 
new subjective mode, which his would-be victims risk falling into.  The Wanderer 
becomes an objective correlative, by making manifest this larger cultural and historical 
shift.  This is evidenced by the fact that the Wanderer is a decidedly unsuccessful 
tempter.  Kathleen Fowler argues that “it is not that Melmoth is remarkably stupid in 
selecting his targets,” for “Don Inez, Fra Jose, the parricide” would all “make easy 
victims for Melmoth, but they have already bargained away their souls” (527-528).  
Instead, continues Fowler, “Melmoth’s task is to seek out those who, like Job, have 
maintained their integrity in prosperity and then to test their steadfastness in the face 
of adversity” (528).  These Jobs are each confronted with the subjectivity of clock time, 
and the Wanderer’s appearance works to fully expound and develop that subjectivity 
for them.  The automatic and ineffectual nature of his temptations is rooted in the fact 
that his function in the novel is not to win over souls, but to reify and render 
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transparent the modality of clock time that those souls approach.  As Amy Elizabeth 
Smith notes, based on the “the perfunctory fashion in which several of the supposedly 
crucial temptations and refusals are skimmed over in this novel, it seems that Maturin's 
interest in his original plan had subsided in favour of other concerns” (529).  These other 
concerns, I argue, consist of revealing the nature of modern subjectivity for those who 
stand upon its threshold. 
 The figures the Wanderer encounters are all on the verge of becoming uprooted 
and detached wanderers through their own temporal alienation.  Either through 
character or circumstance, these figures find themselves cut off from their own organic 
and cultural temporalities, and they each skirt the edges of an alienated solipsism.  The 
first of these is Stanton, who first sees the Wanderer on the “plains of Valencia,” and 
who is a member of the class of “scholars and literati, the intelligent, the idle, and the 
curious” who “wandered over the Continent” (33, 32).  Stanton displays the detached, 
modern itinerancy of an Enlightenment subjectivity.  Educated and solitary, he wanders 
the Continent to engage in his own individual aesthetic and historical contemplation.  
Indeed, he displays a proto-Hegelian historical, aesthetic insight, when he marks “the 
difference between the architecture of the Roman and Moorish ruins,” and notes that 
“among the former are the remains of a theatre, and something like a public place; the 
latter present only the remains of fortresses” with “not a loop-hole for pleasure to get in 
by” (33).  He also partakes in the solitary aesthetic “contemplating” of the sublime, as 
he observes the “glorious and awful scenery before him—light struggling with 
darkness—and darkness menacing a light still more terrible, and announcing its menace 
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in the blue and livid mass of cloud that hovered like a destroying angel in the air” (34).  
Despite the fact that he lives during the seventeenth-century, Stanton is a late-
Enlightenment or even Romantic figure.  He is the quintessential educated, Protestant 
individual musing in solitude, whose intellectual pursuits remove him from the rest of 
society.  Indeed, his “singular turn of mind” “suggested to some prudent people the idea 
he was deranged (50-51).  It is, moreover, this singularity that leads to him being duped 
into imprisonment in the insane asylum, where the Wanderer appears to tempt him.  
When he arrives at the insane asylum, under false and misleading circumstances, he 
immediately becomes preoccupied by “[seizing] the first book near him,” “as usual,” 
instead of actively perceiving where he is (52).  By diving directly into this solitary study, 
he prevents himself from realizing his own confinement; as the narrator notes “it is 
singular that Stanton read on without suspicion of his own danger . . . without ever 
reflecting on the place where he was” (52, 53).  His confinement—a confinement that 
places him within the disciplinary repetition and monotony of life in the asylum—is thus 
the full realization and completion of the detached individualism he already displays.  
His eventual encounter with the Wanderer in the asylum, then, is, in a way, presaged by 
his own fall into an individualism that is always in danger of sliding into solipsism. 
 Moncada also experiences the ennui and disciplinary individuation of an 
institution, which he outlines in his narrative of “monastic life” (86).  Like in other Gothic 
texts, the monastery in which Moncada is forced to live is represented as a menacing, 
disciplinary structure; however, Melmoth the Wanderer ties the disciplinarity of 
conventual life to the “endless monotony,” instrumentalization, and madness of 
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protocol that characterizes institutions (86).  The novel thus connects Moncada’s 
experience of the “frozen and hopeless monotony of a cloister” to the more 
bureaucratic and deadening facets of modernity, not least of which is the convent’s 
reliance upon time (89).  Moncada observes how the monastery is time-bound in its 
very functioning: “how well religious persons understand the secret of making every 
event of the present world operate on the future, while they pretend to make the 
future predominate over the present” (99).  Time in the monastery is neither had nor 
experienced, but rather endlessly surrendered and deferred, which engenders an 
alienation and monotony in which “day followed day for many a month, of which” 
Moncada had “no recollections” (110).  Indeed, the institutional temporality of monastic 
life transforms Moncada into an “abstraction” with “mechanical movements,” and 
makes him an “automaton figure” with “meaningless words” (112).  Moncada recalls 
how “the bell did not toll for service with more mechanical punctuality than [he] obeyed 
the summons,” and that he functioned like an “automaton, constructed on the most 
exquisite principles of mechanism, and obeying those principles with a punctuality 
almost miraculous” (111).  Later, when Moncada is punished for his unwillingness to 
take his vows by being locked in a dungeon of the cloister, he recalls,  
I began to think I could keep time as accurately as any clock in a convent, 
and measure the hours of my confinement . . . so I sat and counted sixty; 
a doubt always occurred to me, that I was counting them faster than the 
clock.  Then I wished to be the clock that, that I might have no feeling, no 
motive for hurrying on the approach of time. (162)   
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Finally, at the news of his brother’s plan of escape Moncada again figures himself as “a 
clock whose hands are pushed forward,” and who “struck the hours” he “was impelled 
to strike” (200).  Clock time in the monastery transforms Moncada into an automated, 
regulated subject.  When Moncada is visited by the Wanderer in the dungeons of the 
Inquisition they are on the same footing—he, like the Wanderer, experiences an 
alienation where he “neither thought, nor felt, nor lived” (111). 
Immalee, the third figure to encounter the Wanderer, begins in a Rousseau-like 
state of nature; however, her education at the hands of the Wanderer, and her re-entry 
into European society, ultimately engender her temporal alienation.  Immalee, while still 
on her isle, “took ‘no note of time;’ and the tale of yesterday or the record of past 
centuries, were synchronized in a mind to which facts and dates were alike unknown” 
(331).  Despite this, soon after the Wanderer commences his visits to Immalee she is 
cast into a sequential temporality that frames time as external and irreversible loss.  
Upon waiting for the Wanderer, “she changed her drapery of flowers every day, and 
never thought them fresh after the first hour,” and she “wept over the withered fruit” 
when “the time . . . passed over without the arrival of the stranger” (321).  While still on 
the island, time has become an irreversible movement that confounds individual efforts.  
Later, after Immalee has been restored to her Spanish family and plans to escape with 
the Wanderer, she is entrenched more completely is the temporality of modernity.  The 
escape is indexed in the language of clock time: “twelve was the hour at which Melmoth 
had promised to meet her, and by the clock, which was placed over the door of the hall, 
she saw it wanted but a quarter to twelve.  The hand moved on—it arrived at the 
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hour—the clock struck” (581).  However, it is Immalee’s eventual confinement in the 
disciplinary dungeons of the Inquisition, where she finds herself after she gives birth to 
her and the Wanderer’s daughter, that truly interpolates her into a structured 
temporality.  In the Inquisition Immalee finds a world governed by clocks and 
administrative procedure.  The “hour” of her examination is announced by a tolling bell, 
and an “account” of her infant’s death is demanded by the Inquisitors in “four-and-
twenty hours” (589).  Additionally, the Inquisitors are “automaton like,” and “their 
movements appeared the result of mere mechanism” (593).  Entombed in the dungeon, 
where the Wanderer appears to Immalee for the last time, Immalee is thus removed 
from her own temporality and cast into an administrative temporal monotony, wherein 
the approach of “midnight” is “unknown in that place, where day and night are the 
same” (594). 
 The fourth narrative of the Wanderer, found in The Tale of Guzman’s Family, 
centers upon Walberg and his family, whose own Protestant modernity, when 
beleaguered by hardship, converts their quasi-spiritual and productive timekeeping into 
an alienating structure, and recasts the family as uprooted wanderers.  The German 
Protestant Walbergs maintain a life structured by time.  Upon hearing “the clock strike 
the hour at which [Walberg] had been always accustomed, in prosperity or adversity, to 
summon his family to prayer” he makes “a signal which all his children understood” 
(451-452).  But this time-bound Protestantism shifts for the Walbergs, after finding 
themselves disinherited by Walberg’s brother-in-law Guzman.  While awaiting news of 
their expected inheritance, “the family returned to their apartment, and for some hours 
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sat in profound silence, interrupted only by the ticking of the clock, which was distinctly 
and solely heard, and which seemed too loud to their quickened ears, amid that deep 
stillness on which it broke incessantly” (456).  The family moves from striving for the 
productive use of time, to simply passing time as a measured sequence—they move 
from being subjects of clock time to objects.  The poverty that besets the family after 
they are fraudulently denied Guzman’s estate casts the family into “a withering 
monotony in the diary of misery,” where “one day telleth another” (464).  Their poverty 
forces the children to embark on “wretched precarious errands,” and converts the 
children into “young wanderers” (471).  Each canvasses the city searching for 
sustenance, and at the end of each day as “night came on,” “the wanderers returned 
slowly one by one” (472).  Indeed, it is Walberg’s own wander that leads him to 
encounter the “enemy of man” with “two burning eyes” that is the Wanderer (474).  
“Every night since our late distresses,” Walberg confesses to his wife Ines, “I have 
wandered out in search of some relief” (473).  The Walbergs are ultimately saved when 
Guzman’s will is revealed a forgery, but Walberg “shudders with horror when he recalls 
the fearful temptations of the stranger, whom he met in his nightly wanderings in the 
hour of his adversity” (482-3). 
 Finally, in The Lovers’ Tale, Elinor like the others, also falls prey to an excess of 
individualism that aligns her to the Wanderer.  Her meeting with the Wanderer is 
prefigured by her own experience of dejection.  Elinor is consumed by a “mortal 
disease,” and lives “like those sufferers in eastern prisons, who are not allowed to taste 
food unless mixed with poison” after she find herself jilted at the altar (543).  The 
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experience untethers Elinor, and “a year after” Elinor returns to her Puritanical aunt in 
Yorkshire to live the life of an austere Protestantism structured by clock.  Her Puritanical 
aunt “rose at a fixed hour, —at a fixed hour she prayed, —at a fixed hour received the 
godly friends who visited her, and whose existence was as monotonous and apathetic as 
her own, —at a fixed hour she dined, —and at a fixed hour she prayed again, and then 
retired” (529).  The sustained repetition of “fixed” stresses the routinized and 
regimented existence of Puritanical life.  Indeed, this life of “mere mechanism” converts 
Elinor into a dispossessed wanderer, as the “two figures were seen to walk, or rather 
wander almost every evening” (529, 526).  Structure and regiment have replaced 
meaning and significance for Elinor, and her wander indexes her disconnection from a 
more organic, intuitive existence.  Upon later returning to Mortimer castle, Elinor 
continues to “wander among the woods” (544).  Indeed, Elinor’s depressive state is 
presented as an erroneous act of wander, that has led her astray from her own 
particular path: “when life and passion have thus rejected us, the backward steps we 
are compelled to tread towards the path we have wandered from, are ten thousand 
times more torturing and arduous” (531-2).  When Elinor eventually encounters the 
Wanderer she is in a state of “deep dejection,” as the caretaker of a now senseless 
Sandal; and soon after their encounter, she and the Wanderer wander together 
“inseparable in their evening walks” (554).  The Wanderer finds in Elinor a member of 
his tribe—they are each hidebound, chronological subjects. 
The refusal of Stanton, Moncada, Immalee, Walberg, and Elinor to succumb to 
the Wanderer carries out the novel’s critique of this temporal mode and the itinerant 
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wander it gives rise to.  Botting suggests that the universal resistance to the Wanderer’s 
offer reflects a naturalized, unmovable Protestantism.  Botting writes, “Melmoth is a 
particularly unsuccessful tempter, a victory perhaps for the personal faith engendered 
by the Reformation” (70).  Similarly, Ashley Marshall finds in the victims’ refusal to give 
in to temptation the novel’s commitment to an unshakable Protestantism.  Marshall 
states, “each plot features a righteous but tormented individual who, after Melmoth’s 
appearance, affirms the inadequacy of institutional religion . . . and the primacy of a 
faith which supersedes all temporal bounds” (123).  In “refusing Melmoth,” Marshall 
continues, “the protagonists all embrace private spiritual conviction” (125).  The novel 
does espouse a natural Protestantism in its sustained critique of organized religion, but 
the very language of the Wanderer’s offer moves beyond the realm of spiritual 
salvation.  The Wanderer’s bargain reads more like the language of bourgeois contract 
law, than it does a satanic pact.  The Wanderer explains to John Melmoth and Moncada, 
near the novel’s end, “it has been said that this power was accorded to me, that I might 
be enabled to tempt wretches in their fearful hour of extremity, with the promise of 
deliverance and immunity, on condition of their exchanging situations with me” (601).  
The terms and conditions that pervade his power echo the language of contract law.  
This is furthered by the Wanderer’s emphasis upon the willing consent of his victims. 
The Wanderer states “none can participate in my destiny but with his own consent—
none have consented—none can be involved in its tremendous penalties, but by 
participation.  I alone must sustain the penalty” (601).  The emphasis upon consent and 
penalization figures the Wanderer and his bargain as signs of a bourgeois modernity, in 
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which rational parties contractually determine their fates.  The Wanderer’s deal in itself 
makes manifest the movement into modernity his victims are each about to make. 
If the Wanderer “exposes rather than embodies the threats to humanity” (126) 
as Marshall claims, then Melmoth the Wanderer stands as a cautionary tale against an 
encroaching modernity that carries with it the risk of dispossession and alienation.  Jack 
Null observes how “the disjunction of the chronology and the fragmentation of the plot 
into tales reflect a world in great upheaval, a world become madhouse in which the 
characters search, aimlessly and unsuccessfully, for selfhood, sanity, and salvation” 
(137).  The novel’s breakdown of a cohesive narrative structure underscores this 
fragmenting worldview, wherein sustaining narratives of nation, religion, and history are 
less and less tenable.  Indeed, Null finds this breakdown of social relations to be taking 
place in the novel at the most immediate level.  Null argues that “each tale explores the 
motif of the disintegration of the family unit” where “the ties that bind have frazzled 
and been replaced by chains of greed, sadism, revenge, and perverted religious 
doctrines” (140, 141).  The “real enemy of man,” Null argues, is not a satanic figure of 
evil but the “monotonous and unquestioned habits of thought and the state of 
psychological despair brought on by such vacant habit” that “produces apathy and an 
insensitivity of the heart” (147).  The Wanderer reveals the detachment and 
estrangement of just such a life.  Mark Hennelly similarly demonstrates how the novel 
functions as a warning against a mechanized existence by claiming that it stands as a 
“prefiguration of modern existentialism” (669).  Hennelly shows how “social and 
religious role-playing and overreaching monomania” function in the novel to “strangle 
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personal freedom and authenticity” (677).  Hennelly asserts that the victims’ 
commitment to their fates signals the novel’s own commitment to a more local and 
immediate life.  The fact that “all the existential sufferers whom the Wanderer tempts 
say no to him and yes to the pain of their existence,” Hennelly writes, reflects a 
“humanistic commitment . . . to the problematic nature of existence” (678).  The novel 
thus stands as a “warning against the life of empty routine and listlessness” (Null 147). 
 Melmoth the Wanderer presents this warning in large part through the formal 
critique it makes of history as a sweeping and developmental narrative.  Victor Sage 
argues that the novel radically presents history as a collection of discontinuous and 
disparate socio-cultural contexts in its heterogeneous and multitudinous form.  Sage 
shows how Maturin’s account of history is directly opposed to Walter Scott’s, who had 
supported Maturin as “both patron and agent” (x).  Scott’s mode of historical romance 
“creates the fiction of an even, panoptical survey of its materials,” and makes use of an 
“Enlightenment narrative persona” to provide an “informed and rational overview” (xi).  
History in Scott’s hands is a contained, coherent and “steadily cumulative process with 
linear narrative as its point of overlap” (xix).  Melmoth the Wanderer, however, presents 
history as that which is constituted by contextual difference, which the novel’s fractured 
and fragmented form demonstrates.  In colonized Ireland, “there is no life in this history, 
only slaughter and famine, only another version of the omnipresent ‘ruins of empire’” 
(121).  David Punter argues similarly that Maturin repurposes the Gothic to counteract 
hegemonic historical narratives, and to articulate the consciousness of colonization.  
Punter claims that “the dehumanizing force in Gothic . . . is brought into alignment, 
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direct or indirect, with that power which reduces or dismembers the national narrative 
of a people operating under a sign of subjugation” (122).  Although the “Gothic began as 
a mode of dealing with the past . . . in the contexts of Scotland and Ireland . . . that past 
looks all too often as though it has already been appropriated by another, as though the 
story of one’s own nation has already ceased to be one’s own to tell” (122).  The novel’s 
“sense of temporal complication,” and its “looping of time,” thus offset the totalizing 
historical narrative that colonialism depends upon (113, 114).  “The larger dehumanizing 
forces of history, religion, and ideology,” Punter argues, “menace human authenticity 
with a different story, a narrative of conquest and subjugation within which individuals 
are mere puppets” (121). 
 In counteracting hegemonic historical narrative, the novel’s form strives to carve 
out a space for “human authenticity.”  Kathleen Fowler argues that the novel’s 
“labyrinth” structure—its “unanswered questions and unexplained contradictions”—
and its narratives “left disturbingly incomplete,” represent a formal call for an active, 
moral reader engagement (525).  Fowler asserts that the novel anticipates and 
encourages the reader’s reassembly of its fractured and fragmented narratives forged 
upon the reader’s willing and Christian faith.  Fowler states, “Maturin, in effect, asks us 
to create the novel with him, or even, for him,” an act which reveals how “we cannot 
reconstruct a coherent novel for Maturin . . . unless we bond all of the pieces together 
with a faith in God which can re-unify the world and the novel” (538).   
Laura Doyle similarly finds in Melmoth the Wanderer a call to reassert human 
connection and understanding over and against a totalizing, hegemonic historical 
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narrative.  Doyle argues that the novel attempts to offset and attenuate the 
“traumatized geostructure” of colonial modernity through its very form (530).  Doyle 
states, “its narrative form” represents “a phenomenology of collectively lived and told 
history that establishes principles for the repair of history” (530).  The novel’s form, “in 
which one story contains another, and that contains one another still, is on closer look 
the structure of a pained dialectic of telling and listening, of seeking witness and giving 
witness,” which effectively critiques dominant and dominating narratives of history as 
they underwrite and authorize modernity (530).  “The whole of Maturin’s novel,” Doyle 
observes, “issues from those who have witnessed the traumas endemic to 
coloniality/modernity” (542).  The act of conveying what one has witnessed, which the 
novel formalizes, revalues individual and particular experience across hegemonic lines.  
Doyle writes, 
Just as the Catholic Moncada’s escape requires that he record the stories 
that the Jewish Adonijah has harbored and carried all his life, waiting for 
one who could translate them for a European audience, so too does 
Anglo-Irish Protestant John Melmoth’s future depend upon listening to 
Moncada the Catholic Spaniard.  And so perhaps might Maturin have felt 
that his readers’ futures depended on their listening to the Wanderer’s 
story. (545) 
This kind of cross-cultural listening disrupts the coherence of dominating historical 
narratives as they strive to encode a colonial modernity forged upon a singular, 
teleological history.  
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 I argue the novel’s critique of hegemonic history extends to a critique of the 
external, quantified, and sequential temporality of modernity.  The universal refusal of 
the Wanderer’s pact signifies the rejection of this alienating time frame.  Marshall 
Brown observes how each victim shifts from being “literally chained to a point in space 
and figuratively chained to the weary succession of hours,” to being “released into a 
limbo, uprooted and driven out into a world seemingly beyond space and time” through 
their meeting with the Wanderer (285).  Brown goes on to argue that each of the victims 
can respond to this “disorientation” either by opting for “madness,” by following 
“Melmoth into sin,” or by selecting the third response, “which is the only valid one” 
(285).  Brown writes, 
That is, to regenerate from within, even in the absence of any objects of 
experience, what Kant calls the pure forms of apperception that make 
experience possible.  Just as for Kant and his followers the beginning of 
experience is the inner sense, the sense of time, so, too, time is the 
foundation and the saving limit of the gothic victim’s experience when all 
else is lost. (286) 
Only through reconnecting and reclaiming temporality as it is individually and 
organically constituted and embodied can the Wanderer and the dominating, singular 
version of history he represents be counteracted.  I argue the novel does posit a form of 
temporal renewal; however, it does not advocate this renewal as an individuated 
process.  Instead, the novel advances a kind of collective temporal reclamation that 
posits the finding of time beyond the confines of the singular subject.  As Doyle states, 
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the novel prescribes a “listening across political, religious, and cultural boundaries”—a 
kind of listening that “contains a promise, but no guarantee, of recovery from the 
nightmare of global history” (545).  
 Melmoth the Wanderer’s conclusion stages exactly this kind of inter-subjective 
listening, but it does so through a movement that is akin to anti-wandering.  The end of 
the novel follows John Melmoth and Moncada as they themselves follow the 
Wanderer’s tracks out of the family estate—out of the prescribed demarcations of 
colonized space—and effectively out of the limits of the Gothic novel itself.  The 
Wanderer, having returned to the family estate, announces to John Melmoth and 
Moncada that “his wanderings are over,” and requests solitude “for the few last hours 
of [his] mortal existence” (601, 605).  Upon entering the apartment the Wanderer had 
retired to, and finding “not a vestige of its last inhabitant,” John Melmoth and Moncada 
notice a “small door” that “communicated with a back staircase,” on which “they 
discovered the traces of footsteps that appeared to those of a person who had been 
walking in damp sand or clay” (606).  The two follow the Wanderer’s tracks out of the 
confines of the estate, and, indeed, out of the confines of the state itself, as “they 
traced the footmarks distinctly through the narrow gravel walk, which was terminated 
by a broken fence, and opened on a heathy field which spread half-way up a rock whose 
summit overlooked the sea” (606).  The Wanderer is, in the end, a series of 
demarcations in the physical landscape—a residue of history itself.  The two observe 
that, “there was a kind of tract as if a person had dragged, or been dragged, his way 
through it” (606).  The word “tract” is telling, as it stresses the Wanderer’s own 
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textuality and discursivity, which the two now read in the land.  Unlike wander, John 
Melmoth and Moncada’s joint act of following the Wanderer’s tracks is a movement 
that reconnects them to the politicized and historicized space that runs from the ocean, 
through the land, and up to the colonial estate.  It is a movement that is at once a 
repetition and a revelation of how this space is politically and historically structured.  
Moreover, their act of anti-wander works to reconnect them to their own temporality.  
The “last trace of the Wanderer” the two discern is “the handkerchief which the 
Wanderer had worn about his neck the preceding night,” which they find “on a crag 
beneath them” “hung as floating to the blast,” and which John Melmoth “clambered 
down and caught” (607, 606-607).  This final act of retrieval figures an overcoming of 
historical and spatial limitations.  The retrieval of the hanging handkerchief—suspended 
as it is between time and space—halts the pursuit of the Wanderer and of his 
significance.  By catching the handkerchief John Melmoth and Moncada bring an end to 
the ceaseless wandering that has affected its owner and threatened those he has 
encountered.  The final lines of the novel, in which “Melmoth and Moncada exchanged 
looks of silent and unutterable horror, and returned slowly home,” attest to this (607).  
After the “horror” is the slow return home, a return that oversees a reconnection to 
time as it might be more locally and collectively understood. 
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Chapter Six: 
 
Conclusion: The Warning of Wander 
 
 
As an unstructured and unguided movement wander becomes the means 
through which Romanticism paces the unsteady ground of modernity.  The rational, 
instrumental, and bureaucratic element of modernity, that which interpolates subjects 
into the Blakean “mind-forg’d manacles,” is represented through the experience of 
aimless, displaced, and uprooted wander.  However, modernity as the deliverer of 
transformation and liberation, as that which frees up bodies from traditional, stifling 
modes of being, be they cultural, economic, political, or spiritual, is figured as an open, 
unregulated, and joyous wander.  I have argued that this duality of wander is a 
reflection of the historical shift towards the temporality of modernity, which occurred 
with pronounced acuity in Great Britain over the course of the eighteenth-century.  The 
increasingly time-bound Britain supplanted more traditional reckonings of time 
(seasonal, cultural, and economical) with the more singular, authority of the clock.  Such 
a shift, as shown above, at once freed time, as a discrete and autonomous space 
available for fulfillment, but also reconfigured time as a new frame of being in and of 
itself, wherein one remains beholden to, and hanging upon, an endless chain of 
sequential, homogeneous moments.  The two versions of Romantic wander, wander as 
freeing and wander as alienating, each perform a valence of this temporality, and 
moreover, a valence of modernity itself. 
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The bifurcation of wander I identify reduces down to a rhetoric, in the case of 
free and open wander, and a praxis or an embodied experience, in the case of alienated 
wander.  Free wander exists, more often than not, as an assertion or desire, if not an 
injunction.  Positive, free wander, as it is asserted in The Excursion and as it is tried 
briefly in The Wanderer, is more rhetorical than it is attainable.  The Excursion advances 
wander not only as the movement of a free and virtuous life, but as the antidote to the 
upheavals of modernity.  Despite this, The Excursion reveals wander to be a rarified 
endeavor, and, moreover, lets slip the work the rhetoric of wander does towards the 
promotion of the disciplinary directive to engage in the productive expenditure of time.  
The rhetorical promotion of free wander undertaken, chiefly, by the Poet and the 
Wanderer aims to keep modernity at bay, whether it is the spectre of industrialization 
looming on the horizon of the poem’s pastoral space, or the crippling solipsism already 
infecting those at its core.  However, as I have argued, the rhetoric of wander in The 
Excursion is difficult to maintain.  The Solitary returns home without having been 
unequivocally won over, and the sad wandering of Robert and Margaret leave a rift in 
The Excursion too deep for the Poet and the Wanderer’s assertions to paper over.   
Burney’s The Wanderer pivots away from the asserted rhetorical positioning of 
wander as freeing, to reveal the class and gender privilege that underpins such a 
rhetoric, in its detailing of Juliet’s experience.  Without name or connection Juliet strives 
to sustain herself in a provincial Britain that is suspended between an aristocratic 
economy of patronage and a rising bourgeois capitalism.  Juliet’s rational economic 
practices are continuously upended by this tension, and by the pronounced patriarchal 
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double standards that condition both aristocratic and bourgeois modes of economic 
exchange.  As a result, she is forced ultimately to seek anonymity as she wanders to and 
through the New Forest.  Wander for Juliet is neither bucolic nor freeing, but a forced, 
rough, dangerous, and isolating endeavour.  Furthermore, nature, and the rural way of 
life, is far more inhospitable and predatory than it is a restorative balm.  Indeed, Juliet’s 
experience of rustic wander leads her to question and rebuke the urban fictions that 
praise rural life.  Juliet’s experience of alienated wander, as both a pejorative 
designation she endures while attempting to sustain herself economically, and as the 
actual state she comes to assume as she flees detection, calls attention to how the 
rhetoric of free wander is necessarily contingent upon class and gender privilege.  To be 
sure, when Juliet’s name and history are eventually disclosed, and the protection of the 
patriarchal aristocratic establishment has been secured, Juliet is afforded the space and 
time to wander; but this space is, of course, heavily circumscribed, and narrows further 
at the novel’s end to the confines of Harleigh Hall.  
The Rime of the Ancient Mariner recounts an historical shift into modernity and 
details the resulting experience as that of isolated and monotonous wander.  The 
voyage inaugurates the transition from the medieval and premodern world of the 
Mariner and his crew greeting the Albatross in Christian fellowship, to the singularized, 
schematized, and rationalized world of modernity that glides into view with the 
irreversible arrow of the Mariner’s crossbow.  The Mariner’s abrupt and singular act of 
volition seems a shock, and yet it is commensurate with the project of naval expedition 
and colonization his voyage signifies.  The Mariner’s irreversible act oversees his 
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transition into modernity, a shift that converts his crew, who necessarily remain 
collective, into ghosts of the past.  Alone, the Mariner experiences the world through a 
quantified domain of time and space—overwrought and mechanistic.  The Mariner’s 
return recasts him as a similarly automated subject; one who circulates endlessly, 
marked by an irreversible historical narrative he is compelled to recount.  His ceaseless, 
punctuated and punctual wander performs his membership in the temporality and 
subjectivity of modernity. 
 Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer similarly outlines the experience of alienated 
and uprooted wander; however, there is less pathos for the Wanderer than there is for 
Coleridge’s Mariner.  More knowing and Faustian than the Mariner, the Wanderer has 
brokered an infernal deal to extend his life for a period of 150 years, and has, in effect, 
transposed his own organic life for a purely sequential span of years.  The Wanderer, 
brother of a Cromwellian colonist, and a product of the turbulent early modernity of the 
mid- to late-seventeenth century, freely circulates time and space—a detached, 
wandering spectator of history.  Despite the powers that attend this virtual subject of 
modernity, the Wanderer spends his time searching out other would-be transgressors 
with whom he might exchange fates.  The figures he finds are all somewhat of his tribe, 
as they each teeter on the brink of modernity themselves.  Stanton, the Enlightenment 
observer on a grand tour; Moncada, who resists the monastic order and recounts the 
madness and violence of its proto-bureaucratic logic; Immalee, the Rousseauian, 
paradisal figure, whom the Wanderer schools in the impure history of the world, and 
who later also bears witness to the bureaucratic torturous-ness of the Inquisition; 
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Walberg, the methodical German Protestant; and Elinor, the solipsistic Calvinist, are all 
proto-modern subjects who likewise experience the isolation and atomization of 
modernity.  The Wanderer’s wander signifies a local, cultural and historical 
displacement, the trauma and menace of which is enough to halt the tentative steps of 
those who would follow. 
 I have argued that free wander and alienated wander each perform a response 
to a different valence of the temporality of modernity; however, both iterations of 
wander, in both of their responses to the temporality of modernity, strive to offset and 
attenuate the displacement and anomie modernity threatens to usher in.  The 
Excursion, The Wanderer, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, and Melmoth the Wanderer 
each display abject and solitary wanderers—figures who have been displaced by the 
torrent of history, like Robert and Margaret and the Solitary and Juliet, as well as those 
who have embodied and subsequently rued the Faustian spirit of the age, like the 
Mariner and the Wanderer.  In The Excursion free wander is advanced over and against 
the dangers of displacement, enclosure, industrialization, and a crippling solipsism.  To 
wander is to oppose the regimentation and instrumentalism that threatens long-held 
freedoms.  In The Wanderer wander becomes an abject movement; or, rather, the 
movement of the abject, as Juliet, washed ashore by the turbulence of the French 
Revolution, is neither capable of establishing herself in the confines of a traditional 
society rigorously policing its boundaries, or in the nascent bourgeois economy.  Her 
wander performs the burden of this disjunction and displacement.  The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner and Melmoth the Wanderer demonstrate how alienated and 
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monotonous wander is the result of the seizure of the stance of modernity.  The 
Mariner and the Wanderer fall headlong into a schematized and isolating world through 
their respective acts of individualism (as the Wanderer’s near victims almost do), and 
their near-interminable wander becomes the deadening march of a virtual, modern 
subjectivity, disjointed from organic life.  Wander is used, whether positively or 
negatively, as a means of redressing the trauma of modernity.  Whether asserted as a 
rhetoric, even a rhetoric that dovetails into a programmatic liberalism, or exhibited as a 
privileged rhetoric with diminishing returns, or displayed as a painful and isolating 
residue, wander becomes the means through which the perceived dangers of modernity 
might be articulated and overcome. 
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